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WHITHER WOMAN?

A Critical Study
of
The Social Life and Thought
of
THE WESTERN WOMAN

By

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THE POPULAR BOOK DEPOT

LAMINGTON ROAD, BOMBAY.

TO THE SACRED MEMORY OF MY MOTHER

PREFACE

Woman's fight for freedom has perceptibly changed the fabric of social philosophy in the West. The recognition, full and complete, of her equal status with man in the fields of social, political and legal rights has given modern woman unprecedented courage and confidence. She has begun experimenting in these new spheres with an attitude that has produced remarkable results on her relation to society.

The Woman Movement presents a virile picture worthy of study. Its hifurcation into two streams of English and Scandinavian feminism, each representing an independent ideology, has given rise to various complicated problems. Are man and woman the same in the domains of mental and intellectual qualities? Does the fulfilment of woman's personality require the same pursuits as man in the fields of educational and economic activities? Do the conventional standards of Western morality enrich the erotic life of woman? What ideal of marriage fulfils the demands of the Western woman? Is the ideal of motherhood compatible with the equality ideal of the Western woman? These and several other points formed the subject matter of research carried out by me for the M.A. degree under the kind and expert guidance of Professor G. S. Ghurye, Head of the Sociology Department of the Bombay University. The present work is a revised version of the thesis then written.

My heart-felt thanks are due to Mr. P. N. Warde, M.A., B.Com. for kindly going through the proofs. I also acknowledge my indebt-edness to the University of Bombay, for the substantial financial help it has granted towards the cost of the publication of this book.

Bombay Y. M. REGE



CONTENTS

PART I

WOMAN IN THE MAKING—HER EMERGENCE FROM SUBJECTION TO COMRADESHIP

1	PAGE
CHAPTER I.—WOMAN'S ROLE IN ANTIQUITY	3
All revolution is evolution, so has been woman's revolution since the last century—To appreciate this revolution we must trace the whole evolution of woman in history. Woman in primitive times—The earliest woman, the equal of the earliest man—The causes that subsequently led to her subordinate position—Why we estimate the primitive woman's position as unsatisfactory. Note on Mother-Right Institution:—Why we started with patriarchal organisation—Mother-right organisation among primitive people—Mother-right and not matriarchy—Views of McLennan, Hartland, Crawley, Westermarck, Hobhouse, Briffault, Ronhaar—Our conclusions.	
CHAPTER IIWOMAN IN GREEK AND ROMAN TIMES	23
In the days of the Greeks—Social position of woman unsatisfactory—Various causes—Story of Hipparete—A glimpse into contemporary opinion—Plato—Aristotle—Xenophon. The splendour of Rome—The institution of PATER FAMILIAS and its influence upon woman's position. Woman in the days of the Republic—Her position in society and at law. Great transformation in woman's position in the palmy days of the Empire—New type of marriage—Woman's emancipation—Woman's emancipation and the fall of Rome.	
CHAPTER III.—WOMAN IN THE MIDDLE AGES	47
I.—In the whole story of woman the period between 500 to the close of 1100 A.D. has left a blank—Ascetic ideas of Christianity—Its. influence upon woman's position—Woman's position in the home and society. An age when reason was in prison—Adverse effects on woman's position—Her education. II.—Later Middle Ages like a rift in the clouded skies—Glorious days of Chivalry—Rise of metaphysical love and "deification" of woman—Woman's position retrieved.	

CHAPTER IV.—THE WOMAN MOVEMENT	68
I.—Deification of woman carried to ridiculous extent upto the middle of the last century—Writings of Swift, Fielding and others—Social conception of woman—Rousseau's ideas. II.—Wave of change in the political and social life of Europe since the close of the 18th century—Rise of philanthropic and humanist movements—Industrial Revolution gives an impetus to these movements in the following centuries—Woman Movement, a full flowering of these movements. The earliest thread in the fabric of this movement in the writing of Wollstonecraft—"A Vindication of the Rights of Women," a fearless exposition of social injustice to woman. Organised movement from 1838—Support of Mill—His Subjection of Women—His amendment to the Reform Bill of 1867—Its failure. Formation of a Women's Suffrage Committee (1880)—Great hopes with the introduction of the Reform Bill of 1884—Amendment of Women's Suffrage defeated—A great disappointment. Mr. Begg's Women's Suffrage Bill (1897)—A theoretical victory—Rise of the Militants (1903)—Woman Suffrage becomes a country-wide interest from 1906—The Mud March of 1907. Suffragists split up into two rival organisations—Conciliation Bill (1910)—Anti-suffrage societies. Great hopes when the Reform Bill was introduced (1912)—Its fiasco—Militant violences—Arrest and imprisonment of Mrs. Pankhurst—The historic pilgrim. Suspension of activities during the War—Woman proves her worth—The Representation of the People Bill passed (1918). Achievements of the Woman Movement. Enthusiasm carried to fanaticism—Wide divergence between the ideals of English and Scandinavian feminists—Need of re-orientation of ideals.	
PART II	
WOMAN CHALLENGES SEXUAL ETHICS	
	116
It is difficult to define the scope and object of morality—Different morality in different places and in different times. Morality in popular parlance—Religion and morality—Western morality is a product of age-long custom sanctioned by religion—As such it is regarded as inviolable and absolute. Western sexual morality alike is founded on tradition and religious superstition—Its dogmatic nature—Woman the worst sufferer under this superstitious morality—Her revolt—Her demands.	

I.—Social treatment of the unmarried mother is a glaring example of the irrationality and injustice of the traditional

.. 136

CHAPTER VI.—PRUDISH SEXUAL ETHICS (Continued)

sexual morality—Sufferings of the unmarried mother and her	
child. Healthy motherhood deserves social respect—The channel	
through which it occurs is none of its concerns.	
II.—The hush-hush morality with regard to sex is predominantly observed in the case of children—Child and sexual life—Freud's revolutionary discoveries—Hush-hush morality and girls—The effect of their blind ignorance on their sexual life. The necessity of imparting sex education to children, especially to girls—the source from which this should proceed—The form in which it should be given. The fear that sex education will awaken unnatural interest is misplaced—Various testimonies—Responsibilities of sex-educators,	
CHAPTER VII.—MARRIAGE ON THE CROSS?	154
I.—Traditional solution of the problem of sex-relationship in terms of marriage is disfavoured by modern women. Christian sexual ethics form the basis of the modern institution of marriage in the West—Greek view of marriage—Roman view—Ascetic ideas of Christianity and their influence upon marriage institution upto 1857—The Act of 1857—The Act of 1923. —Why woman disfavours the present marriage institution—The travesty of her sexual life—Ellen Key's radical demands—Advocacy of 'free love' and 'free divorce'—All sex-intercourse a	
personal affair until a child is born—Westermarck's discoveries	
support these demands.	
A categorical case of a woman fully illustrates the radical demands of modern woman—Dora Russell's views—Views of Marie Stopes.	
Advocacy of the new type of sexual relationship has found its champions among social thinkers and sexologists—Views of Spencer—August Forel—Iwan Bloch—Havelock Ellis—Edward Carpenter—Bertrand Russell—Hobhouse—Wells.	
The new type of marriage that woman is evolving will be in	
the interests of society and the individual. II.—The new type of marriage is made possible through contraceptive methods—Christian opprobrium of these methods—Contraception, a woman's problem.	
CHAPTER VIII.—MORALS IN DISSOLUTION? (EPILOGUE TO	
PART II)	192
Morality must harmonise social welfare with individual good— Researches in psycho-analysis etc., a new light on sex-life—	

Importance of the individual—Doctrines of Nietzsche—Morality, a choice of the individual—Woman is not leading the West to moral degradation—Moral aberrations in some cases no cause for fear—Evolution, the Law.

PART III MISGUIDED IDEALS

CHAPTER IX.—EDUCATIONAL IDEALS	205
English Feminists' demand for the same education as given to men requires impartial criticism. Does woman differ from man—Physical differences patent—Are there psychological differences also?—Views of educationists and psychologists. Does woman require different education in the light of these views?—Other grounds for differentiating educational curriculum. Bad effects of male-like education on the health of girls—Marriage and fecundity of educated women. The system of female education on proper lines in Denmark, Sweden, Czechoslovakia and Germany.	
CHAPTER X.—PARASITISM FALLACY AND THE CALL OF MOTHERHOOD	243
Woman's demand for all labour to become her province—Miscalculation of woman's nature and mission—The effects of various kinds of labour especially factory labour on the health of women—Its effects upon maternity—Large toll of infant mortality—Equality ideals carried to fanaticism. Back to motherhood—Ideals of Scandinavian feminism—Importance of the role of mother—Motherhood, a supreme function—Enlightened motherhood and its vivifying effects on the home	
and society. Social responsibilities towards motherhood—Endowment of motherhood—Wife's right to a share in the family income—Economic 'freedom,' and not economic 'independence.'	
CHAPTER XI.—IN THE WAKE OF EMANCIPATION (Conclusion)	272

WHITHER WOMAN?

PART I

WOMAN IN THE MAKING

CHAPTER I

WOMAN'S ROLE IN ANTIQUITY

T

HISTORY is a record of human evolution; and the revolutions that one meets within its priceless records have been and will remain to be a definite step towards evolution. If man, according to Rousseau—and why not woman too—is born free, when he finds himself everywhere in chains, he (and she too) resents, struggles and revolts. This, in short, is the psychology of all revolutions and movements. Looked at from this point of view, historical records provide us with a testimony no less stern than it is ample that all revolutions and movements have their roots in discontent. The idea of free dom being deeply rooted in every heart, once the conscience becomes awakened to it and finds itself in bondage, man or woman will not stop short until the ideal of freedom is achieved for the best expression of the inner self.

The social and political life of the civilised world became flashed with new ideas, new visions and new ideals with the 'Declaration of the Rights of Man,' which revolutionised the whole outlook of human life. With their slogans of equality, liberty and fraternity the common folk of France challenged the whole aristocracy for its despotism and tyranny, and ultimately not without inhumanities, brutalities and embitterments natural on such occasions, established in their nation a rule in which all have a voice and share and under which there is perfect freedom and equality of opportunity.

These new social doctrines and philosophies that inspired the French Revolution and brought it to a successful close became so very infused in the whole social life of Europe, that not a generation had passed when the world full of curiosity,

^{1.} Wollstonecraft's A Vindication of the Rights of Women was first published in 1792.

amazement and wonder not unmixed with detestation, ridicule and horror saw the soft, tender and trembling hand of woman rising above the commonplace conventions and traditions and demanding with a feeble but emphatic voice: Give me my proper place.—I refer to the Woman Movement.

The germ of the Woman Movement thus lies in the dissatisfaction of the intelligentsia among the women of the nineteenth century Europe, who found themselves in social and legal fetters that denied them a free and separate existence apart from men. The attitude of the Church, law and society towards woman was incompatible with the growing ideas of equality and freedom, and also the exigencies consequent upon the Industrial Revolution. Before we study the actual position of women, the inhibition, checks, restraints and restrictions to which they were subject which led to the genesis of a momentous, far-reaching and historical movement, we ought, for a full understanding of its import and significance, to trace their position from the dim dawn of humanity down to the present times.

Symbolically Eve begins the Woman Movement. In her tasting of the fruit of knowledge, she resents and repudiates Adam's authority to dictate to her. She would not allow Adam to keep her in blind ignorance, and the inherent human passion for knowledge animates her to override his prohibition—with whatever consequences. If thereby she has brought the 'Fall of Man,' a legend which the Church fathers have almost made into a text-book for the disparagement of womanhood, she has nevertheless opened for him the fountain of knowledge and thus made clear for him the way to rise.

H

It is wrong to conceive that the position of woman in primitive times was one of absolute subjection and indifference, though one has to admit after weighing all evidence together that it was far from satisfactory. There is much ground to believe that the earliest woman was the equal of the earliest man in energy, skill and ability, and even in physical proportions, strength and capacity. Even today among some primitive races woman is as strong and muscular as man. In some cases she is even taller, more muscular and superior in body-

build. The various authorities brought together by Briffault¹ support this view. Thus to cite a few cases, the women of Ashanti are of a stronger make than the men. The Wateita women are more muscularly developed than the men. Bishilanga women are more muscular than men; and in Dahomey the women are taller, muscular and broader than the men. As regards physical strength and capacity the Kikuvu women carry loads which would try a Kikuyu man's strength. Manyema women of the Congo can carry loads as heavy as those of the men and with as much ease. A crew of Dayak women can beat a crew of Malay men. The loads which Melanesian women carry present a marvellous sight. Not only are the primitive women sometimes equal to men in physical strength and capacity, but at times they resemble men so completely that it goes difficult to identify the sex of an individual from the external appearance. Thus among the Bushmen it is often difficult to distinguish the sexes even when the individuals are naked. So also among Bantu races the women cannot be distinguished from men, either by their facial or physical forms. So also with Lower Congo and Wanyamwesi races. Among the Kuki and the Marring tribes it is said that different modes of dressing the hairs were adopted by them so as to make it easy for distinguishing the sexes.

It is not only in physical form that woman was the equal of man; but as remarked in the beginning, she equalled him in energy and skill also. Women as hunters, fishers and warriors are not a rarity among the primitive tribes.² The women of New Spain used to go hunting regularly with the men; and among the Similkamean Indians, women were as good hunters as men. The Fuegian women not only collect shell-fish from the rocks, but go out to sea in canoes which are their exclusive property and conduct operations on a large scale. Among the Tasmanians the women alone dived for fish, and among these people it was the women who performed the remarkable feat of climbing the lofty smooth-trunked gum trees after opossums. In Australia and Africa, as well as among the ancient Celts,

^{1.} See Robert Briffault: The Mothers, Vol. I, pp. 442-447.

^{2.} See Robert Briffault: The Mothers, Vol. I, pp. 444-452; and Havelock Ellis: Man and Woman, p. 2.

Teutons and Slavs, women have fought when necessary, and sometimes even habitually. In the Caroline Islands the women take a share in the war. In the Landrones the women fought under female leaders, and in New Guinea the women take part with the men in war. Among the North American Indians the women frequently accompanied the men in war; and among the Iroquois Indians the women were not only famous for warrior-like abilities, but they were powerful in council also.

Thus we have no ground to believe that in the primitive currents of human life woman was inferior to man¹ in domains of physical and mental capacities. Tacitus, for instance, states distinctly that among the Germans of his time women were on a par with men both in size and strength.²

But this equality would naturally not remain long. The peculiarities of her sexual life from which man is immune became, in a way, 'the biological tragedy of woman,' and made her physically subordinate to man and consequently caused her to depend upon him. The primitive woman, although the equal of man in bodily and mental power, nevertheless became his inferior when the periods of pregnancy, parturition and lactation forced her to look to him for support, assistance and protection. Frequent deliveries weakened her physical strength; and at a time when physical strength was the only measure of respect and the only instrument for overcoming the struggle for existence then in the most virulent, brutal and savage form, she naturally found herself at a great disadvantage. She had, under these circumstances, to yield herself to man and live under his protection. This is the beginning of woman's subordinate position.

It must not be assumed, however, that at this stage the primitive man treated the primitive woman with utter indifference and subjection. While man continued to be militant, the physical handicap reduced woman to a sedentary form of life. But here also woman's genius showed itself. Her creative powers found their expressions in various fields of arts and crafts. Thus there came about a sexual division of labour by

^{1.} See F. Muller-Lyer: The Evolution of Modern Marriage, (1930), pp. 187, 188.

^{2.} See August Bebel: Woman, p. 7.

which man devoted himself to fighting, hunting and fishing while the women took to less exciting and irksome work. She became industrial. Woman, no longer able to accompany man in his militant and other activities, stayed at home, and became the home-maker. She sat by the hearth, cooked his food after stripping off the hide from the game which she converted into leather, went to the field to sow grain,2 prepared granaries to store seed against periods of scarcity and want. Her stationary life opened to her a large field for industrial activities. Out of the skins of beasts and barks of trees she prepared garments for her family. "The results achieved in leather work by savage women," says Briffault, "elicit the admiration of experts." The primitive woman is the original potter.3 Even to-day, to cite only a few instances, the art of pottery is exclusively in the hands of women throughout North America. Central and South America and some parts of the Malay Archipelago and Peninsula, Melanesia and New Guinea. With her inventive genius, the primitive woman overcame the difficulties that she met in the course of her industrial activities. The primitive plough and the primitive mill, where one stone is made to move over another for grinding seeds, owe their birth to her creative genius. The primitive woman with imperfect means to her avail invented the crude spindle,4 the weaving frame, the stone knife, the adz and other implements. Woman was the real home-maker of the primitive society. The primitive huts, tents and portable homes are fashioned by the women. The connection of woman with the cultivation of the soil and the search for edible vegetables and roots made her the first primitive doctor. "....There exists, even among the rudest people, the germ of more rational medicine almost everywhere specially cul-

^{1.} See Robert Briffault: The Mothers, Vol. I, pp. 460-483; Havelock Ellis: Man and Woman, p. 7: and O. T. Mason; The Origins of Inventions—A Study of Industries among Primitive People, (1904), (an interesting account of various industries and crafts practised by savages).

^{2. &}quot;Most of the agriculture is woman's work."—O. T. Mason: The Origins of Inventions, p. 196. Also see pp. 187-203.

^{3.} See O. T. Mason: The Origins of Inventions, pp. 157-182.

^{4. &}quot;Woman also everywhere invented the textile art."—O. T. Mason: The Origins of Inventions, p. 168.

tivated by women." The primitive woman, therefore, can aptly be called "the mother of all spinners, weavers, upholsterers, sail-makers." All the arts, crafts and industries that we see today ramified and developed into a variety of mechanism have their faint idea and origin in the genius of the primitive woman.

Possessed of such industrial abilities as these, it is difficult to believe that woman was, at this stage of civilisation, treated like a slave. On the other hand, it was these industrial abilities of woman that made her into a great economic asset to the family and thus caused her to be looked upon as a "property." It is not, therefore, illogical to presume that the proprietary conception of woman developed side by side with her great industrial abilities.

Though Muller-Lyer's conclusion,³ in the light of an amount of evidence, that the original instincts of humanity were polygamous (polygynous) might be disputed, there is much ground to believe that there was wide prevalence⁴ of polygyny among the primitive people. One of the main causes of polygyny was the attraction of female beauty and youth. When the wife became old, a new one was taken. Even when a man married soon after attaining youth a woman of his age, he might still be in the prime of his life when the youthful beauty of his wife had passed away, in which case another wife was taken. This is true even to-day.⁵ (Karaya of South America, Bushmen, Batwa in North-eastern Rhodesia, Akikuyu, Kunnuvaus,

- 1. Robert Briffault; The Mothers, Vol. I, p. 486.
- 2. Havelock Ellis: Man and Woman, p. 7.
- 3. Muller-Lyer: The Family, (1931), pp. 45-60.
- 4. "In general terms we may say that the permission of polygamy (polygyny) is the rule in all grades of the uncivilised world."—L. T. Hobhouse: Morals in Evolution, p. 141. "As an institution polygyny exists in all parts of the world. There are very few primitive tribes about whom we are informed that a man is not allowed, if he can, to enter into more than one union."—Malinowski, in his article on Marriage in Encyclopædia Britannica, Vol. 14, (Ed. 14), p. 944. "In the lower phases of culture polygyny is, as a rule, much more uniformly distributed."—R. Briffault: The Mothers, Vol. II, p. 272.
- 5. See Westermarck: The History of Human Marriage, Vol. III. Also Westermarck: The Origin and Development of the Moral Ideas, Vol. I, p. 388.

Patagonia, Indians of British Guiana, etc.) Another cause of primitive polygyny was man's taste for variety. The sexual instinct becomes dull by long familiarity and is stimulated by novelty. Sterility of the wife was also one of the prime motives of taking another one.1 (Greenlanders, Chukchee, etc.) But more than all these, economic and social advantages accruing from polygyny account greatly for the polygynous practices among the primitive people. Man in a savage or barbarous state of society is proud of a large family, and he who has most kinsfolk exercises a kind of fear and influence over his people.² (Chippewa, Morocco, some parts of Africa, etc.) Polygyny also contributed greatly to a man's material comfort and increased his wealth through the labour of his wives. Thus in Trobriand Islands (Melanesia) the chief's income is due to his wives' endowment. In many African communities the chief derives his wealth from the plurality of his wives, who by means of the produce of their agricultural labour enable him to exercise the lavish hospitality upon which so much of his power rests. A multitude of wives, however, may increase not only a man's wealth but also his social importance, reputation and authority, apart from the influence of the number of children. Hence we find among many Bantu communities in Africa that their desire to have many wives is one of the leading motives in the life of every man.3

Polygynous practices among primitive people is decidedly a mark of the low position of woman. The rise and prevalence of polygyny contributed greatly to the subordinate position of woman. Lest she might be disregarded by her lord, she must always compete with other wives for his favour. The presence of other wives naturally outraged her finer feelings, thus becoming a continuous source of family frictions. Then she had always to pander to her husband's will and whims for the fear of his disfavour. We cannot, therefore, commit ourselves to the view that woman's position in primitive times was quite satisfactory. In our opinion it was far from satisfactory, though not,

^{1.} Westermarck: The History of Human Marriage, Vol. III, p. 75.

^{2.} Westermarck: Ibid., pp. 76-77.

^{3.} See Malinowski's article on marriage in Encyclopædia Britannica, Vol. 14, p. 944.

as remarked in the very beginning, one of absolute subjection and indifference. We associate ourselves with Westermarck's view that "among the lower races, as a rule, a woman is always more or less in a state of dependence."

That the daughter's position among the primitive people is satisfactory can be judged by one single and important fact that in most cases her consent in marriage is taken.\(^1\) Even where marriage by capture and purchase prevails, we find that the desire of the daughter is never violated.\(^2\) After marriage, however, we are not inclined to the view that woman's position continued to be satisfactory. Apart from polygynous practices already alluded to, which in our opinion greatly contributed to her low position, there were other conditions to which the savage woman was subject and which do not permit us of estimating her position as quite satisfactory.

Often in the savage world, the wife is spoken of as the property or the slave of her husband.³ And though this terminology cannot be interpreted, as pointed out by Westermarck, in a literal sense, the underlying idea suggests but a low position assigned to the women. The Fiji women, it is said, are kept in great subjection; and like other property, wives are exchanged away at pleasure for the usual price of a musket. The Carib woman is throughout under the subjection of some male relation, whether father, brother, or husband, and has no power in disposal of herself. Many North American Indians treat their wives as they would treat their dogs. Among the Shoshones, the man can barter away his wives and daughters in any manner he wished. Among the East African Wanica, a woman is regarded as a toy, a tool, a slave in the worst sense. Indeed her treatment is that of a brute.

Other instances, where though the account cannot be taken too literally, cannot escape our impression of the unsatisfactory

^{1. &}quot;In the savage world the consent of the woman to her marriage is very frequently not only asked as a matter of fact, but even required by custom."—Westermarck: The History of Human Marriage, p. 368. For extensive evidence, see pp. 278-308.

^{2.} See L. T. Hobhouse: Morals in Evolution, pp. 156-157.

^{3.} Westermarck: The Origin and Development of the Moral Ideas, Vol. I, pp. 629-633. Also Spencer: Principles of Sociology, Vol. I, pp. 714-717.

position assigned to women. Thus, among the Guiana Indians, the woman is held to be as completely the property of the man as his dog, he may even sell her if he chooses. Among the Plains Indians of the U. S. A., the husband owns his wife entirely. He may abuse her, beat her, even kill her without question. She is absolutely a slave of her husband. Among the Chippewayans the women are as much in the power of the men as other articles of their property. Among the Somals, Danakil, and Gallas, a wife has no rights whatever in relation to her husband, being merely a piece of property.

Another ground on which we estimate the position of savage women as unsatisfactory is the extreme labour to which they are at times subjected and which has very deleterious effects upon their health and beauty. We find among many savage peoples1 women who have lost their beauty and youth in the very prime of their life due to extreme labour. This certainly speaks of a very low position to which they are subjected by their male folks. Thus Patagonian women lose their youth at a very early age from exposure and hard work. Among the Indians of the Paraguavan Chaco the women age quickly on account of having to move so constantly from place to place. The women among the Indians of British Guiana lose all the appearance of youth at the age of twenty-five, whereas men of forty do not look older than the Europeans of their own age. Of the Warraus, it is said that when the woman has reached her twentieth year, the flower of her life is gone. Among the Mandau the beauty of the women vanishes soon after marriage. The native women of California are rather handsome in their free and untoiling youth; but after twenty-five or thirty they break down under their heavy burdens and look ugly. Among the Loucheux Indians women get coarse and ugly as they grow old owing to hard labour and bad treatment. Similar price of extreme toil is paid by Karayk women and the women of Garos. In New Zealand, Tahiti, Hawaii and other islands of the South Sea, the beauty of the native women soon decays as a result of hard labour.

^{1.} Westermarck: The Origin and Development of the Moral Ideas, Vol. I, pp. 631-632; and Westermarck: The History of Human Marriage.

The hard labour to which women are thus subjected is due purely to a kind of proprietary conception of women among the primitive peoples. A Chippewayan chief said to Hearne¹: "Women were made for labour; one of them can carry or haul as much as two men can do. They also pitch our tent, make and mend our clothing, keep us warm at night, and in fact, there is no such thing as travelling any considerable distance in this country without their assistance." It is due to this proprietary conception that among many primitive peoples hardest drudgeries are imposed upon women.² Among the Kitchin, the women are literally beasts of burden to their lords and masters. All the heavy work is performed by them. The Californian Korok, while on a journey, lays by far the greatest burden on his wife whom he regards as a drudge. Among the Kenis Lenos the life of the women is an uninterrupted succession of toil and pain, and the condition of the women among the Chaymas is one of privation and suffering. In Eastern Central Africa the women are viewed as beasts of burden and do all the harder work. Such examples might be multiplied ad infinitum. This shows that woman's position is at this stageanything but satisfactory, however liberal an interpretation be put on the account related above. In the plain words of Spencer, women are at this low level of culture "regarded by men simply as property."3

Wife-lending and exchange of wives, which is in vogue among primitive people not in small proportion, is also a case in point sufficient for our estimation of woman's position as being unsatisfactory. Wife-lending as a form of hospitality "is very widely distributed over the world." This practice is the assertion of the husband's authority in disposing of his wife's person. Very often indeed a man will offer his sister and daughter. Exchange of wives at feast is also widely prevalent.

- 1. See Spencer: Principles of Sociology, Vol. I, p. 715.
- 2. See Westermarck: The Origin and Development of the Moral Ideas, Vol. I, p. 633.
- 3. Spencer: Principles of Sociology, Vol. I, p. 715. Also see Sir John Lubbock: Primitive Times, (1890), p. 439.
- 4. See Malinowski's article on Marriage in Encyclopædia Britannica, Vol. XIV, p. 941.
 - 5. Ibid., p. 942.

(Gilvak, Tungus, Aleuls of N. E. Africa, Bangala, Herero, Banyoro, Akamba, Wayao of Africa, S. Massim of Melanesia, Marquesao, Hawaii, Maori of Polynesia, etc.) Among the Eskimo of Repulse Bay, "if a man who is going on a journey has a wife encumbered with a child that would make travelling unpleasant he exchanges wives with some friend who remains in camp and has no such inconvenience." Among some communities a man's younger brother may share his wife with impunity, provided their relations are not public.¹ According to Westermarck, among the Maori it was a point of hospitality that when a strange chief of high rank paid a visit his entertainer should send a temporary wife or wives to his guests; and among the coast tribes of British Columbia, the temporary present of a wife is one of the greatest honours that can be shown there to a guest. The Eskimo considered such an offer as an act of generous hospitality.2

All these facts put together give us a strong ground to conclude that in general woman's position in primitive times was not quite satisfactory. Certain disabilities³ to which women are subject in some primitive peoples also direct us to the same view. For instance⁴ in Alaska the Eskimo men have a house from which women are excluded; among the Northern Athabaskans the girls are segregated from the boys and women barred from attendance at dances; in California and Melanesia there are men's societies that jealously exclude women; the Hupa men sleep apart from the women. Weighing all evidence, therefore, we cannot help the conclusion that "by far the majority of primitive women enjoys a less desirable position than men."

- 1. E. Sidney Hartland: Primitive Law, (1924), p. 59.
- 2. Westermarck: The History of Human Marriage, Vol. I, pp. 225-227.
- 3. "All the savage world over there is a feeling that woman is uncanny, a thing apart, which feeling is probably responsible for most of the special disabilities."—Dr. R. R. Marteff: Anthropology, p. 176.
 - 4. Dr. Robert H. Lowie: Primitive Society, p. 188.
 - 5. Ibid., p. 192.

NOTE ON

MOTHER-RIGHT INSTITUTION IN PRIMITIVE SOCIETY

With regard to the position of woman in primitive society we started with the patriarchal type of organisation, and showed that the position of woman was not satisfactory. Some writers, however, hold that in the dim red dawn of humanity there was a golden age of woman, which later on passed into the iron age of male despotism. These writers hold that the earliest form of family organisation was universally matriarchal. The theory as we shall show in our further discussion does not lead us far. In the first place, 'matriarchate' as such, in which the mother is the head and ruler of the family, has not been found to be existing in the primitive tribes of to-day. What is proved to be existing is only a 'mother-right' system of family in which descent is traced to the mother, and sometimes rank and property also succeed through her. And secondly, 'mother-right' organisation is not admitted by all to be a universal phenomenon of the earliest society.1 And even admitting that it was a universal phenomenon, it will be seen later on that the position of woman under this system is by no means everywhere satisfactory. We shall, in the first place, record shortly the views of several writers on the subject and in the light of those views draw our own conclusion.

It was Bachofen who, being surprised with a curious family system in which he found children tracing their descent through the mother instead of through the father, laid down certain theories of his own with regard to this system. According to him there are three general phases in the evolution of human sexual relations. The first is the period of aphrodistic hetairism, in which men and women have each other in common. This was the state of sexual promiscuity in which people knew who their mothers were but individual fathership was unknown; the second is the period of demetrian mother-right in which kinship and succession are in maternal line and woman

^{1.} See Max Schmidt: The Primitive Races of Mankind, (1926). Also L. T. Hobhouse: Morals in Evolution, (1929), pp. 161, 162. Also C. G. Hartley: The Age of Mother Power, (1914), p. 9.

gains religious and political supremacy. This religious and political supremacy was due to the 'revolt' of women to emancipate themselves from the degrading conditions of promiscuity; and the third, the period of patriarchate. He regards each of these phases to be a universal cultural stage.

The theory of Bachofen assumes that the earliest period was one of promiscuity and oppression of the female sex and it is followed not only by an age of mother-right involving, as a necessary consequence of uncertainty of fatherhood, the recognition of kinship only in the maternal line; but an age of gynæcocracy in which social leadership was vested in women, and men were subordinate in political and military capacities. Woman in this era emancipates herself and becomes an amazon. She becomes a medium through which rights are conveyed and relationships are established. Thus, according to Bachofen, there was not only mother-right but also matriarchate system of female supremacy in the state of gynæcocracy.

McLennan¹ faces the problem in a matter-of-fact way that mother-right cannot be due to any cause other than uncertainty of fatherhood; and he holds, therefore, that it must have preceded the paternal system. There has been a stage in the development of human races, he points out, when there was no such appropriation of women to particular men, that is to say, when marriage as it exists among the civilised nations was not practised. Wherever this has been the case, the paternity of children must have been uncertain; the conditions essential to a system of kinship being formed through males would therefore be wanting; and there would consequently be a kinship through females only. To be short, the early promiscuity in sex-relationship was the cause of uncertain paternity which he closely connects with kinship through females. McLennan also found a matriarchal system in which not only the family is traced through the mother but all property also descends through the mother; the children live with their mother and the husband does not live with the wife but only visits her occasionally. The children bear her name and not the father's.

^{1.} See McLennan: Studies in Ancient History, Vol. I, pp. 87, 88 and 83-146.

Spencer,¹ Westermarck² and Howard³, and particularly the latter two, have strongly denied the existence of promiscuous relationship in the early society. Spencer does not deny that uncertainty of fatherhood may have been influential in some cases; but he argues that without this assumption it is perfectly natural that the child should be named from the mother with whom it spends its early life, and where exogamy prevails the custom should become a convenient rule for determining who are marriageable women within the group; for the "requirement that a wife shall be taken from a foreign tribe readily becomes confounded with the requirement that a wife shall be of foreign blood." Westermarck seeks a simple explanation of female kinship in the necessary relationship of a child with its mother. In his opinion polygamy (polygyny) has to a great extent favoured the choice of the female line of descent. He generalises that the facts adduced as examples of this system imply chiefly that children are named after their mothers and that property and rank succeed exclusively in the female line and nothing more. He, therefore, denies the existence ever of a 'matriarchate' in which woman was all-powerful. Howard completely agrees with the views of Westermarck. He also denies the existence of general promiscuity in sex-relationship in primitive "Among a number of lower races," says he, "where relationship with the begettor is not recognised, it is found that certainty of fatherhood through securing the fidelity of the wife nevertheless exists." And he gives a single certain example in order to refute McLennan's theory of general sexual promiscuity. Thus, he says, there is the case of the people of Palau Islands, and it is all the more convenient because it is only the wife who is prohibited from general sexual intercourse, while young girls may give free play to their desires.4 Howard points out that nowhere does promiscuity appear among the people known to history or ethnology; and everywhere, even among the 'lower hunters' comprising the most backward members of the human kind, appears the single family in which the man holds the

^{1.} Spencer: Principles of Sociology, Vol. I, pp. 665, 666.

^{2.} Westermarck: The History of Human Marriage, Vol. I, pp. 40-45.

^{3.} Howard: A History of Matrimonial Institutions, Vol. I, pp. 110-115.

^{4.} Howard: A History of Matrimonial Institutions, Vol. I, p. 114.

place of power which is often despotic.¹ He, therefore, leans on Westermarck's view that promiscuous sex-relationship never existed among primitive people and mother-right was due to keen affection between the mother and the child or it may have been due to polygamous (polygynous) practices of men.

E. Sidney Hartland² has his own theory of 'mother-right.' In his opinion the connection between sex-intercourse and birth is unknown to the primitive people. In the contemplation of these people birth is a phenomenon independent of the union of the sexes. "The history of mankind so far as we can trace it, whether in written records or by the less direct but adequate methods of scientific investigation, exhibits the slow and gradual encroachments of knowledge on the confines of almost boundless ignorance." He, therefore, infers that such ignorance should have touched the hidden spring of life itself. Consequently, during many ages the social organisation of mankind "would not have necessitated the concentration of thought on the problem of paternity." Descent was, therefore, reckoned exclusively through the mother as it is still reckoned by a number of savage people. This system, however, Hartland calls 'mother-right' and not 'matriarchy.' In Hartland's opinion this 'mother-right' organisation everywhere preceded fatherright.3

That 'matriarchate' as such does not exist among the savages of to-day is well illustrated by Hartland by a number of illustrations⁴ that he has brought forth. From his illustrations it will be clear that woman does not possess any right or powers; it is some other person (other than the husband), be it her father, brother or son, that exerts authority in the family. Thus, among the Gaughellas when a woman dies in childhood, her husband pays not only the expense of burial but compensation to her male relations, otherwise he becomes their slave. If a Chevrur husband murders his wife, he is required to pay money to her brother. On the Ivory Coast where the Alladians take account only of the maternal descent, the father cannot

^{1.} Howard: A History of Matrimonial Institutions, p. 116.

^{2.} Edwin Hartland: Primitive Paternity, Vol. I, (1909), p. 254.

^{3.} Ibid., p. 256.

^{4.} Ibid., pp. 274-299.

pledge the children, but the mother too cannot pledge them for her debts without the permission of her brother, while her brother can do so without any limit of age. On the Gazelle Peninsula of New Pomerania the mother's brother is the head of the family. Among the Bavil though the mother alone has the right to pawn her child, she has first to consult the father. His conclusion is that potestas in the mother-right organisation is vested in the elders of the kin at large, and the mother's brother or the maternal uncle is the head of the family with almost absolute power over his sister's children.¹

Crawley² rejects Bachofen's theory of mother-right as due to supremacy of woman and also McLennan's theory of it as due to general promiscuity. He accepts the view of Westermarck. To him it is simply the tracing of descent through the mother and giving the children her name. He ascribes this, like Westermarck, to the polygamous (polygynous) practices among primitive people. Like Westermarck he also thinks that the close connection between the mother and the child during the early days of infancy may also be a possible cause.

Hobhouse³ rejects at the outset the theory of 'matriarchate.' "The term 'matriarchate' is a misnomer, since the cases in which the eldest woman rules are extremely rare, if they exist at all, while mother-right is common." The headship of such a clan is ordinarily inherited through the mother, but not by the mother, passing from her brother to her son and from her son to her daughter's son.

Hobhouse points out that what is common among the simpler peoples is not matriarchy, but mother-right; and where it most flourishes, "it is perfectly possible for the position of women to be as low as the greatest misoginist could desire." According to him, therefore, the position of the woman in the 'mother-right' society is by no means invariably satisfactory. As a general rule where a father is not the head of the household that place is taken by the wife's brother. "The woman is not necessarily better off because she is ruled by a brother in-

^{1.} Hartland: Primitive Paternity, Vol. I, pp. 284, 299.

^{2.} Crawley: The Mystic Rose—A Study of Primitive Marriage, (1902) 460.

^{3.} L. T. Hobhouse: Morals in Evolution, p. 47.

stead of by a husband." As regards proprietary rights, Hobhouse points out that the property no doubt passes through the woman, but rarely to the woman. We have already drawn attention to his view that 'mother-right' was not a universal phenomenon. "If we ask how mother-right has actually prevailed into the world," he observes, "we have to deal with fragments which, if conjoined, would make the coherent type but which, in fact, often exist apart² "

Briffault³ attacks the basis of Bachofen's theory on its own grounds. He points out the weakness of Bachofen's theory by citing illustrations to show that hetærism is not a characteristic of all matriarchal societies. "In none of the most pronounced surviving examples of such societies do we find any development of stringent codes of sexual morality." Thus, to select a few illustrations, among the Hopis prenuptial motherhood is common and does not affect marriage prospects. Among the Pueblos, before the advent of Europeans, prenuptial freedom obtained, and marriage relations, if not actually communal, were of the loosest. The extreme sexual immorality of Targi society is notorious. In the age-old society of Tiber, which was originally matriarchal and where women still wield great influence and power, sexual freedom prevails.⁴

Briffault further assails Bachofen's theory that matriarchy was the result of the revolt of women against the general promiscuity imposed by male rule. This theory of gynæcocracy, developed, consolidated and maintained by the conscious and continuous opposition of women against a debasing promiscuity, Briffault calls fantastic. Sexual morality, he observes, has for the most part been imposed by man on woman, not by woman on man. Sexual standards, whatever they may be, are never challenged by women. He refutes the popular conception that polygamy (polygyny) is disfavoured by women. In polygamous countries women are as virtuously orthodox and defend the established order as they do under monogamous conditions. Thus, a Fulla woman of good sense,

^{1.} L. T. Hobhouse: Morals in Evolution, p. 159.

^{2.} Ibid., p. 161.

^{3.} Robert Briffault: The Mothers, Vol. III, p. 256.

^{4.} Ibid., p. 256.

being asked if she disliked her husband having four wives, replied in the negative. So also says the African lady, "the more wives, the better." This argument Briffault has put further and shows that promiscuity and freedom in sex-relationship is equally accepted by women who uphold it as strongly as they do polygamy (polygyny) or monogamy. Thus, he points out that women in some African tribes and also those belonging to Eskimo, Yukaghir and Chinook tribes take pride in their promiscuous relationship.¹

Briffault, therefore, has a novel theory of his own to offer. He believes that matriarchate² did exist in the primitive society. He, however, denies that in this type there was anything like domination of men by women akin to that which is found to be in the patriarchal organisation. The notion of such a domination involves the existence of advanced economic conditions where private property has acquired a supreme importance. "To impute that organisation to primitive society, where property scarcely exists, is an anachronism."

Nevertheless there was a primitive ascendancy of women which. Briffault³ says, was not founded on economic control arising from proprietary rights, but on functional constitution of the social group. "The primitive human group is matriarchal in the same way and for the same reasons that the animal group is matriarchal; it is not so by virtue of established domination, but of functional relation." The female, by means of her function of motherhood exercised a preponderance over the male-it was not, however, a domination upon the male, conflicting with his interest and instinct. This domination, according to Briffault, does come into being, but at a later stage, with the development of private property and accumulable wealth. At this stage there is a domination on the part of the female similar to that exercised by the male in patriarchal societies. The economic lever is used and abused by society which may have resulted in feminine domination and an oppressed condition of the men. This, he says, is not pure primitive matriarchy explained above, but is the result of the

1. Robert Briffault: The Mothers, Vol. I, pp. 330-332.

2. Robert Briffault: The Mothers, Vol. I, pp. 430-431.

3. Robert Briffault: The Mothers, Vol. I, pp. 432-433.

persistence of matriarchal social conditions combined with the later economic development. This later stage he calls 'gynæcocracy.'

The latest contribution to the theory of mother-right is by Dr. Ronhaar. In his scholarly work. Woman in Primitive Mother-right Societies, he has critically examined most of the available data on the subject. His investigation does not prove the existence of matriarchate in primitive societies. ever supposes that the woman is the head of the group in societies with mother-right," says he, "will be disillusioned when he sees the result of my investigation." 80 % of the cases examined showed that woman dwelt with the man and his relatives and was subject to their authority. In cases where the man went to dwell with his wife's relatives, he had of course no authority in that strange family; but here also authority was wielded by one of the male relations of the wife. Man (whether related to the husband's or the wife's family) was found to be the head of the household, family, clan, village etc. in 26 out of 30 cases.1

As regards the form of mother-right among primitive people, whether it exists in the sense that descent and rank is traced through the woman, or in the sense that the child belongs to and is considered as a part of the maternal clan, or both, it was found that the first held good in all cases investigated. As regards the second, where a people is divided into tribes, sibs, clans, or sukus, the child belongs to this tribe, sib etc.²

As regards inheritance, the cases investigated showed that the dignity of chief wherever it existed (these cases were very few) descended upon cognatic and agnatic relations in the proportion of 7 to 3; land was inherited by children from father in 12 cases; only daughters inherited in 3 cases; only sons inherited in 1 case; cases in which children did not inherit from father were 22; undivided clan-property was inherited in 10 cases; brothers inherited in 7 cases and sister's children inherited in 5 cases. Personal property went to man's own children in 8

^{1.} Dr. J. H. Ronhaar: Woman in Primitive Mother-right Societies, (1932), pp. 99-101.

^{2.} Ibid., pp. 63-67.

cases and to brother's or sister's children in 14 cases, there being properly speaking no inheritance in 3 cases.¹

The last thing investigated is the position of woman in primitive mother-right societies. Here the high or low position is judged by the standard of the tribes themselves.² Characteristics of low and high position were different in different communities. His investigation shows that the position of woman is positively low in six cases, in the remaining cases the results showed:

The position is not low	in 9 cases.
very high	7,
high	4 "
fairly high	5 "

Our Conclusions.

- 1. It is not yet definitely proved at what stage of human evolution mother-right organisation came into existence. It was, therefore, suitable to us to begin on broad lines with patriarchal organisation; for as Max Schmidt remarks, "it must not be inferred that the priority always and everywhere lies with mother-right."³
- 2. Existence of mother-right society at present does not lead us far. The theory of 'matriarchate' is exploded. "There appeared to be very little evidence indeed of a matriarchy, a society which, on account of its having mother-right, should be entirely different from one with father-right. . . . in all cases where I tested the so-called characteristics, not with fantasy, but with facts, I arrived at a negative result." It is only relationship and rank that are traced through her. Woman is in very rare cases the head of the family or group. At the best in some cases her position is high; but that by no means proves that she has any power. That only supports our view that in a patriarchal organisation where everything is managed and moulded by man, her position at the low level of culture could not have been much satisfactory.

^{1.} Ronhaar: Woman in Primitive Mother-right Societies, pp. 68-77.

^{2.} Ibid., pp. 227-309.

^{3.} Max Schmidt: The Primitive Races of Mankind, p. 168.

^{4.} Ronhaar: Woman in Primitive Mother-right Societies, p. 522.

CHAPTER II

WOMAN IN GREEK AND ROMAN TIMES

AFTER leaving early antiquity we meet on the path of history a period which in its political and ethical thought has left a glorious heritage to later ages. It was the period of warriors and heroes like Herodotus, Thucydides and Pericles, of thinkers of extraordinary magnitude like Aristotle, Socrates, Plato, Plutarch and Xenophon. It has undoubtedly remained a period with its mosaic display of human geniuses, an inspiration and a wonder for all generations thenceforth. But even with their high mark of culture and civilisation, one has to admit that the Greeks neglected their women whom, Plato complains, they classed with children and slaves.

Among the Homeric Greeks, marriage had primarily two distinct objects in view: the preservation of a pure line of descent and the protection of the property rights of the family. Hence the wife and the mother was furnished with the greatest possible responsibility which was to help to continue the sacred traditions of the family. If these were preserved by her, she added to the glory; if violated, the prestige of the family suffered. In consequence, there was no polygamy and no divorce.

The women of Homer's time had really no rights in the modern sense of the term. "Throughout the whole of life their position was subject to the will or the whims of men." At marriage, woman merely passed from the tutelage of her father to that of her husband who had absolute power over her.

The education of girls in these days was of the simplest character. They grew up in the apartment of their mother and learnt from her simple things in life, like piety towards gods, skill in needlework, and efficiency in the management of the household work.

^{1.} See E. Westermarck: The Origin and Development of the Moral Ideas, (1908), Vol. I. p. 662.

^{2.} Dr. Mitchell Corrol: Greek Women, (1908), p. 29.

But it is not the Homeric but the Athenian woman that represents Greek womanhood. To understand the position of Greek woman, we therefore have to turn to the Athenian woman.

The most prominent feature of Greek polity was the City State,¹ the characteristic feature of which was that citizenship was limited to heredity and every legal measure was taken to preserve its purity. The main principle of this hereditary citizenship was that the union from which the child was sprung must be one recognised by the state. This was accomplished by requiring a legitimate marriage. "To preserve the purity of citizenship," writes Mitchell Corroll, "every precaution was taken that the daughters of Athens should not be wedded to foreigners...and, therefore, the marriage of an Athenian maiden with a stranger or of a citizen with a foreigner was strictly forbidden, and the offspring of such union was illegitimate."²

Under such conception of polity, marriage lay at the very basis of the state; and respect for the local deities, obligation of citizenship, and regard for one's race and lineage demanded that every safeguard should be thrown about it, and that the women of Athens should conform to these enactments. Thus owing to the Athenian conception of the City State, the natural functions of woman—domesticity and companionship, which should be united in one person, were divided, the Athenian man looking to his wife merely for the care of the home and the bearing and rearing of children, and to the hetaira for comradeship and intellectual company. "There was the cordial recognition," writes Lecky in his History of European Morals,3 "of two distinct orders of womanhood.—the wife whose first duty was fidelity to her husband; the hetaira, or mistress, who subsisted by her fugitive attachments." evil was the canker-worm which gnawed out the cord of the social life of Athens and caused the unhappiness of the female sex. The result of this polity was a singular phenomenon. There came into existence two classes of women in Athens—

^{1.} H. G. Wells: Outlines of History, (1920), p. 153.

^{2.} Mitchell Corroll: Greek Women, pp. 160-161.

^{3.} Lecky: History of European Morals, (1910), p. 287.

one carefully secluded and restricted under the rigid surveillance of law and custom; the other free to do whatever it pleased, except to marry a citizen which they were forbidden to do by the theory of citizenship. Thus one class consisted of high-born matrons of Athens, glorying in their birth-right and rulers of the home; the other, of the resident aliens of the female sex, unmarried, emancipated intellectually as untrammelled morally, who could become the 'companions' of the great men of the city.

In the peaceful atmosphere of the home, the Athenian woman was expected to live an irreproachable life. The Greek wife always lived in almost absolute seclusion. She was married usually when young. She lived in a special and retired part of the house. The more wealthy seldom went abroad and never except when accompanied by a female slave; never attended the public spectacles; received no male visitors except in the presence of their husbands, and had not even a seat at their own tables when male guests were there. How persistently the maxim, 'just that brings blame upon a woman, if she will not remain at home,' was carried through during life is exemplified by the fact that even at the news of the fearful defeat of Charonca, the women of Athens only ventured as far as the home doors, where "half senseless with sorrow, they inquired after husbands, fathers, brothers; but even that was considered unworthy of them and their city."1 Commenting on this secluded life of the Greek women, Lecky remarks: "Living as they did almost exclusively among their female friends, deprived of all the educating influence of male society, having no place at these public spectacles which were the chief means of Athenian culture, their minds must necessarily have been exceedingly contracted."2 J. H. Breasted severely comments on this absolute seclusion of the Greek women from public life. "The Greek citizens always kept their wives in the background, and they were no more than mere housekeepers. They had no share in the intellectual life of the men, could not appear at their social meeting where serious conversation was carried on, nor were they permitted to witness the athletic games at Olympia. Their

^{1.} Hans Licht: Sexual Life in Ancient Greece, (1932). p. 29.

^{2.} Lecky: History of European Morals, p. 287.

position was even worse than in the age of Tyrants."1

In general, the position of the Greek women was a very low one. She was under a perpetual tutelage, first of all to her parents who disposed of her hand, then to her husband, and in her days of widowhood to her sons. In Iphigenia in Tauris, Iphigenia laments the low position accorded to woman: "The condition of women is worse than that of all human beings. If a man is favoured by fortune, he becomes a ruler and wins fame on the battle-field; and if the gods have ordained him misfortune, he is the first to die a fair death among his people. But the joys of woman are narrowly compassed; she is given, unasked, in marriage by others often to strangers; and when destruction falls upon her home, she is dragged away by the victor, through the smoking ruins, through the corpses of her dear ones."2 Ouite illuminating are the views of Simonides regarding women. Says he: "Women are the greatest evil God ever created. Even if at times they appeared useful, they soon turn into a torment for their owners. man who lives together with a woman never passes a whole day without disturbance, and it is not easy for him to drive his greatest enemy hunger out of his house. And just when a man has the thoughts of being happy in his home—by the grace of God or the help of men-the woman always finds some cause for complaint and arms herself for war; without the fear of trouble vou cannot invite a friend where there is the wife. Besides which, the woman who seems aptest may well be the most fatal of all. For her husband is agape with admiration for her, while his neighbours laugh at him and his errors. Men are so preposterous, that each will praise his wife, while speak ill of his neighbour's: while nobody sees that we are all in the same predicament, for as I began by saying this is the greatest evil God has created."3

So we see that the old Greek conception of woman was anything but high. It was she who according to them was the cause of family feuds that led to wars, as is evident from Iliad, and caused unrest and discontent among

^{1.} J. H. Breasted: The Conquest of Civilisation, (1921), p. 362.

^{2.} See Bebel: Woman, p. 19.

^{3.} Quoted from Weith-Knudsen: Feminism, p. 178.

men. It was she who was held to be responsible for the good or bad conclusions of their undertakings. Thus, a man with a quarrelsome or ugly wife attributed his failure invariably to her. Idleness and greediness were taken to be her special vices. As regards fidelity, no opportunity was given to her to commit a breach of it, or she was always strictly confined within the doors and penalty was too severe. The wife who violated her marriage-vow was punished with the most terrible disgrace. Should she marry again, the man who ventured to wed her was disenfranchised and she was to all intents and purposes an outcast from society. Further a man could divorce his wife on the slightest pretext; while the wife, though allowed the right of divorce, was compelled in order to obtain a divorce to lodge a complaint with the archon against her husband and a prayer for the return of her dowry, and in the ensuing process she was subjected to many humiliations and delays. Then, as she was still a minor in the eyes of the law, a wife who had left her husband was obliged to return to a state of tutelage under her father or brother. The saddest incident of this marital inequality that we find in Greek literature is the story of Alcibiades's wife Hipparete, and her case shows how difficult it was for a wife to assert her rights. Hipparete's early death leaves on the reader the impression that her heart was broken by her brilliant husband's inconstancy and brutality.

"Hipparete," writes Plutarch, "was a virtuous and dutiful wife, but at last growing impatient because of the outrages done to her by her husband's continual entertaining of hetairai, strangers as well as Athenians, she departed from him and returned to her brother's house. Alcibiades seemed not at all concerned at this and lived on still in the same luxury; but the law required that she should deliver to the archon, in person and not by proxy, the instrument by which she claimed divorce; and when, in obedience thereto, she presented herself before the archon to perform this, Alcibiades came in, caught her up, and carried her home through the market-place, no one daring to oppose him or take her from him. So she continued with him till her death, which happened not long after "1

It was the principle of pure citizenship with its concomitant

1. Plutarch quoted by Mitchell Corroll in Greek Women, pp. 174-175.

sentiment of repulsion for importing foreign blood that stands as an outstanding cause of the absolute subordination and seclusion of Greek women. Rigorous fidelity on the part of the wife was demanded, though laxity was allowed to the husband¹ who indulged with little or no censure in concubines.² The tortoise was taken as the symbol of female life, the creature that never goes out of her shell. The inferiority of woman to man was illustrated and defended on a curious physiological notion that the generative power belonged exclusively to men, women having only a subordinate part in the production of their children. The woman Pandora represented the authorship of all human evils in woman.³

The complete absence of any proprietary rights in the Greek woman is accounted for by the religious character attached to the family worship. The Greeks were, one must note, extremely patriotic; and a side current of this patriotism centred round the family, which manifested itself in the worship of the ancestors. Now for the Greeks two things—the family worship and its property—were closely allied. It was therefore a rule without exception that a property could not be acquired without the worship, or the worship without the property. "Religion prescribes," says Cicero, "that the property and the worship of a family shall be indispensable, and that the care of the sacrifices shall always devolve upon the one who receives the inheritance."

From this principle then were derived all the rules regarding the rights of succession among the Greeks. The first is that the domestic religion being hereditary from male to male, property is the same. As the son is the natural continuator of the religion, he alone inherits the estate. This rule of inheritance was not the result of a simple agreement made between men; it was derived from their belief, from their religion, from that which had the greatest power over their minds. It was not the personal will of the father that gave inheritance to the son. The son inherited the property out of his full rights as

^{1.} C. F. Thwing: The Family, p. 31.

^{2.} Lecky: History of European Morals, p. 280.

^{3.} Ibid.

^{4.} Cicero quoted by Fustel De Coulanges: The Ancient City, (1901), p. 93.

a continuator of the family. He was a necessary successor. He had neither to accept nor to reject the inheritance. The continuation of the property, like that of the worship, was for him a part and parcel of his family religion. It was for him an obligation and a right. Whether he wished it or not, the inheritance fell to him, whatever it might be, even with its debts and encumbrances.

It, therefore, becomes clear to us why the daughter in the Greek family does not inherit. It was the religious character attached to the property that vested the whole proprietary rights in the son to the exclusion of the daughter. The rule of the family worship was that it should be transferred from male to male: the rule for the inheritance was that it should follow the worship. The daughter was not qualified to continue the paternal religion, since she might marry and thus renounce the religion of her father to adopt that of her husband.1 She had, therefore, no right to the inheritance. If a father should happen to leave his property to a daughter, this property would be separated from the worship, which would be inadmissible. The daughter could not even fulfil the first duty of an heir, which was to continue the series of repasts; since she would offer sacrifices to her husband. Religion, therefore, forbade her to inherit from her father.

We have thus studied in brief the social and legal status of Greek women which is anything but cheering. It explains, in the words of Lecky², "why Greece, which was fertile, beyond all other lands, in great men, was so remarkably barren of great women." It is interesting to note that the Greek polity, which confined to the home and the hearth the lawful brides—the progenitors of a mighty race ever born, quite ironically allowed fullest possible freedom to the courtesans—a freedom which they availed to acquire a degree of knowledge which enabled them to add to their other charms an intellectual fascination. Thus when the brides of Greece were burning themselves night and day over the hearth, these free courtesans were gathering around them the most brilliant artists, poets, historians and philosophers, flinging themselves unreservedly into the intellec-

1. Fustel De Coulanges: The Ancient City, p. 94.

2. Lecky: History of European Morals, p. 297.

tual and æsthetic enthusiasm of their time, and thus becoming the centre of a literary society of matchless splendour. Worse tragedy of woman cannot be found.

This study of Greek women would be imperfect without going into the contemporary opinion. Being an age replete with educationists and thinkers, it is worth while to know what they thought of women.

The most malicious of all criticisms of women are those of the Ionians. One of the stories goes to say that there was once a united couple. The wife was most attached to her husband, so much so that when he died she would not leave the corpse and insisted on following the dead into the underground sepulchre. She remained there five days refusing to take any food. Meanwhile some robbers were crucified near the spot. A soldier who was guarding the corpses happened to see the lady mourning over her husband's corpse. He approached her and began to console. He succeeded so much that the lady overcome with his pacifications gave herself up to him. And further when the soldier found after some days that one of the corpses of the robbers was missing, being removed away by the relatives on account of his neglect of duty, and thought of committing suicide lest he should be punished, the lady suggested to him to hang the corpse of her husband in the place of the missing corpse and thereby to save himself. This story is told to throw ridicule on the character of woman and to show her fickleness of mind. It is a parody to show woman's superficiality, inconstancy and susceptibility to every passing event. Such low estimate of woman was due to the fact that "their views of women were strongly infected by the Mediterranean, and more especially the eastern, fear of having more fellowship with woman and giving her more freedom of movement than was strictly necessary." And this was why the Athenians considered that politics was not a subject for women and that the ideal of a woman lay in being mentioned the least in any scandal or praise.

Among the enlightened thinkers of those days, Plato, Aristotle and Xenophon stand as outstanding figures who devoted much space to the consideration of what we might in modern

1. Weith-Knudsen: Feminism, p. 183.

terms call the Woman Question. The women were, in the opinion of these philosophers, what Plato put it, "accustomed to live cowed and in obscurity"—and so justly deserved more favourable conditions.

Of these, Plato was the most idealistic, and like his other views his views of women are coloured with idealism. Plato was keenly alive to the evils of democracy as then existent, and recognised the need of social and political reform. He felt that in the disregard of women, at least half the citizen population was neglected; and we have in his works the strongest possible assertion of the equality of the sexes.

Plato's conception of woman was far in advance of his times; and as we have pointed out, it was in a degree influenced by his idealised views about everything. Unlike for Aristotle, for Plato goodness of a man and a woman are the same.1 In his opinion, in any of the pursuits or arts of civic life the nature of a woman does not differ from that of a man. There is nothing, says he, peculiar in the constitution of women which should affect them in the administration of the State.2 But though in this way Plato would assign the same position and status to women in the administration of the State and in the civil pursuits of life, still he also does not escape his own times as is evident from his belief in the inferiority of women to men. In his *Republic* he admits that all the pursuits of men are also the pursuits of women; still he qualifies his opinion by adding that in all these pursuits "a woman is inferior to a man."3 Perhaps this was due to his not having come across a woman of distinct achievement.

Plato advocates the same type of education both for men and women without any distinction. "The existing difference between men and women," writes he in his *Republic*, "is only accidental and purely nominal." He argues that because a bald man is a cobbler, nobody has said that a hairy man has no right to do so. So also, "if the difference between the two sexes is that one begets and the other bears children, this does not prove that they ought to have distinct education." And

^{1.} A. E. Taylor: Plato: The Man and Work, (1926).

^{2.} Plato: Dialogues, Vol. III, pp. 146-147.

^{3.} Ibid., pp. 147-148.

^{4.} Ibid.

if the same type of education is given to different people differing in their excellences, why not give the same education to women who have the same capacities as men, though in his opinion in a less degree? Women are the same in kind as men and have the same aptitude for medicine or gymnastics or war (again he qualifies this opinion by saying that these are possessed by women in a less degree). "You will admit," he writes, "that the same education which makes a man a good guardian will make a woman a good guardian. For their original nature is the same." "There shall be compulsory education," he writes in one place in his laws. "for females as well as males; they shall both go through the same exercises. I assert without fear of contradiction that gymnastic exercises and horsemanship are as suitable to women as men. I further affirm that nothing can be more absurd than the practice, which prevails in our country, of men and women not following the same pursuits with all their strength and with all mind, for thus the State, instead of being a whole, is reduced to a half."2

Aristotle is more conservative or rather more practical than Plato. The difference between him and Plato lay in this that while the latter always spoke in terms of 'what ought to be' he always limited himself to 'what can be.' Aristotle, therefore, appears less generous than Plato to woman. For him the male is by nature superior, and the female inferior. He arrives at this conclusion on account of the difference of functions and duties that he saw between the two sexes. And therefore he jumps up to the conclusion that males are natural rulers and females natural subjects. And if that was true, "the virtues of rulers and subjects are not identical but different" on account of their different functions. Thus "the temperance of a man and a woman is not the same, nor their courage and justice; for a man's courage is of a ruler and a woman's of a subordinate kind,"3 and so also with all other virtues. He identifies himself completely with the view of Sophocles that "Silence is woman's crown."4

^{1.} Plato: Dialogues, Vol. III, pp. 147-48.

^{2.} Plato: Dialogues, Vol. V, pp. 186-187.

^{3.} Aristotle: Politics, (J. E. C. Weldon's Translation, 1912), pp. 34-35.

^{4.} Ibid., p. 35.

Yet asserting woman's inferiority, Aristotle preaches to men faithfulness and regard and appreciation in their attitude towards women. In his *Ethics*¹ in which he has discussed the theory of conduct, though he expresses his inability to lay down rules of conduct for amicable and happy relationship between husband and wife, still he dwells with delicacy on the affectionate regard the husband and the wife should each have for the other. They should bear with and encourage each other in all the evils of life. And while he insists on the limitations of woman's intelligence and reasoning powers, he recognises her superiority to men in the qualities of the heart; and when he wishes to give an example of disinterested affection, it is woman who serves as his model.

On the whole, Aristotle draws a more pleasing picture of woman's character and position than Plato, in spite of the greater equality granted by the latter. Plato's philosophy, as we have pointed out, was primarily the product of imagination to which his well-known theory of community of wives and State parenthood of children bear testimony; while that of Aristotle was of experience. Plato was essentially theoretical, Aristotle practical. Aristotle, like Plato, was dissatisfied with the low position occupied by woman in society. This conception of inferiority of woman is in our opinion a mis-statement; because he knew the moral loss of society in closing avenues of public life to woman. He was one for the recognition of the rights of citizenship in woman; but what he was afraid of was the negligence of the home and children that a too much interest in social life and activities might bring about in woman. practical philosopher, he was conscious of the immense and irreplaceable value of woman in the most constructive and essential art of home-making. So he would admit woman to the rights of citizenship to enrich her personality, and at the same time he wanted woman to fulfil her most altruistic function of giving to the nation a worthy race possessed of noble qualities.

Xenophon's treatise on domestic economy was probably intended to contribute to the current discussion of the Woman Question. In it he sought to prove the falsity of the views of

1. Aristotle: Ethics.

Plato and Aristotle, who advocated a greater freedom for women. He recognises the great qualities of woman; but he wants to confine her activities to the sphere of the home-life alone. Xenophon sees in woman the diligent mother and industrious housekeeper, watchful of her house and its management. But he wants to leave her in seclusion, occupied with her quiet domestic duties, though at the same time he recognises the charm and usefulness of her presence in the home. He praises her for economy, vigilance and care.

Unlike Plato he does not admit any mental equality between the sexes. In the imaginary dialogue between Socrates and the good Ischomachus we get a good glimpse of his views as to what he considered to be the best virtues, duties and accomplishments of an ideal wife. Ischomachus relates to Socrates the talk that passed between himself and his newly wedded wife "concerning the duty and care of my house." The talk is worth reproducing.

Says *Ischomachus*: Use your endeavour, good wife, to do those things which are acceptable to the gods and are appointed by the law for you to do.

Wife: And what are these things, dear husband?

Ischomachus: The wisdom of the divinity has prepared the union of the two sexes, and has made of marriage an association useful to each one—a union which will secure for them in their children support in their old age. It is man's duty to acquire food, to be busied with field work, and to defend himself against enemies. Therefore God has given him strength and courage. The woman must care for and prepare the food, weave garments and rear the children. Therefore God has given her a delicate physique which will keep her in the home. an exquisite tenderness of heart which brings about her maternal care and a watchful vigilance for the safety of her little Since they are united for their common advantage, they are endowed with the same faculties of memory and diligence. Both are endowed with the same force of soul to refrain from things harmful, and the one who practises this virtue the morehas, by the force of the divinity, the better recompense. However, as they are not equally perfect, they have the more occasion for each other's assistance: for when man and woman are

thus united, what the one has occasion for is supplied by the other.

Ischomachus then compares the duties of a wife to those of the queen bee, which without leaving the hive, extends her activity around her, sends others to the field, receives and stores away provisions as they are brought, watches over the construction of cells, and brings up the little bees. And finally he preaches her: "Consider how laudable it will be for you to excel others in the well-ordering of your house. Be therefore diligent, virtuous and modest, and give your necessary attendance on me, your children and your house; and your name shall be honestly esteemed, even after your death; for it is not the beauty of your face and form, but your virtue and your goodness, which will bring you honour that will last for ever."

If Plato is radical, Aristotle liberal, here we find in Xenophon a conservative. His conception of woman, we see, therefore, could not transcend the social custom of his time, though in a way he wants to modify them by assigning to woman the supreme position in the home that would make her a real mistress of the whole household politics.

IV

Time opens a new curtain, and on the stage of history appears a new race immortalising its civilisation in marble and bronze. In the Æneid of Virgil, the marble sculptures of Ara Pacis that record the Peace of Augustus and their noblest monument of all, the Roman Law—to epitomise the whole Roman civilisation—present a round of human genius in full, the like of which no individual nor any race has ever presented.² The role of woman, however, in its early years is not enlivening.

The two characteristics of the Roman Republic were: (a) the authority of the State, and (b) the integral unit of the family. Of the latter the most constituent feature was the despotic powers of the PATER FAMILIAS—the father of the household. The PATER FAMILIAS was the owner of the whole family

^{1.} Xenophon: Works. (Translated by Ashley and others. 1922), pp. 655-662.

^{2.} See P. E. Matheson: The Growth of Rome, (1922), p. 96. Also see J. W. Mackail: The Lesson of Imperial Rome, (1929), p. 5.

estate and the lord of his wife's body and spirit, of his children and their children, and of its servants and slaves, all of whom owed him implicit obedience. The right over them included:

- (1) the right of chastisement; (2) the right of life and death;
- (3) the right to sell or send as hostage against debts; (4) the right to betroth, give in marriage, and divorce; (5) the right to dispose off at will not only of the family wealth, but any money the sons obtained independently. As against these unrestrained powers of the PATER FAMILIAS, "all other members of the household were destitute of legal rights—the wife and the child no less than the bullock or the slave," writes Momsen, a great authority on the political history of Rome. Thus the Roman family of the ancient times was a common slavery to the head viz. the PATER FAMILIAS, sanctioned by religion, law and morals. The family became consequently a tomb-like dungeon to individual hope and happiness. "Father or the family!" writes Victor Duruy, "It is always he who is mentioned. for there is no one else in the house, wife, children, clients, slaves, all are only chattels, instruments of labour, persons without will and without name, subjected to the omnipotence of the father."1

The position of the Roman matron could now be easily imagined, growing as she did under this Patriapotestas. The father in the Roman family was the high priest of the sacred fire. In the presence of this sacred fire, he ranked first. He lighted it, and supported. In all religious acts, his functions were the highest. He slayed the victims, he pronounced the sacred formulas and thereby invoked the blessings of gods. The family and the worship were perpetuated through him.

But Roman religion did not place the woman in so high a position. The wife took part in the religious acts, indeed, but she was not the mistress of the hearth. She did not derive her religion from her birth. She was initiated into it by her marriage.² She learnt from her husband the prayers that she should pronounce. She did not represent the ancestors, since

^{1.} Victor Duruy: History of Rome and Roman People, Vol. I, (1883), p. 183.

^{2.} Fustel De Coulanges: The Ancient City, p. 112.

she was not descended from them. She herself did not become an ancestor. In death as in life, therefore, she was considered only a part of her husband.

Roman Republic, as we know, had divided society into two classes: the patricians and the plebians. Woman belonging to neither class had any legal part whatever in the State affairs or any public functions, excepting those of a religious nature. "Her duties were confined to home..... the only advantages which a patrician woman could possess were her natural pride in her privileges of her family and whatever was reflected upon her by her relatives." The status of the 'head of the family' which held its most tyrannical meaning in those times was never assigned to her. The husband was all powerful in the family. Nobody else was recognised by the The power of the husband over his wife was called 'manus.' The wife was placed in the same category with the children and slaves. They were all 'mancipia' under him. The husband was in one sense the State in miniature. ruled over his family as the State ruled over the subjects. it was who answered to the State for his wife. children and slaves, and he judged them. If a wife was accused of a crime, she was committed to her husband. The husband was no doubt required to call a council of his own and his wife's male relatives,2 still once the matter was discussed in the council, he could condemn her to death for serious offences like the breach of the marital vow. Alfred Brittain points out that this punishment was meted out to the wife even for the simple offence of forging false keys in order to steal his wine.3

Legal subordination of woman was recognised by the Romans in the legal principle that she belonged to the family and not to the State. The latter consisted only of men, to whom women were merely necessary accessories. No one thought that woman possessed any claim or right to independence of individuality. She was always under a master—her father, when she was a girl; her husband, when she was mar-

- 1. Rev. Alfred Brittain: Roman Women, (1908), pp. 40-41.
- 2. Dr. W. Goodsell: The Family, p. 115.
- 3. Rev. Alfred Brittain: Roman Women, p. 41.

ried; and her nearest male relative, if she became a widow.1 If the City State was the remarkable cause of the degradation of women in Greece, the PATRIAPOTESTAS, which invested the head of the family with all family powers making him the sovereign ruler thereof, was the cause in Rome. "The rigorous development of marital and still more of the paternal authority," writes Momsen, while discussing the relation of the Roman family to the State, "regardless of the natural rights of persons as such was a feature peculiar to the Italians; it was in Italy that the moral subjection became a legal slavery."2 Under this type of polity, as naturally it could be imagined, the position of woman was not only unfavourable, but also greatly low. All important, interesting and honourable avocations were appropriated by men. "First and foremost, of course, warfare and leadership in battle; all the upper ranks of the priesthood; political activities, trade, sea-faring, manufactures of various kinds, large-scale agriculture, and stockraising."³ Compared with her Greek sister, the Roman matron enjoyed more social, if not more legal, freedom. Unlike her sister in Greece, she was never secluded; she was not limited to one part of the house, nor was she excluded from free social intercourse. "Unlike the Greek, the Roman women walked abroad, frequented the public theatres and took their places at festive banquets with the men."4 So also she received relatives. and paid visits, shared meals inside and outside the house, attended religious ceremonies, and could even appear before a court of law, and indeed with her husband's permission, go to circus and theatre. The only thing required of her was that she should not go out unaccompanied. In the home, she was the mistress of the whole household economy, supervising the instruction of the children and taking care of them and governing the domestic slaves.

But judged by the strict letter of the law all this independent position of woman is nullified by the marital position in

^{1. &}quot;Women, according to the idea of the early Romans, were always children."—Principal Donaldson: Woman: Her Position and Influence in Ancient Greece and Rome, etc., (1907), p. 87.

^{2.} Momsen: The History of Rome, Vol. I, p. 30.

^{3.} Muller-Lyer: The Family, p. 185.

^{4.} Rev. Alfred Brittain: Roman Women, p. 127.

which the law placed her. Roman marriage in its strict legal sense was not very much indulgent to the weaker sex. Roman marriage, in spite of the fact that the mother of the family was respected by the husband as the mistress and her advice was asked in important decisions, was only a 'marriage de convenance,' having very little of affection in it. Men regarded marriage, first and foremost, as a device for securing heirs of unquestionable legitimacy for their gods and wealth. Their wives, the Romans always regarded as personal property, the bearers and wet-nurses of their sons and heirs.

The Romans recognised two distinct classes of marriage: the strictest and, in the eyes of the law, more honourable, which placed the woman into the 'manus' or hand of her husband and gave him almost absolute authority over her person and property; and a less strict form, which left her legal position unchanged. The former was more in practice during the Republic and was of three kinds. The 'Confarreatio' was celebrated and could only be dissolved by the most solemn religious ceremonies and was jealously restricted to the patricians. Confarreatio consisted of three parts. By solemn rites the father of the bride declared that her relation to his home ceased. She was then conducted to the home of her husband, where she was led to the hearth where stood the domestic gods about the sacred fire. Then a prayer was offered, a sacrifice was made. and a cake of flour was eaten. Thus and henceforth they participated in the same worship, in the same rites, prayers and festivals. Thus their relationship as husband and wife was The 'Coemptio' was the second kind, which was constituted. purely civil and derived its name from a symbolical sale. it a woman was simply delivered over to a man as his wife in the presence of a witness. And the third was the 'Usus' which was effected by the mere cohabitation of a woman with a man without interruption for the space of a year. We shall deal more with this form which developed enormously during the Empire days.

1. See Edward Carpenter: Civilisation, its Cause and Cure, (1906), where he says: "In the Roman antiquity, marriage seems, with some brilliant exceptions, to have been a prosaic affair—mostly a matter of convenience and house-keeping—the woman an underling—having little of the ideal attached to the relationship of man and wife."

By marriage a woman became the daughter of her husband. The family, as we have pointed out, was based less upon the ties of relationship than upon power; and the husband acquired over his wife the same despotic powers which the father had over his children. There can be no question that, in strict pursuance of this conception of marriage, all the wife's property passed at first absolutely to the husband and became fused with the domain of the new family.² The husband could appoint her guardian by his will or, if he died intestate, his nearest male relations succeeded by law to the office; so that it was possible, in spite of the law of nature, that a mother might be under the guardianship of her son.³ This is the institution known to the ancient Roman law as the Perpetual Tutelage of Women, under which a female, though relieved from her parent's authority by his decease, continued subject through life to her nearest male relations, or to her father's nominees as her guardians. This perpetual guardianship was nothing but an artificial prolongation of the PATRIAPOTESTAS, when for other purposes it had been dissolved. The reason for this perpetual tutelage is not far to seek. As we have already pointed out, the early Roman law took notice of families only. This was the same thing as saving that it took notice only of persons exercising PATRIAPOTESTAS, and accordingly the only principle on which it enfranchised a son or a grandson at the death of his parent, was a consideration of the capacity inherent in such son or grandson to become the head of a new family and the root of a new set of parental powers. But a woman, of course, had no capacity of the kind, and no title accordingly to the liberation which it conferred. There was therefore a peculiar archaic contrivance for retaining her in the bondage of the family for ever; and this was how the institution of her Perpetual Tutelage came into existence.4

During the early Roman period, right of divorce was given only to the husband. The right was, however, rarely used. The marriage with 'usus' could be dissolved only by ceasing to

^{1.} Sir Henry Maine: The Early History of Institutions, (1875), p. 312.

^{2.} Thomas Arnold: History of Rome. Vol. I, (1848), p. 265.

^{3.} Ibid.

^{4.} See Sir Henry Maine: Ancient Law, (1897), pp. 152-153.

cohabit; but the marriage with 'confarreatio' could be dissolved with great difficulty, if at all, and only after the ceremony of 'Diffarreatio' or breaking of the marriage bonds. This was accompanied with elaborate methods. "The husband and the wife who wished to separate appeared for the last time before the common hearth. A priest and witnesses were present. As on the day of marriage, a cake of wheaten flour was presented to the husband and wife; but instead of sharing it between them they rejected it. Then instead of prayers, they pronounced formulæ of a strange, severe, spiteful, frightful character, a sort of malediction, by which the wife renounced the worship and gods of the husband. From that moment the religious bond was broken. The community of worship having ceased, every other common interest ceased to exist, and the marriage was dissolved." But it must be noticed that in no case a judicial decree or any social interference was required for the dissolution of marriage which was recognised as the sole concern of the individuals concerned.

Continuation of the family and the family worship being the primary motives of marriage, barrenness in wife was considered a sufficient and at times a compulsory ground of divorce. Among other grounds of divorce were reckoned the commission of capital offences and adultery by the wife. Yet, when these acts were committed, the husband was required to call a council of his own and his wife's male relatives and lav the matter before them, before he could pronounce his separation. It was only in the case of adultery, that the husband was dispensed with from this obligation of calling a council. But though the wife could be divorced on the ground of her adultery, the same right was not recognised in her. As the great censor Cato put the whole matter in the following words: "If you were to catch your wife in adultery, you would kill her with impunity without trial; but if she were to catch you she would not dare to lay a finger upon you, and indeed she had no right."2

The woman who was separated from her husband had the right, like the widow after the period of mourning, of contracting a new marriage. At a late period of Roman law, however,

^{1.} F. D. Coulanges: The Ancient City, p. 60.

² Cato, quoted by Goodsell: The Family, p. 122.

this right of remarriage was curtailed by the Theodosian code,¹ and the woman of 'many nuptials' received no respect. The widow remarrying was forbidden certain civil or religious privileges.²

The proprietary position of the daughter was recognised on the same basis with the son. But the right of the daughter to inherit on an equal footing with the son was in great measure rendered ineffectual on account of her legal disability to transfer or bequeath her property without the consent of her guardians, that is to say, of her husband, brothers, or her nearest male relatives on the paternal side, all interested, as her heirs, in preventing her from selling or bequeathing the same. Thus there was very little chance of the family property passing out of the family limits. "And there were always found persons who upheld this system with all its selfishness and injustice as favourable to a wholesome severity of manners and a proper check upon the weakness or caprice of a woman's judgment."

The legal and social position of woman, however, became completely transformed during the palmy days of the Empire. The PATRIAPOTESTAS of the early Republic years became completely obsolete. This formed woman's emancipation a good deal. Marriage came to rest purely on a mutual agreement without any civil or religious ceremony. This had this very important consequence that the woman so married remained, in the eyes of the law, in the family of the father, and remained under his guardianship, and not under the guardianship of her husband. But as we know the old PATRIAPOTESTAS had become completely obsolete. The practical effect of the general adoption of this kind of marriage was the absolute legal independence of the wife. With the exception of her dowry, which passed into the hands of her husband, she held property in her own rights; she inherited her share of the wealth of her father and she retained it altogether independently of her husband.

Thus with the introduction and prevalence of this new 'free' type of marriage, the wife became free of the 'manus' of her husband which had amounted to virtual slavery. Mar-

^{1.} T. C. Sanders: The Institutes of Iustinian, (1900), p. 39.

^{2.} Thwing: Family, p. 41.

^{3.} Thomas Arnold: History of Rome, Vol. I: p. 265.

riage came to rest on the formal consent of the parties to the union; hence the Roman maxim: "Nuptice solo consensu contra huntur" meaning "marriage is by consent" only. But this should not lead to a misunderstanding that there was infidelity or want of moral character among the women of the Roman Empire. Many historians that have attributed the decay of the Roman Empire to this side of woman emancipation have not properly balanced the causes that led to its decay. These free marriages by no means introduced any immoral activities in public life. On the other hand it made true love possible and tended to make married life dignified. This is why we meet several specimens, in the fair sex, of large and accomplished minds united with all the gracefulness of intense womanhood, and all the fidelity of truest love in the flourishing days of the Empire. Such were Cornelia, the brilliant and devoted wife of Pompey: Marcia, the friend, and Helvia the mother of Seneca. Writes Lecky: "To the period when the legal bond of marriage was most relaxed must be assigned most of these noble examples of the constancy of Roman wives, which have been for so many generations household tales among mankind." And writes Principal Donaldson: "Examining history, then, I think we must come to the conclusion that the Roman ideas of marriage had not a bad effect on the happiness or morals of the woman."2 In these glorious days of the Empire we meet with the bright record of female chastity like Portia, the most faithful wife of Brutus: of Paulina, the wife of Seneca: and of the vounger Aria, the faithful companion of Thrasea, in a type of marriage the only cohesive element of which was individual This brings home the great truth that it is only a free activity of which the mind has grasped the purpose, and intelligence the strength, that the best of one's individuality can be offered not only for its service but also ennoblement. It is evident from the later Roman history, that it was only when love was given its choice that purity based not on social tabus and restraints but on voluntary limitations and real understanding was possible. And this crystallised love is symbo-

^{1.} Lecky: History of European Morals, pp. 309-311.

^{2.} Principal Donaldson: Woman: Her Position and Influence in Ancient Greece and Rome, etc., p. 120.

lised by the medallion which is so common on the Roman sarcophage, which bears the images of husband and wife each in embrace with the other, united in death as they had been in life, and facing it calmly because of the prospective companionship in the tomb.

If marriage was a matter of simple private agreement in which the man and the woman approached each other on a footing of equality, divorce was also a private transaction to which the wife was as fully entitled as the husband, and it required no inquisitorial intervention of a magistrate or a court. Momsen speaks in high terms of this free marriage which raised the status of women. He calls this innovation an "enlightened conception of marriage prevailing in the greatest and most masterful Empire which has ever dominated the world at the period of its fullest development."

Economic independence of women began to grow apace. so much so that, being relieved from any marital or tutorial powers, they not only began to manage their own property, but at times sought the help of solicitors who would make an impression on them by their knowledge of business and law, and thereby procure for themselves ampler perquisites and legacies than other loungers on the exchange.² This growing economic independence, bringing as it did a mass of capital in the hands of women, became a growing concern of anxiety to the statesmen of those times who saw in it a source of danger. This led them to a legal enactment to prohibit the testamentary nomination of women as heirs.3 Women thus, we see, had assumed not only proprietary independence, but they also obtained occupational freedom, many of whom entered different trades and professions like inn-keeping, medicine, acting, the barber's art, driving chariots4 etc. This social freedom is manifest in allowing her appearance in the court of law for the purposes of testifying—a privilege which was so long barred.

- 1. Momsen: The History of Rome, Vol. V, p. 392.
- 2. Momsen: The History of Rome, Vol. III., p. 123.
- 3. Dill: Roman Society, (1911), pp. 79-81.
- 4. See W. B. McDaniel: Roman Private Life and its Survivals, pp. 55-56.

The school system of Rome had by this time reached a high water-mark. Children of both the sexes were allowed access in the schools. Boys and girls sat together on the benches of the literator in the open porticos, and the girls of the well-to-do went on to the secondary schools of the grammaticus, as their brothers did. The girls learnt at their mothers' sides lessons of conduct and domestic art, but their education did not end here. Whatever education in the way of reading and writing was given to boys was equally imparted to girls; and there are no traces that these attainments were less familiar to the one than to the other sex.¹ Apart from this linguistic training, music and dancing were held to be the most important parts in a girl's education. Theatrical music and dancing had come to assume an independent standing during Cæsar's time and in these realms women began to come forward publicly in Rome.²

Thus in the fullness of its power, Rome had completely removed the sex-disability of its women. That this emancipation did not go to the extent of granting any political powers can cause no surprise to the student of Roman history. Since the fall of the Republic the men themselves had no political powers, and therefore the absence of political power in women was not much a thing of anomaly to agitate against. "It is true," writes Joseph McCabe, "that the imperial purple was held exclusively by men, and the great administrative offices were open to men alone. Against this arrangement women may have protested; but we hardly expect such a protest until a more advanced stage of evolution; and, in point of fact, the more ambitious women had a great deal of indirect power."³

The decay of the Roman Empire, setting as it did immediately after the completion of woman's emancipation, is closely associated with it by many historians and writers. And though the causes that led to the tottering of that mighty edifice are not our concern, the appreciation of woman's emancipation leads us to find no connection between the fall of the Roman Empire and this emancipation of woman. No true and serious historian would ever dream of such a notion. To say that the

^{1.} A. S. Williams: Roman Education, (1914), p. 14.

^{2.} Momsen: The History of Rome, Vol. V p. 516.

^{3.} Joseph McCabe: Woman in Political Evolution, (1909), p. 39.

powerful building of Roman civilisation created by its master masons, each adding stone over stone—finished as it was polished-with all his dexterity and energy and thus giving it an appearance of grandeur and power—to say that this mighty structure came down on account of woman emancipation is to assume most avowedly an anti-feministic role. On its moral side1 it was the decay of initiative, disappearance of inventive genius, increase in apathy, and the domination of fear in life, that account for the dissolution of one of the most ancient and historic civilisations. On its political side² the concentration of the whole political power in one person without representative institutions, the lack of proper administrative services, excessive despotism and bureaucratic tyranny, favouritism, caste spirit, cabal spirit, arbitrary action, cruelty, slackness, slavery to routine and hundred other vices, under the heap of which Roman civilisation, it may be pointed out, lies buried. Thus it was political, social and physical degeneration that wrecked the mighty vessel, with which the position of women is absolutely unconnected.

We saw at the zenith of the Roman power woman on her way of attaining the fulness of her personality. After the breakup of Roman civilisation, however, new religious and social principles based on pure authority and superstition entered and dominated the public life; and woman sank back again into legal and social subordination. If an equally bright civilisation had followed Roman civilisation as the Roman had done the Greek, the story of her development would have long been completed. But the dark ages that followed the Roman civilisation undid its whole fabric and the cause of woman passed into an abyss, from which it only emerged after a period of nearly fifteen hundred years.

^{1.} J. W. Mackail: The Lesson of Imperial Rome, pp. 29-30.

^{2.} Leon Homo: Roman Political Institutions, (1929), pp. 372-374.

CHAPTER III

WOMAN IN THE MIDDLE AGES

I

JUST as the mountain torrent rushing headlong from vale to vale is suddenly held up by an expansive morass stopping its force and obstructing its progress, so appear the earlier Middle Ages (500 to the close of 1100 A.D.) leaving an absolute blank in the whole story of woman's evolution.

Rise of Christianity determined the decline of woman's position. Christianity saw the world full of evils and so it came to its rescue to save it from its fall. The worst of the evils was woman; and so nothing but her complete subordination and subjection would save the world. Christian view of woman is, therefore, humiliating to the female sex. The humiliating conception of woman is due to ascetic ideas of Christianity that look upon all sexual life as a disgustful enemy of human salvation.¹ The views of Christ himself are opposed to marriage and sexual relationship. He looked upon marriage with utter contempt and preached: "Some there be that are eunuchs from their mother's womb, and some there be that are made eunuchs of men, and some there be that are eunuchs for the kingdom of heaven's sake." When his mother humbly sought his help at the marriage feast at Cana, his saintly voice replied: "Woman, what have I to do with thee?"

To Christianity 'Flesh' is evil and it corrupts man by creating various temptations in the way of his salvation. The saintly ideal which the early church fathers held before the public was, therefore, complete renunciation from all carnal pleasures. Celibacy became the ideal of saintly life for the

1. A full and critical exposition of Christian ethics on sexual matters is made in Part II, titled: Woman Challenges Sexual Ethics,

attainment of God's kingdom. The greatest obstacle to celibacy was woman; consequently she came low in public conception. The apostle who greatly influenced the views of the early church fathers was St. Paul, extremely ascetic in his views and conduct. In his famous epistle to the *Corinthians*, he doctrinates his views on marriage and woman:—

Now concerning the things whereof ye wrote unto me: it is good for a man not to touch a woman.

Nevertheless, to avoid fornication, let every man have his own wife, and let every woman have her own husband.

For I would that all men were even as myself.

I say therefore to the unmarried and widows, it is good for them if they abide even as I.

But if they cannot contain, let them marry: for it is better to marry than to burn.¹

In another place, in his epistle to *Timothy*, he brands woman with the following disqualifications²:

Let the woman learn in silence with all subjection.

But I suffer not a woman to teach, nor to usurp authority over the man, but to be in silence.

For Adam was first formed, then Eve.

And Adam was not deceived, but the woman being deceived was in the transgression.

From such and many other passages, it becomes evident that the one and the only impress that St. Paul and his followers created on the mind of the general public was the inherent impurity of all sexual life. Paul permitted marriage not on the positive ground of spiritual necessity but on the negative

- ,1. I Corinthians, Chapter VII, verses 1, 2, 7-9.
- 2. I Timothy, Chapter II, verses 11-14.

Paul's other sayings on women that greatly influenced public opinion can be copiously quoted. In *I. Corinthians* he says: ".... A man indeed ought not to cover his head, forasmuch as he is in the image and glory of God: but woman is the glory of the man. For the man is not of the woman; but the woman of the man. Neither was the man created for the woman, but the woman for the man." *I. Corinthians*, 11 verses 7-9.

"Let your women keep silence in churches: for it is not permitted unto them to speak; but they are commanded to be under obedience, as also saith the law." I Corinthians, 14, verse 34.

ground of it; it was to avoid all illicit intercourse, which he called fornication, that marriage was permitted as a substitute. Better is marriage than fornication, but this in regard to the choice between the two; otherwise both are evils, one of less and the other of a greater degree.

As the love of the sexes appeared to the church fathers as the root cause of many evils-if not all, virginity was praised, adored and advised. As Paul himself preached: "He that giveth the virgin in marriage doeth well; but he that giveth her not doeth better." Virginity came to be associated with the working of miracles. Mary, the sister of Moses, leading the female band, passed on foot over the straits of the sea; and by the same grace of virginity Thelca was reverenced even by lions, so that the unfed beasts, lying at the feet of their prey, underwent a holy fast, neither with wanton look nor sharp claw venturing to harm the virgin—such was the power of her virginity. Virginity was to these fathers like a spring flower from the white petals of which immortality radiated out. In his letter to Eustochium, a young Roman girl who had dedicated her life to Christ in perpetual virginity, Jerome admonishes her: "Do not count the company of married ladies or visit the houses of the high-born....Learn in this respect a holy pride; know that you are better than they." And further he says: "Virginity is natural, while wedlock only follows guilt."

As the Church looked upon all sexual life in terms of contempt and disapprobation, woman came to be looked upon, as naturally as it could be imagined, as the 'gate of hell.' "You are the devil's gateway," writes the famous Tertulian! "—you are she who persuaded him whom the devil was not valiant enough to attack. On account of you even the son of God had to die." He further arraigns them: "The very women of these heretics, how wanton they are! for they are bold enough to teach, to dispute, to undertake cures, and even

^{1.} Tertulian was a native of North Africa. He practised law and became converted to Christianity. He died at the beginning of the 3rd century.

^{2.} Taken from: E. M. White: Woman's Place in Great Religions, pp. 307-308.

to baptise." St. John Chrysostom writes with the following attitude: "Thou art the devil's gate, the betrayer of the tree, the first deserter of the divine law what sayest thou, O woman? Why, thou hast no longer a body of thine own!.... she shall not demand equality for she is under the head."

To Christianity woman is the unclean one, the seducer who brought sin into the world. It is she who gave a great set-back to man's salvation by tempting him to many pleasures of the senses, "Walk in the spirit of, and fulfil not the lust of the flesh; for the flesh lusteth against the spirit, and the spirit against the flesh." This hatred of the 'flesh' is nothing but the hatred of woman. The effect of such ascetic principles on woman's position in the words of Bertrand Russell was "that they inevitably, through the emphasis laid upon sexual virtue, did a great deal to degrade woman. Since the moralists were men, woman appeared as the temptress, it was desirable to curtail her opportunities for leading men into temptation. Consequently respectable women were hedged about with restrictions, while the women who were not respectable being regarded as sinful were treated with utmost contumely."3 The worst moral effect of preachings like

"Wives, submit yourselves unto your own husbands, as unto the Lord. For the husband is the head of the wife, even as Christ is the head of the church:4

was, as Principal Donaldson points out, that they tended to lower the character of woman and contract the range of their activities.

We now understand how with such ethics Christianity greatly degraded woman in popular conception, who was to be tolerated only as a necessary evil. Throughout the centuries that followed from the Middle Ages down to the close of the nineteenth century—excepting the bright span of 'Chivalry'—these impressions were writ hard on the minds of men and account in a large degree for the social and legal disabilities with which woman was enthralled.

^{1.} Taken from: E. M. White: Woman's Place in Great Religions, pp. 307-8.

^{2.} Ibid.

^{3.} Bertrand Russell: Marriage and Morals.

^{4.} Ephesians, Chapter 5, verses 22-23.

II

We are entering into the Middle Ages with its background filled in with such social and moral principles as described above. The hold of the Church over the public was so enormously powerful that all constituent factors of society, from the highest kings and nobles to the lowest burghers and peasants, all owned allegiance and obedience to it. Influence of the Church had deeply penetrated into the private and public life. "Control of church over the affairs of the daily life," writes Dr. Emerton in his study of the Middle Ages, "was gradually growing, and had paved the way for the entire subjection of all human concerns to the Papal will, which in short time became the groundwork of mediæval society."

The social conception of woman also was therefore greatly moulded after the views of the Church.³ The clergy were the worst slanderers of the female sex. They could never get out of their heads the part that Eve had played in the unfortunate incident of the apple in the Garden of Eden; and they therefore assumed that as the first woman had brought sin into the world by tempting Adam, so all women were temptresses and responsible for most of the sins committed by men, and they did not hesitate to preach so openly. The Mediæval Church, of which all the official members—the clergy, monks, nuns, etc. were according to the ascetic principle celibate, therefore, lost no opportunity of praising the beauty of celibacy and disparaging married life. "As the ascetic ideal rose and flourished and monasticism became the refuge of many of the finest minds and most ardent spirits. there came into being, as an inevitable consequence, a conception of woman as the supreme temptress, 'ianua diaboli,' the dangerous of all obstacles in the way of salvation." Monastic point of view, therefore, slowly permeated society. Society began to think

- 1. Elinor Glyn: Love: What I Think of it, p. 32.
- 2. Dr. Ephraim Emerton: An Introduction to the Study of the Middle Ages, (1888), p. 160.
- 3. "The dogmas of the Christian Church were simply a manifestation of the particular concept and attitude towards woman and parenthood which dominates the Early and Midfamilial epochs in any and every ethnic setting."—Dr. Muller Lyer in Family, p. 228.

in terms of inferiority and subordination of women. "The common people," writes Salzman, "heard women continually abused from the pulpit not unnaturally they had rather a low view of womankind, and popular literature is full of stories—their fickleness, deceit, extravagance, and above all their inability to keep either silence or a secret; such as:—

One thyng forsoth I have spied All women be not long-tied; For if they be, they be belied If ought be said to them, certayn Were you they will not answer agayn Yea, for every word twayn

and:

They be as close and covert as the hory of Gabriel That will not be heard but from heaven to hell."1

The low popular estimate of woman consequent upon the preaching of the Church, we meet with in Coulton's Life in the Middle Ages in which he has depicted life, thought and manners in mediæval Europe by the production of some authentic documents. Thus the clergy gives mass to the women assembled round him: "Hast thou noted, when the pack sitteth ill (on a mule) and the one side weigheth more than the other? Knowest thou that a stone is laid on the other side that it may sit straight? So I say of matrimony: it was ordained that the one might aid the other in keeping the burden straight. And mark me, women, that I hold with you so far as to say that ye love your husbands better than they love you."2 Notice how the preacher—possibly a saint—sermonises on marriage so as to compare woman to a mere dead weight, having no other use in life but to balance the life of man. In the same discourse, the worthy preacher ostracises the man who, "if she speak a word more than he thinketh fit, forthwith taketh a staff and beateth her, but hath patience with the hen that cockles all day long"; and he asks this wicked fellow to have patience with her and give her kind treatment looking

^{1.} L. F. Salzman: English Life in the Middle Ages, (1926), p. 250.

^{2.} Dr. G. G. Coulton: Life in the Middle Ages, (1928), p. 220.

to the "noble fruit that she beareth for him." So the only ground on which woman commands respect is not, in the opinion of these days' leaders, her intrinsic worth, but her capacity to bear children.

Falsehood and dissimulation were, according to the then conception, ingrained in woman's heart. The following story cited in the above-mentioned book is strikingly illuminating. There was a lady called Madonna Saragia who very much liked the cherries grown in her vine-yard. One Saturday her farmerhailiff brought her a basket full of cherries. She was extremely pleased at the sight and thanked him. She then took away the basket into her private chamber and began eating the cherries by the handful, leaving only a few for her husband. Then when her husband came for dinner, she lav before him those few cherries that she had left and said: "The bailiff is come and hath brought us a few cherries." And when the meal was over, she began to eat thereof in the presence of the bailiff. While eating she took them one by one and made seven bites of each cherry; and while eating she said to the bailiff: "What eating is there of cherries in the country?" "Lady," said he, "we eat them as you ate them even now in your room. We eat them by the handful." "Ugh! la!" cried out the lady, "How saith the fellow? fie on thee, knave!" "Lady," said he again, "we eat them even I have said."2 When such stories were told in their sermons by responsible persons like the priests, we can little wonder why woman occupied a low position in the society of those days. If looking after the household was held to be her only and the most sacred duty on the ground of its capacity to make the husband happy, she was of course thought to be little deserving any privileges. much less rights.

Throughout the Middle Ages, woman's sphere was limited to the home. Legally she was dependent on her father, husband or other guardian as in early antiquity. In conformity with the Catholic Church's view of woman being a second-rate being, any kind of right or authority was most scrupulously denied to her. The married woman lived in the strict-

^{1.} Dr. G. G. Coulton: Life in the Middle Ages, (1928), p. 224.

^{2.} Ibid., p. 229.

est retirement. She worked from morn to night and even then her work could be completed with the help of her daughters. The sphere of her work was not only household duties, but it occupied an extensive area consisting of works from which the modern women are free on account of industrial development. She went to the field and garden, attended to the poultry. She had to spin, weave and bleach, to make all linen and clothes, to boil soap, to make candles, and brew the beer. And in return for this host of duties in which she travailed day in and day out, what society gave her was supine obedience and servility to her husband. As Joseph McCabe puts it: "Socially, woman became once more absolutely subject to her husband. In the new marriage ceremony, she pledged herself to blind obedience to his orders; and both Church and State gave him the power to flog her when he thought fit, and for a long time gave him the power to sell or dismiss her."1

The parental power in early Middle Ages was so much extensive that a father could sell his daughter. "The ecclesiastical as well as the civil law gave this right of sale to the parent expressly stating that upto the age of sixteen a girl was in the power of her parents."2 Marriage was, indeed, for the most part a matter of arrangement—a commercial transaction, in which the feelings of the bride were very little considered. "If a man buy a maiden with cattle," the law laid down, "let the bargain stand, if it be without guile; but if there be guile, let him bring her home again, and let his property³ be restored to him."⁴ We may gather from this that the early marriage in the Middle Ages was but little more than a commercial bargain. In particular a wealthy heiress was regarded as a valuable property to dispose of and a good investment to obtain.⁵ It was not unnatural for parents to arrange marriages of their daughters on this commercial basis even when they were still infants.

Once married, the first duty of the wife was to be meek

- 1. Joseph McCabe: Woman in Political Evolution, p., 44.
- 2. A. R. Cleveland: Woman under the English Law, (1896), p. 35.
- 3. Note the maiden is called property.
- 4. A. R. Cleveland: Woman under the English Law, p. 36.
- 5. L. F. Salzman, English Life in the Middle Ages, p. 252.

and obedient to her husband; and the husband had full authority to enforce her obedience by personal chastisement. It was only in the case of extreme cruelty that her kindred would feel bound to interfere. The ideal of wifehood in these days is depicted in Griselda of Chaucer. Raised from poverty to be the wife of a great Marquis, she is put to a variety of tests. She is compelled to give up her children (to be slain, as she believes it), to give up her wealth and position, and even to act as servant to the new wife that the Marquis declares he is going to marry, all of which she does without a murmur. for which her husband lavishes her with praise and graciously restores her to her former position. Griselda, to modern eyes, is a worm and no woman. The married state was in no way one of happiness to the woman. "The lives of some of the unmarried women of the period," writes Jarret in his Social Theories of the Middle Ages, "indicate that sometimes at any rate the happiness, or at least content of a woman's life, could be achieved even in the single state." Besides owing abject subjection to her husband, the married woman, as we have pointed out, had a great amount of work to do both inside and outside the house which sapped her very energy and vitality. To begin with, there was the care of the servants who must be treated fairly, neither too strictly nor too leniently; they were not to be kept idle. Then she would look after the herb garden, help with such work as hay-making, go into the market with butter, cheese, eggs, poultry, make malt, and brew ale. She would again do the whole cooking. Then she would do spinning, weaving and embroidery work. Again, as Salzman points out, the mediæval woman was also skilled in compounding medicines from herbs which she administered to her household and to other poor neighbours.2 And amidst these various types of duties and works she reared and looked after her children. Mediæval woman was, therefore, a veritable beast of burden.

The earliest Anglo-Saxon law allowed divorce to the husband on the ground of adultery of the wife. In the case of the wife, however, non-consummation of marriage was the only

^{1.} Bede Jarrett: Social Theories of the Middle Ages, (1926), p. 78.

^{2.} L. F. Salzman: English Life in the Middle Ages, p. 258.

ground on which the ecclesiastical law gave her a decree of nullity; the ground of the husband's adultery was not recognised in her. So according to the Teutonic legal and moral conception, only the wife could commit adultery. The punishment visited upon the wife for adultery was extremely brutal and unjust. "If during her husband's life," runs Cnut's law, "a woman lie with another man, and it became public, let her afterwards be for a worldly shame as regards herself, and let her lawful husband have all that she possessed, and let her then forfeit both nose and ears; and if it be a prosecution and the laid fail, let the bishop use his power and doom severely." In Copenhagen, in the fifteenth century, the adulteress was buried alive.2 Such brutal punishments were visited on the unfaithful wife not from the ethical or pseudoidealistic stand-point as a crime against morality or sanctity of marriage. Adultery was considered as an invasion of the proprietary right of the husband. His wife was part of his property.3

During the Middle Ages when, in the happy words of Prof. Bury, reason was in prison,4 belief in witchcraft, magic and demons became far more lurid and made the world terrible. "Men believed that they were surrounded by fiends watching for every opportunity to harm them, that pestilences, storms, eclipses and famines were the work of the Devil." And quite consistently with their faith in every word of the Holy Scripture, they thought that they should not suffer a witch to live, and many a woman became victims being suspected of witchcraft. A woman suspected of this fantastic crime was bound hand and foot, and thrown into a river or pond. If the unfortunate person survived, that accounted for her innocence, but through this fiery ordeal (or should it be called 'watery') she scarcely survived. At a later period witchcraft was legislated into an offence punishable by death.6

- 1. Cleveland: Woman under the English Law, p. 52.
- 2. Thwing: Family, p. 94.
- 3. Muller-Lyer: The Family, p. 224.
- 4 Prof. J. B. Bury: A History of Freedom of Thought, p. 51.
- 5. Ibid., p. 66.
- 6. Cleveland: Woman under the English Law, p. 99.

The education of girls in the Middle Ages is a subject of which not much is known. Owing to the absence of any institution for girls corresponding to the grammar schools for boys, it is probable that few women of the middle and lower classes had any kind of education. And though in the noble and wealthy classes of society the proportion of girls who could read and write was high, the instruction was limited to the reading and writing of English and French. Education for the development of personality, as is the main object of true education, was not given to girls as it was to boys. And the reason of this is queerly given by Philipe de Navarre in his treatise "Des quatre tens d'aage d'ome." he says, "have a great advantage in one thing; they can easily preserve their honour, if they wish to be held virtuous, by one thing only. But for a man many are needful if he wish to be esteemed as virtuous, for it behoves him to be courteous and generous, brave and wise. And for a woman, if she be a worthy woman of her body, all her other faults are covered and she can with a high head wheresoever she will; and therefore it is in no way needful to teach as many things to girls as to boys."2

It is evident from this survey of woman's position in the early Middle Ages that woman was under absolute legal and social subjection of man. Woman was meant as the help-mate for man; and despite her prerogative and excellences, which surpassed man's, she had to remain in subjection to man for whom she was considered to be made. The mediæval moralist might say: "Subjection is two-fold. One is servile, by virtue of which a superior makes use of his subjects for his own benefit, and this kind of subjection began after sin. There is another kind of subjection, which is called economic or civil, whereby the superior makes use of his subjects for their own benefit or good; and this kind of subjection existed before

^{1. &}quot;The education of girls in the Middle Ages did not go beyond knowing how to read the Psalter and to write her own letters—any further education being thought as superfluous, if not actually undesirable."—M. Phillips and W. S. Tomkinson: English Women in Life and Letters, (1926), p. 5.

^{2.} See Crump and Jacob: Legacy of the Middle Ages, p. 404.

sin. For good order would have been wanting in the human family if some were not governed by others wiser than themselves. So by such a kind of subjection woman is naturally (i.e. by nature) subject to man, because in man the discretion of reason predominates."

III

Later Middle Ages (1200 to 1500 A.D.) appear like a rift in the clouded skies. With the dawn of the twelfth century, ideas and institutions became immensely changed. Out of the ashes of the dying feudalism arose the knight of 'chivalry' who gave to Europe not only the conception of a perfect warrior sworn to uphold religion, to redress human wrongs and protect the weak, but also the idea of a perfect gentleman whose love romances have since provided a fund of myths and stories to the later poets and singers. We get a stirring picture of the knights of the day in the words of Arthur picturesquely coloured by England's Poet-Laureate, Tennyson. Says King Arthur:

I made them lay their hands in mine and swear
To reverence the king as though he were
Their conscience, and their conscience as their king
To break the heathen and uphold the Christ
To ride abroad redressing human wrongs,
To speak no slander, no, nor listen to it,
To lead sweet lives in purest chastity,
To love one maiden only, cleave to her
And worship her by years of noble deeds,
Until they won her.

To this glorious knighthood that emerged out of the nobility of the mediæval feudalism, idealistic love and services of the chosen lady became the most inspiring forces in life. In feudalism, we know, love and marriage were completely divorced; and the wife of the knight and baron was a serf and a chattel. "In most of the early poems of France the knight is intent only on the pursuit of war and is usually indifferent to the charms of the fair sex. These warriors

^{1.} Summa Theologica, quoted by B. Jarrett: Social Theories of the Middle Ages, p. 72.

thought less of a beautiful woman than of a good lance thrust or a fine charger. Woman was in fact so little esteemed in these early days that poets sometimes tell us how the lord availed himself of his feudal rights to beat his wife." But now the new era of chivalry that had appeared on the historic stage presents an entirely different scene. The true knight whose mind was formed in the best mould of chivalric principles was a more perfect personification of love than poets and romances have ever dreamed. The fair object of his passion became now truly and emphatically the mistress of his heart. His love was

"All adoration, duty, and observance."

Thus a renaissance of love had dawned; and we see the knight, valiant, noble-minded and gentle in the company with his lady-love whose picture is equally fair and pleasing. Woman became the source of his inspiration and the object of his knightly vows. For the vindication of her honour and dignity he would spare nothing; and to win her applause and love he would risk anything. As Henry Hallam says: "Courtesy had always been the proper attribute of knighthood, protection of the weak its legitimate duty; but these were heightened to a pitch of enthusiasm when woman became their object."

It was a triumph of woman. In love, as in war, the knight, lit up with the loftiest ideals of chivalry, saw the consummation of his life. His mistress he conceived as the embodiment of all that was worthy of honour and worship. And he wished, therefore, that the domination of his mistress should be absolute. In the words of the English poet, Gower, every knight said:

"In every place, in every stead, Whatso my lady hath me bid With all my heart obedient I have there to be deligent."

And every gallant spirit of Gower's days said of his mistress:

- 1. Edgar Prestage: Chivalry, (1928), p. 66.
- 2. Henry Hallam: View of the State of Europe during the Middle Ages, Vol. III, p. 438.

"What thing she bid me, I do;
And where she bid me go, I go;
And when she likes to call, I come;
I serve, I bow, I look, I loute;
My eye followeth her about;
What she will, so will I.
When she would sit, I kneel by;
And when she stands, then will I stand;
And when she taketh her work in hand
Of wevying or of embroidrie,
Then can I not but muse and prie
Upon her fingers, long and small."

Love, then, was a marked feature in the chivalric character and valour; and in the phrase of the time, he who understood how to throw a lance but did not understand how to win a lady was but half a man. The knight fought to gain her smiles, for love in brave and gentle knights kindled inspiration for the highest honour. "O! my lady saw me," was the ecstatic exclamation of many a knight in the pride of successful valour, as he mounted the city's wall, and with his good sword was proving the worth of his chivalry.1 In the well-known words of Don Quixote, "a knight without a mistress was like a tree without either fruit or leaves, or a body without a soul, a ship without a rudder." Such expressions were characteristic of chivalric love that assigned a high and dignified position to woman. It was no wonder then that she became the dictatress of the knight's thoughts, the inspirer of his courage. All the heroes of the age have accordingly a mistress in the background who uplifts them to acts of valour. And whatever might have been his true reason for fighting, the knight's only avowed motive was the love of his lady in whose exalted name proceeded the challenge to combat.

A story² which is typical of the age is that of Olivier Mauni and the Partridges. During the siege of Reunes by the Duke of Lancaster, an English knight approached the walls of the town carrying some partridges he had taken in the

^{1.} Charles Mills: History of Chivalry, Vol. 1, p. 200.

^{2.} Edgar Prestage: Chivalry, P. 68.

fields and expressed a desire to speak with Du Guesclin, the commander of the defence. He was accosted at the gate by Olivier Mauni who asked whether he would give or sell the partridges for the ladies of the town. The English knight thereupon challenged the Frenchman to fight for them. Olivier was fully prepared for this and the fight started beneath the walls of the town. Finally the English knight was overpowered by Olivier who led him across the moat and into the city and there he presented him to the ladies together with the partridges. This story illustrates how the honour of the fair sex was to the valiant knight more sacred than his own life. Another gallant story recorded in the Chronicles of Froissart¹ is of Oueen Isabella and William and John of Hainault. When Oueen Isabella left her husband Edward II and fled to France, she hoped in the first place to get help from her brother, the king of France. But she failed in that quarter, and she next appealed to William of Hainault and his brother John who were held as models of chivalry. This time, therefore, her appeal was not in vain. When she arrived fugitive and penniless at Valenciennes, the knights of Hainault rode out to greet her. The expedition to England was, in the opinion of many, too dangerous an enterprise. But John of Hainault imbibed with the glorious spirit of chivalry thought little of it. "Every knight," he declared, "must do his best to help women and maidens in distress." So he submitted to the lady: "Certainly, fair lady, behold me here, your own knight who shall not fail you to die in the quarrel. I shall do the best of my power to conduct you and, my lady, your son and help to bring you into your estates in England." He had only to die once, and he would bravely do so in the cause of the noble lady who had been driven from her kingdom. An expedition was accordingly raised which brought about the dethronement of Edward II and the coronation of his son Edward III. Another knight called the Knight of the Swan reinstated a lady in the possession, of which the Duke of Saxony had deprived her.2

^{1.} See the Chronicles of Froissart, (1895), pp. 6-12.

^{2.} Charles Mills: History of Chivalry, Vol. I. p. 222.

Chivalric conception of love and woman was of an idealistic nature. A soldier of chivalry would go to battle, a pursuivant of love; and in the contests of chivalric skill which gave brilliancy and splendour to war, a knight challenged his antagonist in the name of the love of ladies, and he commended himself to the mistress of his heart for protection and assistance. He conceived woman as a being of mystic power. "In the forest of Germany her voice had been listened to like that of the spirits of the wood, melodious, solemn and oracular; and when chivalry was formed into a system, the same idea of something supernaturally powerful in her character threw a shadowy and serious interest over softer feelings, and she was revered as well as loved." It was this kind of mystic love with which he was imbibed that the knight answered with enthusiasm and vigour the various calls of chivalry—he fought the battles of his country and church and he travelled to foreign lands as a pilgrim and crusader. He always faced the front in the battle and was the last in the retreat; and this conduct in war was, in his opinion, the surest way of winning a lady whose love was to him the crowning grace, the guerdon of his soul, and its gentle influence was a great force in the discharge of his gallant and solemn duties.

It is now clear that woman had become the centre of chivalric life. And this was a reaction against the old ecclesiastical idea which regarded woman as a 'gate to hell.' Woman whom society disparaged and depreciated became the very centre of being. Men refined their feelings, ennobled their ideas, practised self-restraint, put on good manners, developed taste for art, so that the idol of their worship may be pleased. Thus there came about a deification of woman which had not in it the least tinge of passion or lust, it was the spiritual love of man for woman.

This deification of woman—this spiritual conception of love in the later Middle Ages is exhaustively dealt with in his *Evolution of Love* by Emil Lucka; and we cannot help the temptation of drawing upon it to make clear how this spiritual conception raised woman to the highest pedestal of

1. Charles Mills: History of Chivalry, Vol. I, p. 198.

2. Emil Lucka: The Evolution of Love. (1922).

honour and dignity she has ever attained. Thus she was no longer, as Lucka remarks, "the medium for the satisfaction of the male impulse or the rearing of children..., no longer the silent drudge or the devout sister of the first Christian millenary; no longer the she-devil of the first monkish conception; transcending humanity, she had been exalted to the heavens and had become a goddess."

This was a compensation to woman for the humiliation that was heaped upon her under a narrow conception of sensuality and lust. Man now prostrated himself before this great goddess. She was the climax of earthly perfection. "What were the world if beauteous women were not," sang Johannes Madlaub, a German poet.

We find in the poetry of the time¹ the expression of this chaste and genuine love of woman, untainted by sensuality or lust. Thus sang Gullem Augier Novella:

"Lady, often flow my tears,
Glad songs in my mem'ry ring
For the love that makes my blood
Dance and sing.
I am yours with heart and soul
If it please you, lady, slav me."

And said Bernart of Ventadour:

"God keep my lady fair from grief and woe,
I'm close to her, however far I go;
If God will be her shelter and her shield,
Then all my heart's desire is fulfilled."

And also Elias of Barjols:

"Full of joy I am and sorrow When I stand before her face."

In the love-songs of the time the mistress is always above the rank of the lover who would like to be her serf and servant. "I would rather win a kind glance from my lady's eyes than the crown of France," was a frequent expression of the poets. This supreme reverence for chaste love is the main characteristic of the time. The dominant feeling was that

^{1.} Emil Lucka: The Evolution of Love, (1922), pp. 122-145.

chaste love alone could make a man noble, good and wise. Thus sang Lapo Gianni, an Italian poet:

> "The youthful maiden who appeared to me So filled my soul with pure and lofty thoughts, That henceforth all ignoble things I scorn."

And the famous Dante calls Beatrice "the destroyer of all evil and the queen of all virtues." The very thought of the beloved purifies the lover's mind.

"I cannot sin when I am in her thoughts," sings Guirot Riquier who wants to know what it was to love a woman truly.

This spiritual love and deification of woman was developed and carried to perfection by the greater and profounder Italian poets. Purely spiritual woman-worship was in itself conceived as an immortal virtue. Thus Guinicelli ennobles and worships his mistress:

"A song she seems among the rest and those Have all their beauties in her splendour drowned.

In her is every grace-

Simplicity of wisdom, noble speech,

Accomplished loveliness;

All earthly beauty is her diadem.

This truth my song must teach

My lady is of ladies chosen gem."

This emotion was unique. As Lucka¹ remarks, "the beloved was more and more extolled; in her presence the lover became more and more convinced of his insignificance; she was worshipped, deified. The overwhelming emotion, the longing for metaphysical values which dominated the whole epoch, had reached its highest characteristic, had reached perfection." And in the deep obsession of profound and pure love, in full breath a Bernart would muse:

"I stand in my lady's sight
In deep devotion
Approach her with folded hands
In sweet emotion;

1. Emil Lucka: The Evolution of Love, p. 141.

Dumbly adoring her, Humbly imploring her."

And a Peire Vidal would almost adore her as God's most glorious of creations:

"God called the women close to Him, Because He saw all good in them."

and

"The God of righteousness endowed
So well thy body and thy mind
That his own radiancy grew blind
And many a soul that has not bowed
To Him for years in sin enmeshed,
Is by the grace and charm refreshed."

And Guilhem of Cabestaing:

"God has created her without a blemish Of His own beauty."

Such verses might be given ad infinitum to show how woman occupied a high place in the moral conception of the later Middle Ages. Woman's position was greatly redeemed and the graceful qualities of her nature blossomed into rich womanliness, "and the chastening influence of feminine gentleness and tenderness was, for the first time in history, felt by men." A pleasing picture of the domestic life of chivalry is drawn by Gower in describing the knight's mode of tendance on his mistress:

"And if she list to ridden out
On pilgrimage, or other stead,
I come, though I not be bid,
And take her in my arms aloft,
And set her in her saddle soft,
And so forth lead her by the bridle,
For that I would not be idle;
And if she list to ride in chare
And that I may thereof beware,
Anon, I shape to ride,
Right even by the chare's side;

1. Charles Mills: History of Chivalry, Vol. I, p. 257.

And as I may, I speak among And other while, I sing a song."

Woman was no longer kept in seclusion within the walls of home life, but was present at festivals and at tournaments.¹ The young maiden of the baronial mansion was accomplished in many arts. She arranged all the domestic economy. She learned from the monks the knowledge of vulnerary medicament. A fair maiden, it is said, could perform many wonderful cures as the most renowned and skilful leach.²

There was not only this domestic renaissance which restored woman to her true position—the mistress of the home; in social life too woman's position greatly retrieved. Thus woman was admitted to the various guilds of the later Middle Ages. The guild system which greatly flourished in those days was limited to men; but as public opinion became enlightened, women were admitted to a number of them with the same privileges and rights as men. The most important trades in which women were engaged in considerable numbers were woollen weaving, linen weaving, braiding, to some extent tailoring, fur-dressing, tanning, baking, leather cutting, armorial embroidery, goldsmith's work and gold-spinning. Women frequented the taverns as men did. They conducted retail shops and still more often sold such goods as fish and vegetables or fruit at stalls in the markets.3 Karl Bucher has given a fine account of various industries in which women were engaged. Thus we find women represented in marketing, huckstering, as dealers in frippery, as bath attendants, in copying as musicians in the taverns. Women were employed in the service of the municipality itself as nurses, and also as porters, gaolers, in the excise, in money-changing and in herding. Even women doctors are not of rare occurrence at the time, and some of them were granted remittances of taxes and honourable distinctions for curing persons in authority; and finally we not infrequently meet with women in the intelligence service as

^{1.} See W. C. Mellor: A Knight's Life in the Days of Chivalry, (1924), pp. 5-6.

^{2.} Charles Mills: History of Chivalry, Vol. I, p. 188.

^{3.} See L. F. Salzman: English Life in the Middle Ages, p. 264.

spies; and in spite of the constitution of guilds, we find many exceptions permitting female masters to keep journeymen and maids.

Woman's position, as far as sentiment and not legal practice was concerned, was thus fully restored. Woman who was treated with suspicion, disparagement and degradation by the puritan asceticism of the early Middle Ages, who was denied a soul at the Council of Macon (in the 6th century), became in the later Middle Ages more soulful and inspiring. What is most striking to a student of human psychology is the inspiring mystery with which she was surrounded and the idealistic love with which she was worshipped. They knew what woman really is. In her they found their consoler, solacer, and inspirer of great and valorous deeds. And at her feet they poured their romances and love-songs;—higher tribute to her is unthinkable.

CHAPTER IV

THE WOMAN MOVEMENT

I

I P to the middle of the last century the legal and social position of woman was one of great subordination and dependence. The deification of woman which flourished during the bright span of chivalry became, with the disappearance of the knight, a ridiculous thing. Woman, who was to the knight an inspiration of all his valorous deeds and for whose honour and love he pledged his life, came very low in the estimation of the later centuries. The chivalrous conceptions were carried to their extreme ridiculousness. Woman was admired and praised for the beauty and charm of her person; but society took this as her sole objective in life. Woman came to be looked upon as a pretty doll just to please man with the charm and grace of her personality. Society held woman as being created to gratify, with her sweet attractive charms and implicit blind obedience, the senses of man. All her education was consequently to be directed towards the art of pleasing. And that the fashionable education for women was in effect the art of pleasing may readily be seen in the authors of the period. For our purposes, Henry Fielding, one of the greatest novelists of this period, would give us an idea of this fashionable education in his farce, An Old Man Taught Wisdom. The plot is that of an old man planning to marry his only daughter Lucy. There are several suitors: an apothecary, a lawyer, a dancing singing master. Lucy pretends to love master, and a all in turn, though Thomas, her father's fine-looking young footman, was her heart. Confee, the dancing master, is indignant because Lucy is uninstructed in dance.

"Why madame," he says, "not learning to dance is absolute ruin to a young lady. I suppose your father took care enough you should learn to read."

Lucy: Yes, I can read well and spell too.

Confee: Aye, there it is, why now, that's more than I can do. All parents take care to instruct their children in low mechanical things while the genteel sciences are neglected.

Education for women was thus taken as instruction in 'genteel' sciences, so that woman should be perfect in the art of pleasing men. What we wonder at is that even an enlightened genius like Rousseau holds a very low conception of woman's worth. "Men and women," he says, "are made for each other, but their mutual dependence differs in degree; man is dependent on woman through his desires; woman is dependent on man through her desires and also through her needs: he could do without her better than she can do without him. His morals, his passions, his tastes, his pleasures, his happiness itself, depend on her. A woman's education must therefore be planned in relation to man. To be pleasing in his sight, to win his respect and love, to train him in childhood, to tend him in manhood, to counsel and console, to make his life pleasant and happy, these are the duties of woman for all time; this is what she should be taught while she is young."1 And for this very reason, gentleness, docility and spaniel-like obedience were counted as great virtues of women. What a grotesque caricature of chivalrous ideas! While discussing natural aptitudes of woman, her supreme duties and her innate subordination to man. Rousseau indulges in the following perfidious philosophy: "...it follows the woman is expressly formed to please the man. If the obligation be reciprocal also, and man ought to please in return, it is not so immediately necessary: his great merit is in his power, and he pleases merely because he is strong. This, I must confess, is not the refined maxim of love; it is, however, one of the laws of nature, prior to herself." His philosophy of lasciviousness goes so far as to say that modes of attack and defence between the sexes are facilitated by endowing man with boldness and woman with timidity, so that armed with modesty and bashfulness woman should subdue man.2

^{1.} Rousseau: Emile. (Barbara Foxley's Translation), p. 328.

^{2.} Ibid., p, 322.

For this art of pleasing men, girls were to be early subjected to restraint. "This misfortune, if it really be one, is inseparable from their sex.... They must be subject all their lives to the most and constant restraint, which is that of decorum." Fashion, consequently, became the art of woman's life. It was this alone which occupied the thought and life of most of the women, whose profession, according to Rousseau, was to be only coquetry. The way of life of a fashionable woman of the period could hardly be better illustrated than in the following stanzas selected from Swift's Journal of a Modern Lady:

"The modern dame is waked by noon, (Some authors say not quite so soon), Because, though sore against her will, She sat all night up at quadrille. She stretches, gapes, unglues her eyes, And asks if it be time to rise; Of headache and the spleen complains; And then to cool her heated brains, Her night-gown and her slippers brought her, Takes a large dram of citron water.

But see, the female club disbands, Each twenty visits on her hands. Now all alone poor maiden sits In vapours and hysteric fits;

"Here Betty, let me take my drops; And feel my pulse, I know it stops;

"Dear madam, try to take a nap"— But now they hear a footman rap: "Go, run, and light the ladies up: It must be one before we sup."

^{1.} Rousseau: Emile, (Barbara Foxley's Translation), p. 329.

The table, cards, and counters set, And all the gamester ladies met, Her spleen and fits recovered quite, Our madam can sit up all night;

The time too precious now to waste, And supper gobbled up in haste. Again afresh to cards they run, As if they had but just begun."

In another of his sarcastic poems, Furnishing a Woman's Mind, 1727, Swift paints the picture of the woman of his time as one who could

".....in her club dispute
What lining best the silk would suit
What colours each complexion match
And where with art to place a patch."

In *Pamela* (1741) Richardson picturesquely describes the general fashionable life of women by presenting the contents of a fashionable woman's diary. Following are her engagements:

January.

- 1. *Monday*. To call at Deards in the morning.

 To dine with my husband's uncle, the city merchant.
- Tuesday. In the morning with the Miss Flareits, to drive at the silk mercers' etc. At night to go to the Opera.
- Wednesday. Expert Mademoiselle La Tourne to try on my French head. In the evening to pay forty-three visits.
- 4. *Thursday*. My own day. At home. To have a drum major and seventeen card-tables.
- Friday. To go to the auction with Lady Nicknack. To dine at home with a parcel of my husband's city relations.
- 6. Saturday. Monsieur le Frise all the morning to dress my head. A Night (being Twelfth Night) at court. To dance if I can with the handsome Bob Brilliant.

7. Sunday. If I rise soon enough, St. James Church. Lady Bragy's in the evening.

Women were persistently taught in and out of home that life's bargain could be successfully knocked down only if one was possessed with the handsome price of 'beauty.' Woman without this valuable and essential endowment had no prospects of a happy life. It was the prevailing conception that women were created rather to feel than to reason and all the powers they obtain must be obtained by their charms. This idealisation of physical charm and beauty as the only objects and business of woman's life, as the weapons which she must scrupulously guard to win over the hearts of men, and the humiliation and disgrace in which she falls were she to lose these, is graphically described by Pope in his mock-heroic poem, Rape of the Lock.

Under this pale of conception, marriage became the price-less thing for women. The novels of the last two centuries present pictures of mothers and daughters in keen look-out after marriageable young men, and their whole discussions and talks centre round matrimony. To the society the one aim of woman's life was to get married; the woman that remained unmarried, for whatever reasons, was reckoned a social failure. Thus the first and the most significant duty of a girl was to prepare for marriage. "What business," would they ask, "have women turned to forty to do in the world?" So the one aim of marriage was to be pursued with unceasing vigilance. In accordance with this, woman's education, dress, manners and thoughts were attempted to be moulded just to suit the pursuit and success of this one object.

Social and legal position of woman was consequently one of subordination and dependence. She passed her life pleasantly if she was beautiful and gay and was fortunate enough in her family surroundings. If, however, her father, brother or husband was ill-disposed, the whole fabric of her life might be shattered through no fault of her own. For, she was only relative to man having no independent standing in social life. Marriage fused her whole existence in her husband, under whose protection, cover and wing she acted and was therefore

called 'Fame Covert.' The property, the earnings, the liberty, and even the conscience of a wife all belonged to her husband, as did also the children she might bear.

The legal and social subordinate position of woman was due to social belief in her innate inferiority—intellectual and moral. Woman must, therefore, be protected, sheltered and indulged—so ran the theory. Her best accomplishments, one could easily gather from the novels and plays of the period, centred round good cooking and wholesome stupidity. Ambition, achievement and independence were regarded foreign to her personality; obedience, humility and unselfishness were regarded her best virtues.

The effect of this social attitude and treatment of woman was disastrous. Woman came to regard herself greatly subordinate and inferior to man whom she came to regard her great superior in intelligence, integrity and thought. She felt her existence futile without his guidance and help. "The women who were brought up under this convention grew accustomed to it, and loved it. They sheltered under the irresponsibility it gave them, and they hugged the 'chains' which seemed so protective."4 Their inferiority complex became so very impressed on their brain cells that they never thought of any higher pursuits in life. They indulged the whole time in frivolous pursuits of fashion and decorum. They never knew the meaning and value of true education—the ideals that it visualises before human mind and its capacity to contribute to the growth of human personality. Their intellect was closed to the economic and political conditions amidst which they moved and on which depended their well-being. This criminal ignorance in which they were brought up by men was responsible for the social parasitism in the domain of culture of half of the human world.

- 1. The right of a man to imprison his wife in his own house was not questioned till 1891.
- 2. Crimes other than murder and high treason, committed by a woman in the presence of her husband, were presumed to have been committed under coercion and she was exonerated from the guilt.
 - 3. Mothers had no guardianship rights at all before 1839.
 - 4. Ray Strachey: The Cause, p. 16.

II

The French Revolution became a new light in the social and political life of Europe. From the fifties of the 18th century social life and manners of Europe were undergoing enormous transformation. "Study of the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries," to quote only one great authority, "indicates beyond doubt that in most phases of life there came about what is perhaps as fundamental a change as is possible to human kind--a complete change of state."1 Political and social theories were exploring new avenues of thought. Philosophers and statesmen began discussing the meaning and purposes of government. Burke's Reflections on the French Revolution focussed attention on the subject. This great political philosopher was followed by Mackintosh, Priestley, Price, Bentham, Godwin and others, Of these Bentham is well-known for his utilitarian views. Welfare of mankind was, to him, the one and only motive on which the stability of government could subsist. As a forerunner of Utilitarians, he took the position that the only justification of government was its power to contribute to create maximum happiness for the largest number of its people. Adam Smith's Wealth of Nations (1776) was nothing but an appeal for the economic freedom of the individual. Thus we see that the latter part of the 18th century inaugurated a new era in the field of thought. Welfare of humanity became an absorbing subject for great thinkers of the age. In short, an era of philanthropy had set in, whose object was to diminish the volume of suffering among human beings and to promote their happiness. Coincidently, the age-old revolt against the inequalities, the injustices, the apparently unwarranted hardships imposed by social conditions, received a new impetus in the period of readjustment incident to the Napoleonic wars and the Industrial Revolution. The efforts of some reformers were consequently directed towards social legislation, political reform, education, the development of organisation designed to promote social welfare.

We now see that the great reforms and movements which

^{1.} James T. Shotwell: Records of Civilisation—Sources and Studies, Vol. II, (1926), p. 1x.

characterise the 19th century had their seeds already sown in the later 18th century. Nineteenth century is a century of hope -as Marvin called it. Throughout the nineteenth century we see "the Western mind gathering itself to the task of creative social and political reconstruction."1 This social and political reconstruction was only the fruition of the philanthropic movement of the earlier century. But what marks nineteenth century as the most revolutionary in the process of historical progress is rapid progress in scientific inventions transforming the whole outlook and conduct of life. There swept across the world a wave of universal change in human power and the material conditions of life. The accumulating knowledge and confidence of men who had been carrying on scientific investigations now began to bear fruit. The most obvious first fruit was the Steam Engine invented by James Watt—a mathematical instrument maker of Glasgow. It was made available for the driving of machinery and the first engine so employed was installed in a cotton mill in Nottingham in 1785. Trevithick adopted the Watt engine to transport and made the first locomotive. In 1830 the first railway between Liverpool and Manchester was opened. From 1830 onward railways multiplied. The later inventions of Volta, Galvani and Faradav—that gave electricity to the world—were a great wonder to the progressing humanity. Especially the steam railway and the electric telegraph were to the popular imagination of the middle nineteenth century the most striking and revolutionary of inventions.

It is now evident that the nineteenth century was palpitating with a new life. With the invention of steam engine, factories multiplied; distant parts of the world became linked with each other with the increase in transport facilities. The task of empire-building became easy and promising. People began to look ahead with hopes and ambition. Adventure received impetus and encouragement. Wealth began to flow like the streams in the full monsoon. But there was also another side to the picture. The factory system gave rise to a class called the capitalists who, for their selfish interests, began to employ children and women and exacted as much work as possible. The hours of labour were long. The condition of labourers' lives

^{1.} H. G. Wells: Outlines of History, (1920), p. 505.

became miserable. Their bodies were neglected along with their minds. In Mrs. Browning's poetry we get a stirring picture of a labourer's life in those times. This all gave rise to humanitarian and philanthropic movements. Philanthropists like Lord Ashley took interest in the cause of labourers. It inspired the efforts of factory reformers; and finally various factory acts were passed to ameliorate the conditions of labour.

Between the period 1814-1848 there was a considerable amount of liberal thinking and writing, the dominant liberal ideas being freedom and a certain vague equalitarianism. A number of experiments were attempted in the formation of trial human societies. One of these was the Oneid, a community (1845-1879) under the leadership of a man of very considerable genius and learning, John Humphrey Noys, who for a number of decades succeeded in realising many of the most striking proposals of Plato's Republic. Another historic figure of the time was Robert Owen (1771-1858), the father of modern socialism. His Utopian ideals and methods are too well-known to need any mention. In his model shops in his factory at New Lanark he experimented every kind of socialism which he exposed for the welfare of labourers. "As a matter of fact, there is scarcely a solution of any description which was not to some extent tried by him." Thus we see that humanitarian experiments were occupying a good deal of social field. Rise of trade unionism, its recognition by Parliament (1824), the Parliamentary Reform movement with its first marching success in 1832, abolition of slavery in 1833, the passing of the Poor Laws (1826, 1827, 1829, 1843), the Oxford movement—all these show the trend of the nineteenth century to ameliorate the conditions of human life.

We are now in a position to appreciate the genesis of the Woman Movement and its place in history. It was not the outcome of merely the outbursts of a few revolting women and men. It was the final flowering of the great human and philanthropic movements that arose in the late eighteenth and throughout the nineteenth century. We see throughout the nineteenth century the slave, the workman wishing to exercise his rights by joining a trade union; the non-conformist, the

^{1.} Gide and Rist: A History of Economic Doctrines, (1925), p. 235.

merchant and the manufacturer whose industry still bore the burden of excessive taxation, the citizen whose rights of representation were still limited to the mediæval system—all these we see emancipating from the restrictions and disabilities of the past. It was a natural result, therefore, that the removal of the above disabilities, the prevalence of the ideas of free development and the right to grow and live as a human being enunciated by thinkers from Bentham to Ruskin, made it imperative that "these rights should be extended to women, during the progress of the great wave of reform that filled the nineteenth century from the days of Peel and Huskisson onwards to the great Gladstone ministry of 1868-74."

A woman movement was, therefore, bound to be. In this great fabric the earliest thread woven by a woman herself we find in the work of Mary Wollstonecraft: A Vindication of the Rights of Women (1792). She was the first among women to raise the voice of protest against the unequal and unjust treatment given to woman. In this pioneer work she protested against the whole system of law and custom that governed women. In this book, most sincerely and frankly she animadverted society for the dire subjection, intellectual and moral, in which the whole womanhood was being brought up. Her work requires here a special treatment, as it was the first glowing torch lighted fearlessly and that ultimately became a great conflagration never afterwards to be extinguished.

Virtue in the broadest sense of the word, she started logically, is the one human accomplishment that distinguishes man from the brute. Virtue requires experience and knowledge. She deplored and resented that both these avenues were closed to women. The coquettish manner in which women were being brought up had turned them into domestic brutes. As Messrs. Phillips and Tomkinson point out, a miss of sixteen was introduced into the world who put away all trifling with books for the more serious business of life-routs, masquerades, balls and husband-hunting.² Woman was everywhere in this

^{1.} Quoted from S. A. Burslale: The History of Manchester School for Girls. (1911). p. 10.

^{2.} Phillips and Tomkinson: English Women in Life and Letters, p. 196.

deplorable state. And when men had various employments and pursuits which engaged their attention and gave character to the opening mind, women, confined to one and having their thoughts constantly diverted to the most insignificant part of themselves, seldom extended their views beyond the triumph of the hour. Wollstonecraft, therefore, made an appeal that it was time "to restore them their lost dignity" in order that they should become a part of the human species. And this, according to her, would be possible only if, instead of being shut up like the Eastern princesses, "women are educated in such a manner as to be able to think and act for themselves."

In a plain manner Wollstonecraft argued that it was vain to expect virtue from women till they were in some degree independent of men. Their supine dependence would make them only cunning, mean and selfish. "When women live by their personal charms," said she, "how can we expect them to discharge these ennobling duties which equally required exertion and self-denial?" Instead of following frivolous pursuits and decorating their physiques, she therefore desired women to come at the proper estimation of human values and thereby realise how their life was rich with great potentialities which, if developed, would open before them a new vista of life, would change their narrow outlook, refine their feelings and thought and ultimately make them into a cultural asset for social good and progress. She wanted women to develop supreme human qualities that lay dormant within them. "I earnestly wish to paint," she wrote, "in what true dignity and human happiness consist; I wish to persuade women to endeavour to acquire strength, both of body and mind, and to convince them that the soft phrases, 'susceptibility of heart,' 'delicacy of sentiment,' and 'refinement of taste,' are at most synonymous with the epithets of weakness and that these beings, who are only the objects of pity and that kind of love which has been termed its sister, will soon become objects of contempt."2

Education she particularly stressed as the only thing that liberates mind and intellect to great achievements in life,

^{1.} Wollstonecraft: A Vindication of the Rights of Women.

^{2.} Ibid., p. 25.

whether for man or woman. Education was never recognised as a feminine accomplishment. And the views of Rousseau, as already mentioned, measured it only in terms of arts of pleasing and domestic duties. Lord Chesterfield in his Letters to His Son expresses contemporary opinion when he says: "Women are only children of a larger growth.... A man of sense only trifles with them, plays with them, humours and flatters them. as he does a sprightly forward child; but he neither consults them about nor trusts them with serious matters, although he often makes them believe he does both, which is the thing in the world they are proud of." One could easily imagine the educational position of women in Wollstonecraft's times, when even as lately as 1887 we get a description of woman's education in the lamenting words of Lady Montague: "We are forbidden no books but such as tend to weakening or effeminating of the mind. Our natural defects are in every way indulged, and it is looked upon as in a degree criminal to improve our reason or fancy we have any. There is hardly a creature in the world more despicable or more liable to universal ridicule than that of a learned woman²: These words imply, according to the received sense, a tattling, impertinent, vain and conceited creature." Wollstonecraft's emphasis on liberal education for women can be well appreciated. Women who loitered with easy grace were, she declared, no better than drones. She appealed to them to study the art of healing and to be physicians as well as nurses. They should also study politics and settle their benevolence on the broadest basis. Reading of history in its true significance—the character of the times, the political movements and arts-would broaden their outlook and enlarge their vision. So also would be greatly beneficial to the development of their personality, various business pursuits followed in an orderly manner. The few employments that were open to

^{1.} Quoted from H. J. Mozans: Woman in Science, (1913), p. 97.

^{2.} It is worth while to know that Jane Austen never actually avowed the authorship of her books. And Bronte sisters and George Eliot wrote under pseudonyms—for the fear of overstepping the limits of their sex as understood by society.

^{3.} Lady Mary Montague: The Letters and Works, (1887), Vol. II, p. 5.

women in these days did not go beyond the menial type. Liberal professions would, in her opinion, greatly serve women in emancipating them from the idea of marriage as their only support. These respectable stations in life had become the monopoly of men, which she vehemently resented. She put a straight question to society when she said: "How many women thus waste away life, the prey of discontent, who might have practised as physicians, regulated a farm, managed a shop, and stood erect supported by their own industry, instead of having their heads surcharged with due excess of sensibility, that consumes the beauty to which it at first gave lustre, etc."

Nobody else had before made such a feeling appeal for granting liberal education to women as Wollstonecraft. Man should form with woman rational fellowship and not make her into an obedient slave. Liberal education alone would make a woman a more observant daughter, more affectionate sister, a more faithful wife and a more reasonable mother—in a word a better citizen. It is only then, she said, that "we should love men with true affection, because we should learn to respect ourselves; and the peace of mind of a worthy man would not be interrupted by the idle vanity of his wife."

Wollstonecraft did not believe in the innate intellectual and mental inferiority of women. Perpetual obedience, she contended, thwarts the capacity of reasoning, and education and responsibility keep it alert and strengthen it. She draws the pathetic picture of a woman who throughout has been subjected to the despotic rule of her husband who manages everything and steers clear of all difficulties with his wisdom. The man suddenly dies, leaving behind him his wife and children and a large family. The woman's previous life has not prepared her for the arduous duties of being both mother and father to the children. She is ignorant of the management of their property and their education. The result is that she has to choose another husband or shift to other shoulders the responsibility that she has to discharge. Impediments both social and legal were thus, according to her, the causes of woman's intellectual backwardness, "Let their faculties have room to unfold their virtues, to gain strength; and then determine where the whole sex must stand in the intellectual scale."

With her whole strength, Mary Wollstonecraft protested against the double standard of morality. She exposes in this connection the hypocrisy of those who point the finger of scorn at the woman who has gone wrong while at the same time receive with every mark of consideration her partner who may have tempted her by money, ease and flattery to her ruin. She demands from society equal morality. The two sexes must rise or sink together. In demanding equality in moral standard, Wollstonecraft shows herself far ahead of her times.

What strikes us as greatly remarkable in her whole writing is her demand for female representation in Parliament—and this at a time when even democratic ideals were a far-off dream. She bitterly characterised the whole parliamentary machinery as only a convenient handle for despotism. This despotism ought to go and give place to a true democracy in which women also should have a voice.

Wollstonecraft laments that man has not judged the true personality of woman. She proceeds with her demands for economic independence, education and parliamentary representation for women, and for the recognition that woman is equally great and useful with man and that she has her own mission to fulfil in the world. In the most appealing words she questions society whether woman was meant only to submit to man, her equal, a being who like her was sent into the world to acquire virtue. "Was she designed only to be occupied to please him, merely to adorn the earth, when her soul is capable of rising to him? And can she rest supinely dependent on man for reason, when she ought to mount with him the arduous steeps of knowledge?"

For us the great merit of Wollstonecraft's writing lies in its balance of thought. Nowhere is to be found a single trace of fanaticism or emotionalism. She has made just and legitimate demands for a human treatment of woman that were long overdue. Nowhere does she plead that woman and man are the same. She constantly exalted what was truly feminine as the aim of woman's education and training; she recognised love and attraction between the sexes as the

cardinal facts in human life. She was fully conscious that women have different duties to fulfil. Her only contention was that they are also human duties and as such "the principle that should regulate the discharge of them must be the same." And this is why she has throughout upheld feminine accomplishments to be as great as those of men and did not sanction the depreciation of the immense importance of domestic duties. Mrs. Fawcett makes an honest appreciation of this great merit of Wollstonecraft, when she remarks: "Mary Wollstonecraft, in her writings as well as in her life with its sorrows and errors, is the essentially womanly woman with the motherly and wifely instinct strong with her, and caring for all she claims and pleads for on behalf of her sex, because she is convinced that a concession of a large measure of women's rights is essential to the highest possible conception and fulfilment of womanly duties." It is unfortunate that the later feminists overstepped these limits and a great way marred the progress of their own cause by their excesses and follies.

It is evident now that it was Wollstonecraft who, in the realm of thought, first and foremost brought home to the women of her times the potential development of their virtue and intelligence. Her book still forms the text-book of the Woman Movement.

Up to the year 1838, however, a 'Women's Rights' movement as such did not make its appearance. Wollstone-craft's work served no doubt to create individual dissatisfaction and discontent among women who individually carved out an independent life for themselves and achieved personal triumphs. But for the teeming mass of womanhood groping in ignorance and chained with restrictions it was the spirit of 1838 that gave the will to organise. In that year began the Chartist Movement. The first draft of the Charter of Rights and Liberties included a Women's Suffrage clause. Though this clause was afterwards struck off for the fear that it would bring ridicule upon the agitation, the important thing that it achieved was to win the sympathies of the radicals and philanthropists who from 1840 began to take interest in this

^{1.} Fawcett in her Introduction to Wollstonecraft's A Vindication of the Rights of Women.

great human movement. The Infant's Custody Act of 1839 which gave mothers of moral character some measure of custody over their children under seven and which, though, was a mere caricature when compared to the Act of 1925, had already given a hopeful sign that this struggle was not going to be a friendless one. Philanthropists and politicians like Richard Cobden. Joseph Hume and Disraeli made themselves one with its cause. A resolution was thus introduced in Parliament by the joint efforts of Hume and Cobden to include women rate-payers among the voters. The move, though it became unsuccessful, proved at least that "the day when it would be considered was at hand."1 The two eventful facts of the period, of great significance to women, were the founding of two institutions, Oueen's College (1848) and Bedford College (1849) for women, which afterwards were to become the breeding stocks of fiery organisers of the movement like Barbara Leigh Smith, Hill. Sophia Jex-Blake. Frances Mary Buss. Dorothea Beale and many more.

The most historic event of this period was the publication of the 'Declaration of Sentiments' by American women,² which thrilled the whole woman world in the West. Prepared in parliamentary style and drafted after a political propaganda, the 'Declaration of Sentiments,' after the pattern of the 'Declaration of the Rights of Man' shows the new spirit that permeated the women of the middle nineteenth century, that of revolt and self-assertion. For a full understanding of their grievances against which they complained and protested and for a full appreciation of their demands, political, legal and social, a full reading of the text is necessary. The Declaration reads as follows:—

DECLARATION OF SENTIMENTS

"When in the course of human events, it becomes necessary for one portion of the family of man to assume among the

- 1. Ray Strachey: The Cause, p. 43.
- 2. This Declaration was prepared by Elizabeth Cady Stanton, Susan B. Anthony and Matilda Joslyn Gage, and was adopted by the First Women's Rights Convention in U. S. A., (1848).

people of the earth a position different from that which they have hitherto occupied, but one to which the laws of nature and of God entitle them, a decent respect to the opinions of mankind requires that they should declare the causes that impel them to such a course.

"We hold these truths to be self-evident: That all men and women are created equal. That they are endowed by their Creator with certain inalienable rights; that among these are life, liberty and pursuit of happiness. That to secure these rights governments are instituted, deriving their just power from the consent of the governed. When any form of government becomes destructive of these ends, it is the right of those who suffer from it to refuse allegiance to it, and to insist upon the institution of a new government, laving its foundation on such principles and organising its powers in such form as to them shall seem most likely to effect their safety and happiness. Prudence, indeed, will dictate that governments long established should not be changed for light and transient causes; and accordingly all experience doth show that mankind are more disposed to suffer, while evils are sufferable, than to right themselves by abolishing the forms to which they were accustomed. But when a long train of abuses and usurpations, pursuing invariably the same object, evinces a design to reduce them under absolute despotism, it is their duty to throw off such government and to provide new guards for their future security. Such has been the patient sufferance of the women under this government, such is now the necessity which constrains them to demand the equal station to which they are entitled.

"The history of mankind is a history of repeated injuries and usurpation on the part of man towards woman, having in direct object the establishment of an absolute tyranny over her. To prove this let facts be submitted to a candid world.

- "He has never permitted her to exercise her inalienable right to the elective franchise.
- "He has compelled her to submit to laws in the formation of which she has no voice.
- "He has withheld from her rights which are given to the most ignorant and degraded men both native and foreign.

"Having deprived her of all rights as a married, if single, and the owner of property, he has taxed her to support government which recognises her only when her property can be made profitable to it.

"He has monopolised nearly all the profitable employments; and from those she is permitted to follow, she receives but a scanty remuneration. He closes against her all the avenues to wealth and distinction which he considers most honourable to himself. As a teacher of theology, medicine or law, she is not known.

"He has denied her the facilities for obtaining a thorough education, all colleges being closed against her.

"He allows her, in Church as well as State, but a subordinate position, claiming Apostolic authority for her exclusion from the ministry and with some exceptions, from any public participation in the affairs of the Church.

"He has created a false sentiment by giving to the world a different code of morals for men and women, by which moral delinquencies which exclude women from society are not only tolerated but deemed of little account in men.

"He has usurped the prerogative of Jehovah himself claiming it as a right to assign for her a sphere of action, when that belongs to her conscience and to her God.

"He has endeavoured, in every way that he could, to destroy her confidence in her own powers, to lessen her self-respect, and to make her willing to lead a dependent and abject life."

The spirit that permeated the Woman Movement from the very day of its infancy becomes manifest in the presentation of woman's case in the clear and fearless form of the 'Declaration.' Woman was no longer prepared to tolerate the social inhibitions that hampered her progress. She claimed the right of human development on the same footing as man. She was no longer willing to remain only a sight-seer of man's achievements. She had become conscious of her own personality and, for its free and full development, demanded a complete deliverance from social restrictions. And to this end she demanded from society economic independence, social equality, political rights and legal status without any distinction between

man and woman.

The radicals and philanthropists of the fifties and sixties gave a new impetus to the movement and quickened it to life. It is doubtful whether the movement would have advanced with so great a success as it did without the powerful and effective support of John Stuart Mill. It is one of the ironies in social history that Mill's father. James Mill, should have been one of those who combated women's claim to participation in political rights—a claim that received its greatest champion in John Stuart Mill. In his admirable Principles of Economics (1848) and in his work Liberty (1859) he condemned the political and social system that subordinated women. In his Representative Government (1861) he made a strong argument for extension of political rights to women. It was, however, his The Subjection of Women (1861), which has since become a landmark in the history of the movement. that infused new blood into the social and political life of the West.

The Subjection of Women coming as it did from a popularly gifted writer, whose reputation as a political and social philosopher had already spread on the Western hemisphere, and written as it was with diction pure and yet dignified, simple and yet attractive, arrested the attention both of social reformers and legists, not to talk of the general public. With his mind, clear, logical and sincere, he exposed the flagrant injustice that was being done to the female world. Subjection of women, he pointed out, was the product of age-long custom and was not a testimony of any inherent inferiority in them. The subordination of one sex over the other, he historically analyses, arose "simply from the fact that from the very earliest twilights of human society, every woman (owing to the value attached to her by men, combined with her inferiority in physical strength) was found in a state of bondage to man" and this physical fact, according to him, was converted into a legal right. Thus, subjection of women was, to Mill, only a relic of the past, based on the law of superior force; and hence he warned society that being discordant with social progress, it must disappear.

Mill contended that distinctions between men and women which went to show inferiority of women in the domains of mental and intellectual productions were not natural but artificial, meaning thereby a product of subjecting environment. The education and external circumstances in which women were being brought up were, according to him, responsible for their seeming inferiority; all other talk, he pointed out, of her 'innate' inferiority was logical perversion and psychological misunderstanding. He pointed out the most ridiculous anomaly that existed in society by allowing its most mediocre male members social and political rights and closing these against the most eminent women of his times. The frequent charge that history has not produced woman geniuses in the field of art and literature, his logical mind meets by pointing out that if a woman Elizabeth, a woman Victoria, a woman Debora or a woman Joan of Arc were the realities and possibilities of history, there was nothing to prevent a woman from becoming a Homer, an Aristotle or a Michelangelo, under favourable circumstances of education and opportunity.

The Subjection of Women was an appeal to the logical mind; it was also an eye-opener of the slaves of custom. Mill, with his logical insight, held before the society the great advantages that would accrue both to the female world and society by removing the sex disabilities by throwing open all honourable occupations to women. By such equality all selfish propensity, self-worship and unjust self-preference which have their roots in unjust social relationship between the sexes would disappear. Enlightened womanhood, he believed, would bring its own quota of knowledge and service. Woman's dignity would rise in her own estimation; and she would come to realise that she was not created merely to satisfy the physical cravings of man, but had an independent life of her own which she could enrich and fulfil as much as man. "A mere consciousness a woman would have of being a human being, like any other, entitled to choose her pursuits, urged or incited by the same inducements as any one else, to interest herself in whatever is interesting to human beings, entitled to the share of influence on all human concerns which belong to an individual opinion this alone would effect an immense expansion of the facilities

of their moral sentiments." This rational freedom would besides become an infinite source of personal happiness, the value of which would be inestimable.

Unsupported by logical calculation or psychological vision, the existing inequality, the legal subordination of one sex to the other, appeared to this great apostle of woman emancipation, the fundamental doctrines of which he learnt at the feet of Jeremy Bentham, a glaring wrong and a chief hindrance to human advancement, "which ought to be replaced by the principle of perfect equality admitting no power or privilege on the one side, nor disability on the other."

Mill did not remain silent after publishing The Subjection of Women. He began to take active interest in the cause of women, and made it the subject of his election addresses. So when he was elected to Parliament in 1865, women became imbibed with fresh hopes and enthusiasm. In 1867 a new Reform Bill was brought in the Parliament to which Mill suggested an amendment by omitting the word 'man' and inserting the word 'person' in the enfranchisement clause. The amendment was received with antagonism and it was rejected by 196 to 73. A year before this, a small committee was formed to collect signatures of women rate-payers on a Parliamentary petition for granting franchise to women. The committee included women like Miss Garrett, Mrs. Bodichon, Miss Emily Davies, Mrs. Taylor, Miss Rosamond Hill and other well-known women. Mill approved of four such petitions which bore on it the signatures of 1499 women, 1605 women tax-payers, 3559 and 3000 men and women respectively.² Among those who strenuously worked in this propaganda were Mrs. Somerville, Florence Nightingale, Harriet Martineau. Miss Swanwick, Mrs. Josephine Butler, Lady Anna Gore-Langton, and Mrs. William Grev. When these enthusiasts saw that Mill's motion was defeated, they became excited and there was a whirlwind spread of suffrage societies in important centres like London, Manchester, Bristol, Edinburgh and

^{1.} J. S. Mill: The Subjection of Women, pp. 155-156.

^{2.} See Dr. Millicent Garrett Fawcett: Women's Suffrage, (1911), pp. 19-20. Also see Dr. Kaethe Schirmacher: The Modern Women's Rights Movement, (1912), p. 61.

Birmingham. The leader in the North of England was Lydia Becker, a woman of unusual political insight. The result was that in 1869 the municipal franchise was extended to women rate-payers; and in the following year when the school boards were created, women were made eligible and were actually elected to them.

The death of John Stuart Mill in 1873 came as a terrible blow to the movement. He was its chief pillar and had made it a parliamentary subject. It had definitely become a political issue through his ceaseless efforts. The struggle, however, did not suffer with his death. By this time it had rallied round it able and eminent men and women who were determined to carry it through. The years that followed 1870 show that it was gaining social sympathy. An indication of this was that in 1882 the Married Women's Property Act was passed which gave women a complete control over their own property, which was a great advance over the earlier law of 1870. In the field of education in 1881 the senate of the Cambridge University decided by a large majority to admit women of Gorton¹ and Newnham² Colleges to Tripos examinations on an equal footing with men and to grant them certificates. Women had, however, come to realise that without political rights their emancipation was not possible. So they strengthened their political organisations between 1870 and 1884. To push ahead their struggle for suffrage, they won over to them women of aristocracy like Lady Amberley, Lady Anne Gore-Langton and others. A 'Central Committee of Woman's Suffrage' was formed: and a number of distinguished speakers among whom were Biggs, Maclaren, Becker, Fawcett, Craigen, Kingsley, Todd and others carried on a lecture propaganda throughout Great Britain. A Women's Suffrage Journal was founded with

^{1.} Gorton College was founded in 1869 by a committee of eminentmen and women, including Sir John Gorst, Miss Emily Davies, the Dowager Lady Stanley of Alderly and Miss Sedley Taylor. Between 1872-1881 the students read for the Tripos examinations of Cambridge University, but the examiners retained the option of refusing to mark their papers See Gresham's Encyclopædia, (1930), Vol. V, p. 339.

^{2.} Newnham College and English College for Women were founded in Cambridge in 1871 and incorporated in 1880. See Gresham's Encyclopædia, Vol. VIII, p. 1312.

Miss Lydia Becker and Miss Helen Blackburn on its editorial staff. The hopeful result of all this was that the general election of 1880 returned a considerable majority of members favourable to women's suffrage. Great optimism prevailed when the Reform Bill was introduced in Parliament in 1884. But to their great misfortune, they found their staunchest opponent in the Prime Minister himself. Mr. Gladstone. He declared that "women's suffrage would overweight the ship." The most disappointing feature was provided by 104 Liberals who, though they had pledged their support, voted against the women's suffrage amendment. The cause of women was thus thrown overboard. Commenting on Mr. Gladstone's attitude, Mrs. Fawcett¹ makes the following scathing remark: "So different are the traditions of the politician from the heroic traditions of the seaman, who, by duty and instinct alike, is always prompted in moments of danger to serve the women first."

The result of the defeat was deeply discouraging to the whole movement; and the years between 1884 and 1903 were comparatively lifeless in the whole history of the movement. In 1885, the suffragists formed a 'Primrose League' to support the Conservative candidates in the election, and a similar one called 'Woman's Liberal Federation' was formed in the same manner to support the Liberals in the election of 1887. A frail attempt was accordingly made to secure suffrage for women; but the Suffrage Bill did not go further than its second reading. Apart from these activities, a staleness had crept through the movement in spite of the unabatable enthusiasm of women like Fawcett and others. In 1887 the cause received a terrible blow in the death of its indefatigable worker, Miss Lydia Becker. But what came as most disappointing was the organised opposition to suffrage aspirations by women themselves. In 1889 a solemn 'Protest against Women's Suffrage' signed by a number of ladies including the well-known Mrs. Humphrey Ward, Mrs. Creighton and Mrs. Sidney Webb. appeared in the Nineteenth Century. "We believe," they wrote, "the emancipating process has now reached the limits fixed by the physical constitution of women." And though the

suffragists gave a fitting answer to this Protest, the damage done to their cause was severe.

The granting of vote to women by New Zealand in 1893 to be followed by South Australia in 1894 refreshed the energies and hopes of English suffragists. Accordingly, in the teeth of staunch opposition, Mr. Faithful Begg introduced Women's Suffrage Bill in 1897, and surprisingly it passed its first reading. This gave hopes to the suffragists and a monster petition signed by 257,796 was sent to Parliament. This resulted in securing a solid majority of 73 in favour of the Bill. The enthusiasm of the suffragists now could hardly be imagined. A 'National Union of Women's Suffrage Societies' was immediately formed under the presidentship of Mrs. Henry Fawcett. And though Mr. Begg's Bill was received with vehement opposition, particularly by Mr. Labouchere, resulting in its defeat, it established a theoretical victory the effects of which were far-reaching.

The suffragists suspended their forces for a while during the South African War (1898) only to effulge into a terrific militant form in 1903. In that year occurred an event which, as the writer in the Encyclopædia Britannica¹ remarks, was "both a symptom of renewed interest and a cause of further progress," viz. the formation of the 'Women's Social and Political Union.' The leader of this Union was Mrs. Emmeline Pankhurst who, along with her husband Dr. Pankhurst, had worked for the Married Women's Property Act Committee. She had been an active supporter of Liberals till Gladstone had belied all her hopes in 1884, when she went into the Labour fold along with her husband. After the demise of Dr. Pankhurst in 1898, she lost all her faith in the Labour party. In 1904 she attended personally the full debate on Begg's Bill. The fate of the Bill rudely shocked her. She came to realise that patience and trust were of little avail and that it was time for a fresh enterprise. Accordingly when the Bill was defeated, Mrs. Pankhurst along with others including Mrs. Elmy held a protest meeting outside Parliament. They were at once scared away by the police, on which they held another meeting beyond the forbidden grounds (since meetings of all kind are

^{1.} Encyclopædia Britannica, Vol. 23, 14th edition, p. 110.

forbidden near Parliament when it is in session). This was the beginning of the militant movement.¹

In October of that year (1905) the Liberal party on the eve of its taking office held a great meeting in the Free Trade Hall at Manchester. The chief speaker was Edward Grey, who was to lav before the meeting the programme and intentions of the new government to be formed. After he addressed the meeting, questions were invited; and Christabel Pankhurst and Annie Kenny who had attended the meeting on behalf of the Women's Social and Political Union heckled him with several questions as to what the attitude of the new government would be with regard to the woman suffrage. They were, however, treated indifferently, and their questions received no answer. This excited the girls; and Annie Kenny unfurled her little banner and rose up on her chair to question again, which resulted in a storm of angry cries from the audience. They were then seized by the stewards and thrown roughly in the street: and when they held indignation meeting outside, they were arrested. Both chose to go to prison², and this gave an enormous advertisement to their cause.

The next move of the suffragists was to concentrate all their activities in London. They determined to exhibit the little 'Votes for Women' banners wherever a prospective Liberal member rose to speak. On December 21 a great meeting was arranged at Royal Albert Hall, London, where the new Prime Minister, Sir Henry Campbell-Bannerman, was to make his first speech as a Prime Minister. The suffragists sought permission to attend the meeting; but Henry Campbell-Bannerman returned no reply, nor did he even make a mention of woman suffrage. This greatly enraged Annie Kenny and Theresa Bellington who had been smuggled into the meeting. They created great excitement in the meeting by putting questions to the speakers; and when Theresa Bellington threw a huge banner bearing the words "Will the Liberal Government give justice to working women?" in the midst of the

^{1.} Emmeline Pankhurst: My Own Story. (1914), p. 43.

^{2.} For a full and graphic description, see E Sylvia Pankhurst: The Suffragette Movement. (1931), pp. 189-90.

meeting, there followed a great uproar and conflicting shouts, and they were seized and flung out of the hall. "This was the beginning of a campaign," writes Mrs. Pankhurst in her *Own Story*, "the like of which was never known in England, or for that matter in any other country." The enthusiasm and hopes of the suffragists did not abate an inch, and they carried a regular tirade of questioning several prominent members of Parliament. They questioned Asquith in Sheffield, Mr. Lloyd George in Altrincham and the Prime Minister again in Glasgow. They were every time violently thrown out and insulted; often they were painfully bruised and hurt. But they remained undaunted.

From the summer of 1906 onwards woman suffrage became a centre of public discussions. It became the main political issue and assumed a country-wide interest. As Strachey vividly describes it, "the extraordinary behaviour of the 'suffragettes,' as the members of the Women's Social and Political Union came to be called, and the ever-widening propaganda of the 'suffragettes' as the law-abiding section, made it impossible for any one in the country to be unaware of the existence of the demand... Every one in the country felt an interest, every one knew, or thought they knew the fundamental differences between men and women, and consequently every one was ready to have an opinion."1 The awakening among the mass of women caused by the militant advertisement on the one hand and the constitutional forces on the other was most significant. The years, therefore, which followed were the great years of the Woman Movement when "organised societies were expanding, when agitation was becoming an exact science, and when the ever-recurring crises seemed to have a glamour greater than the light of the common day."2

In 1907 the first public demonstration in the streets was organised, and on a wet afternoon 3000 women took part in the big procession called the 'mud march' from Hyde Park corner to Exeter Hall. Hereafter the idea of public demonstration became the central fact in their ceaseless pro-

1. Ray Strachey: The Cause, pp. 302-303.

2. Millicent Fawcett: Women's Suffrage, p. 63.

paganda. Meetings were held in halls and drawing rooms, in schools and chapels, at street corners and village greens. Paper, mice, rotten eggs, fish, oranges and such other missiles were freely flung at them. But they maintained their patience.

It is essential, here, to distinguish between two rival organisations of women which sprung up by this time working for different ideals with different methods. The militants uptil now (1907) suffered all violence without the least resistance. But now they abandoned this plan, and stone-throwing of a not very formidable kind was indulged in, and personal attacks upon ministers of the Crown were attempted. 'Deeds not Words' became the motto of the militants and their whole move was only to create sensation. They ridiculed all who did not belong to their fold. The whole atmosphere of their work was aggressive and headlong. Women's Social and Political Union, to which a reference is already made, became the organisation of the militants who adopted a purely autocratic system and entrusted everything to their leaders, Mrs. Pankhurst and her daughter Christabel Pankhurst, and other militant leaders Mr. and Mrs. Pethick Lawrence.

Sharply distinguished from this type of militant organisation was formed another organisation, the National Union, under the presidentship of Mrs. Fawcett. This Union adopted constitutional methods, and did not regard their work as an attack upon men but a struggle for human good as a whole. They fully believed that constitutional methods alone would bring a change of opinion in the country as a whole and especially the staunchest opponents in Parliament. They repudiated the new militant method as most likely to create reaction in the country and thereby to mar all prospects of further achievement. The National Council openly condemned the violent methods of the militants in forms of protests, one in November 1908 and another in October 1909. The second and shortest read:

"That the Council of the National Union of Women's Suffrage Societies strongly condemns the use of violence in political propaganda, and being convinced that the true way of advocating the cause of Women's Suffrage is by energetic, law-abiding propaganda, reaffirms its adherence to constitu-

tional principles, and instructs the Executive Committee and the Societies to communicate this resolution to the Press."1

The militants, however, remained deaf to such protests and laughed at them. They created disturbances at government bye-elections, heckled cabinet ministers; they arrived in all sorts of guises and appeared in all sorts of places. They sprang out of organ lofts, they peered through roof windows, and leapt out of vans. Again and again they made efforts to see the Prime Minister who persistently refused to grant them interviews. Then they made regular 'raids' on Parliament. They were arrested and convicted, but they willingly courted prison. This was followed by throwing stones. They attacked shops and public buildings. "Since we must go to prison to obtain the vote, let it be the windows of the Government, not the bodies of women which shall be broken, was the argument."

The use of physical violence by the militants was not the only difference between them and the National Union. Between 1906 and 1911 they developed different election poli-They wanted woman suffrage to become a party question: and towards this end they endeavoured at every electoral contest to coerce the government of the day to take up the suffrage cause. The National Union adopted a different election policy —that of obtaining declarations of opinion from all candidates at each election and supporting the man, independent of party, who gave the most satisfactory assurance of support. Their move was to educate the electorate in the principles of woman's suffrage. For this purpose the National Union opened Women's Suffrage societies on non-party lines in each electoral constituency, which by holding meetings, publishing articles and carrying on all kinds of educational propaganda endeavoured to create a strong feeling in favour of woman suffrage.

In 1910 when the Liberal Government resumed office, a great wave of enthusiasm and hope again swept over the suffragists, when a Bill was definitely drafted by an all-party 'Conciliation Committee' with Brailsford as its chairman. All sections of opinions favoured it and to insure a smooth success the

1. Millicent Fawcett: Women's Suffrage p. 64.

^{2.} E. Sylvia Pankhurst: The Suffragette Movement, p. 309.

Women's Social and Political Union was persuaded to call a truce to its militancy. The Conciliation Bill came to the House in July in an atmosphere palpitating with great expectation. And although *The Times* had carried a regular tirade against it by publishing articles every day for the preceding fortnight, it passed its second reading by a majority of 110 votes. The attitude of the Government itself destroyed its further progress. Mr. Lloyd George and Mr. Winston Churchill attacked the Bill as undemocratic and its further progress was stopped.

The leaders of the Women's Social and Political Union became outraged. Here was a fine reward of their truce. So when the second election of 1910 began, they declared their war once more. They were determined to fight the Liberals tooth and nail. They accordingly interrupted Mr. Lloyd George while he was making a suffrage speech to women Liberals and dogged the footsteps of the Liberal ministers with even greater pertinacity than before. The National League, though exceedingly dissatisfied, held full faith in constitutional methods. Instead of sending petitions signed by women, now they decided to send petitions signed by voters. They were successful in this attempt and submitted a petition signed by three thousand voters. The government, as usual, threw it to the winds.

The Conciliation Bill came once more in May 1911 and was carried by a majority of 167. But immediately after this Bill was passed, its further chances were wrecked by an announcement that the Bill would get its chances in the next session. All patience of women was tried. Every time they saw that their hopes were frustrated just on the border-land of success. It was, therefore, no wonder that the militants became desperate, and carried their campaign with greater virulence and indignation.

To add fuel to the flames, anti-suffragists formed themselves into strong organisations.¹ The beginning was made, as already pointed out, by publishing an article in the *Nine*teenth Century signed by Mrs. Sidney Webb and others. But until 1908 the opposition to the woman suffrage was only feeble and unorganised. An anti-suffrage society of ladies was

^{1.} See Mrs. Philip Snowden: The Feminist Movement, pp. 163-165.

formed in 1908 with Mr. Humphrey Ward as its president, and another was formed in 1909 called 'Men's League for opposing Women's Suffrage.' These two were amalgamated in 1910, with Lord Cromer as its president. The coming into being of these organisations, however, did not dishearten the suffragists in the least. On the contrary, the suffrage made its remarkable progress since the inauguration of the antisuffrage campaign; and a crop of suffrage societies followed. Thus were formed the Actresses' Suffrage League, and the Artists' Suffrage League; the Catholic Women's Suffrage Society, the Church League for Women's Suffrage and the Conservative and Unionist Women's Friends' Association; the Free Church League, the Jewish League, the Friends' League, the London Graduates' League and the Scottish Universities Women's Suffrage Union.

Since the violent outbreaks of the militants, admission to Parliament was closed to women. So when the Conciliation Bill came up before the House, the suffragists could not know its progress. This outraged them, and the reply of the Women's Social and Political Union was immediate and forceful. "Led by Mrs. Pethick Lawrence," Mrs. Pankhurst describes vividly, "our women went out with stones and hammers and broke hundreds of windows in the Home Office, the War and Foreign Offices, the Board of Education, the Privy Council Office, the Board of Trade, the Treasury, Somerset House, the National Liberal Club, several Post Offices, the Old Banqueting Hall, the London and South Western Bank, and dozen other buildings." This decided the fate of the Conciliation Bill, and the very House that had passed its second reading in the earlier year by a majority of 167 now rejected it by a majority of 14.

The Reform Bill of 1912 to extend male franchise again brought the question of woman suffrage in prominence. The Bill was to be debated in January 1913. Several drafts were prepared so as to go some way in meeting suffrage demands of women. Finally the Reform Bill reached the committee stage and the women's suffrage amendments were tabled. But at the eleventh hour the Speaker ruled out the amendments by

^{1.} Emmeline Pankhurst: My Own Story, p. 209.

arguing that the adoption of any one of the women's suffrage amendments would change the Bill materially so as to make it a different Bill. This fiasco of the Reform Bill maddened the militants. They resorted to desperate methods by pouring acids into pillar boxes, by cutting of telegraph wires and by smashing of pictures in public galleries. They set fire to empty houses, they destroyed golf-courses, they threw bombs at churches. An attempt was also made to burn Lloyd George's house. All this was irrelevant with their own cause and estranged public sympathy. Mrs. Pankhurst was arrested and charged for committing felony. She was found guilty and sentenced to three years' penal servitude. She was afterwards eight times released and imprisoned.

The methods of the National League were diametrically opposite. The members of this League were no less indignant at the way their cause had been flung to the winds; but their rage and passion expressed itself in quite opposite ways. They did not lose their faith in peaceful activities. In the summer of 1913 the National Organisation organised a great pilgrimage of women which marched upon London from all quarters of the country and culminated in a monster meeting in Hyde Park. The pilgrimages received everywhere on their routes warm and friendly receptions. This gave them great hopes and they again became inspired with new enthusiasm. Success seemed to be in sight.

With the outbreak of the Great War, the suffragists sunk their differences and suspended all their activities. Both the National Union and Women's Social and Political Union identified themselves completely with the country's cause. Now was come an opportunity for them to show their worth. Rich and poor, old and young, spent their time in searching for useful work. And in those critical days work was not wanting. They applied in thousands for all kinds of works.

Women showed remarkable success in all kinds of work. They spared no pains to do their little bit; nothing daunted them, and they threw themselves heart and soul for the service of their country. They were employed in works of which they had little experience, like shipbuilding, aircraft, ordnance, chemical, rope, rubber, steel and iron works; and they did

their work cheerfully and successfully. In July 1915 was organised a Women's Legion which placed itself at the service of the War Office. This was followed by founding a Women's Army Auxiliary Corps. The work of these organisations was so very successful that within a short time was organised the Women's Royal Naval Service, and Women's Royal Airforce Service. Women thus gained great confidence of the country. and they were entrusted with most responsible and useful works. They were employed in Army Pay Office, the Remount Department, the Anti-gas Department, the Forage Corps, the Army Records, and the Army Service Corps. In banks and business houses, as signalmen and porters, as bus conductors, van drivers and electricians, women proved quite capable and useful. Thousands were engaged upon charities and other relief works which were requisitioned by the War, viz., the separation work, the separation allowances etc.

What astounded the country most and elicited its applauses was women's work in the war hospitals. The British Red Cross refused admission to the medical women in 1914. This did not, however, dishearten them, and they opened their own hospitals in France, staffed entirely with British women. One of these organised by Dr. Louisa Garret Anderson and Dr. Flora Murrey began work in Paris in September 1914; and a month later another branch of it was opened at Wimereux which was accepted by British authorities. These hospitals, as Strachey¹ points out, were so ably managed and became so successful that the British War Office changed its mind in 1915, and placed these two women doctors in charge of a military hospital of 520 beds in London which was entirely staffed with women and carried its work up to the close of the War.

Thus, it required a ravaging test like the Great War to prove that women were sharers of the virtues and vices of the common humanity. Public opinion underwent enormous transformation. The heroism, courage, ability and the sacrificing spirit of women worked out a change which hundreds of petitions from them could not have achieved. The great moral effect of this is evident from the fact that at last when the War was over, the Government gave itself seriously to the

^{1.} See Ray Strachey: The Cause, p. 347.

woman suffrage question. The great moral victory was achieved when one of their strongest opponents Mr. Asquith supported in no unequivocal words their claim. "When the War comes to an end," he said in 1916, "and when the process of industrial reconstruction has to be set on foot, have not the women a special claim to be heard on the many questions which will arise directly affecting their interests?... I say quite frankly that I cannot deny their claim." The opposition was fast dissolving; the anti-suffragists joined with the suffragists, and the Government itself was in the favour of satisfying their long overdue claim. And ultimately when the Representation of the People Bill was presented in the House of Commons amidst scenes of wild enthusiasm, hopes and excitement, the Women's Suffrage Clause¹ was declared to have passed by a majority of 335 votes (November 1917). It was a victory clear and complete.

The success of the Bill in the House of Lords was, however, not smooth. Lord Curzon was its president. And this great orator and politician opposed the Bill tooth and nail. On the 10th of January, 1918, he was to wind up the debate. When he rose to speak, there was a complete silence in the House. The passage of the Bill, announced Lord Curzon, would be the ruin of the country. He declared that women were worthless and that the whole ideal of the Women's Movement was disastrous and wrong. All his oratory was, however, wasted. The wind of the House was blowing in a different direction. He had, therefore, before him the option of either withdrawing his opposition or facing defeat. He gave a diplomatic turn to the whole situation by announcing that he had no intention of "precipitating a conflict from which your Lordships would not emerge with credit." He himself abstained from voting on the woman suffrage clause. The ballot showed one hundred and thirty-four Peers in favour of it, seventy-one against it, and thirteen neutral. On the 6th of February it

^{1.} This clause gave all women householders and the wives of householders a right to vote. The age limit was placed at thirty. In the case of men it was twenty-one. This defect was remedied by the Representation of the People Bill of 1928, placing the age limit for both men and women on an equal footing, viz. 21.

received Royal Assent and became the law of the country. To make the story complete its small defect was removed (as already stated in the foot-note on the preceding page) by the Representation of the People Bill of 1928. Thus after a ceaseless struggle for more than half a century women obtained one of the greatest mundane rights—the right to share in the government and thus broke down this greatest sex-barrier.

The long struggle ended; and to-day woman stands face to face with man, no longer his subject. She has gained equal political, social, and legal rights with him, so that she has now become his comrade and companion. A woman married or unmarried may become a sovereign (Act of Settlement). She may become a Peeress and a Privy Councillor. By the Endowment Act of the League of Nations, which is the First Part of the Treaty of Versailles, "all positions under or in connection with the League, including the secretariat, shall be equally open to men and women." By Part XIII of the same treaty which sets up an international organisation "the principle that men and women shall receive equal remuneration for work of equal value" is laid down. A woman may be registered as a medical practitioner (1876, 39 and 40 Vict. Clause 41). the universities admit women to degrees and except Cambridge to membership. Midwifery has the status of a profession by the Midwives Act of 1902 and 1918, and nursing by the Registration of Nurses Act, 1919. A married woman is capable of entering into and rendering herself liable on any contract in respect of her separate property (Married Women's Property Act of 1882 and 1893). By the Guardianship of Infants Act, 1925, a mother is given the same rights of guardianship as a father in any case brought before the court. She is also given equal rights in giving consent to the marriage of her child and in the naming of a guardian to act after her death. A sweeping change in the status of women is effected by the Sex Disqualification (Removal) Act of 1919, the first section of which reads :--

[&]quot;A person should not be disqualified by sex or marriage from the exercise of any function, or from being appointed to or holding any civil or judicial office or post, or from entering or assuming or carrying any legal profession or

vocation, and should not be exempted by sex or marriage from the ability to serve as juror."

In pursuance of this Act the professions of a barrister, a solicitor, a veterinary surgeon, and the highest grade of the Home Civil Service have been opened to women. Many have since been appointed justices of the peace; women now regularly serve on juries and have been admitted to the police force with the same powers as men constables. They have also recently been admitted to the Institute of Actuaries, the Society of Naval Architects, the Institute of Bankers, the Auctioneers' and Estate Agents' Institute, the Land Agents' Society, the Surveyors' Institute. There are women clergymen in the Congregational, the Baptist and the Unitarian Churches, and the Weslevan Church has authorised their admission. This Act has thus opened the opportunities of public life to women. She may now become a member of Parliament, the first to be so elected being Viscountess Astor in 1919. She may even adorn the cabinet chair as was done by Miss Bondfield. She may be selected to act as a mayor of important boroughs like Cambridge, Norwich and Colchester, for instance, in 1927 Viscountess Cowdray was selected to act as High Steward for Colchester, a position which no woman had held before.

One gets wild with ecstasy when one sees a Miss Bond-field occupying the cabinet chair; one's whole nervous system shakes with amazement and applause when one hears the Australian flight of a Miss Amie Johnson, or the still more exciting trans-Atlantic flight of a Miss Earheart. The tragic end of this woman's recent attempt to fly round the world would always be remembered with an acclamation of woman's adventurous nature. The English Channel must have sensed an immense pride when a woman, a mother of two children, swam across it. In the domain of culture the rich fount of womanhood which lay pent up behind her forced ignorance and subjection has found a free outlet to pour forth in all its affluence, splendour and beauty, so that the world may become a happier home for human habitation.

III

When enthusiasm is carried to fanaticism it becomes derogatory to any cause. Judged from this point of view, the

trend of the later day feminists has been disappointing. The raison d'être of the whole Woman Movement was to secure "the recognition, full and complete of the humanity of women." "The chief purpose of feminists through all the years, and at the present time, is the achievement of freedom for womanhood and its equality of opportunity with manhood." The great moral agony that the women of the last century felt of having to be subservient to men in the fundamental human rights was the most moral cause of their revolt. And, therefore, they demanded equal fellowship with men so that woman should become a better citizen—and above all a rational mother2. It was because they were "convinced that a concession of a large measure of women's rights is essential to the highest possible conception and fulfilment of women's duties."3 that their whole fight raged. Woman has an equally rich and glorious personality with man, and its creativeness is not possible under fettered conditions. To get free from the fetters so that womanhood should become a mighty force in the world of action and thought—as a daughter, sister, wife and mother, this alone could and did justify the great Movement. As Mrs. Snowden makes it clear, feminism did not seek the extinction "of strength and courage in men, nor of beauty and softness, and tenderness in women, but the recognition that these fine and lovely qualities are the heritage of men and women alike-human qualities which all human beings have in germ, and which all human beings are entitled to cultivate and use without question or reproof." The chief purpose of feminists was, therefore, "the achievement of freedom for womanhood and its equality of opportunity with manhood."4

The spirit of the Woman Movement can be accepted only in this idea that woman has her own role to fulfil and therefore all disabilities and barriers that prevent its fulfilment are unnatural and unjust. It was a fight for her human right to grow. And should it not have been in the course of nature that,

^{1.} See Mrs. Phillip Snowden: The Feminist Movement, p. 9.

^{2.} See Wollstonecraft: A Vindication of the Rights of Women, p. 157.

^{3.} Dr. Millicent Fawcett in her introduction to Wollstonecraft's, A Vindication, etc. p. 19.

^{4.} Mrs. Phillip Snowden . The Feminist Movement, p. 15.

now that she has achieved her greatest victory in gaining the vote and that all possible avenues of opportunities and freedom have been flung open to her, women should have become more happy, restful and jovial? No, she is not. As a saner woman has pointed out, "at a time when she is freer than at any other period of the world's history—she is apparently more uneasy."

And this is because modern woman has misjudged the fundamental values. She has come to interpret emancipation. as Havelock Ellis has remarked, "as emancipation from womanliness itself."2 She has come to regard emancipation as equalising man in all his pursuits, educational, economic and industrial. The consequence was that she came to conceive in woman a lesser personality and in womanliness an inferior quality. And we see a host of modern women in active pursuit after man's various achievements. In her dress, in her talk, in her ambitions, her tastes, her education, her vocation, she has held man as her standard; unconsciously man has become the idol of her worship. We get a graphic description of these fanatic tendencies in Tarbell's book: "The uneasy woman, driven by the thirst for greater freedom, and believing man's way of life will assuage it, lays siege to his kingdom." "Go to-day into many a woman's club-house, in many a drawing-room or studio One or probably more women in mannish suits and boots calmly smoking cigarettes while they talk about things in which women are not supposed to be interested, but which, it is apparent, they understand." "Look the exhibit over they have simply found certain masculine ways to their liking and adopted them."3 The result of this attitude is what Dr. Beatrice Hinkle has pointed out woman's complete psychological dependence on man. Women have been "dominated largely by masculine methods and attitudes, and as far as the world outside the home as well as the world of opinion is concerned, they are almost wholly

^{1.} See Ida Tarbell: The Business of Being a Woman, (1919), p. 2.

^{2.} See Havelock Ellis in his Introduction to Ellen Key's Love and Marriage, (1914), p. 4.

^{3.} Ida Tarbell: The Business of Being a Woman, pp. 30-31.

identified with masculine psychology."1

With her successive triumphs in the achievement of freedom and rights, modern woman has come to regard her womanhood itself as a great impediment in the way of her development. Equality in education and occupation has been the cry. The whole tone of the famous work of Charlotte Perkins Gilman's Woman and Economics, is to show that womanliness is a vain attribute, a creation of man's fantasy, and that woman could and should equal man in all his pursuits. She contests the idea that motherhood in itself is a worthy function to claim woman's whole attention and service. She claims equal brain capacity for woman with man and therefore advocates the same education, the same skill, and therefore the same occupation; and she argues that motherhood is not a better occupation than work outside, and that education and occupation like man would alone bring about true emancipation of woman. Another feminist, Rosa Mayreder, speaks in equal terms-nay, she goes even further. She has become in a way amaternal in her attitude towards the woman problem. Her whole work, A Survey of Woman Problem is a consistent argument against the idea of motherhood being a worthy and necessary function. She values motherhood to be only a "child-bearing part of humanity"; but further than that the claim that it is a vocation worthy of social endowment and respect, and the most honourable one a woman could have, receives from her an emphatic denial.² She even denies maternal instinct in itself as a worthy "measure for the degree of woman's worth."3 And though "as a mother, woman enjoys the most ecstatic veneration," though "before this awe-inspiring and moving figure all the powers of life bend low in order to offer her a crown," she belittles all this as being in her opinion the "price for her spiritual freedom and equality." She deprecates motherhood as being a great "impediment to her (woman's) development," and chastises Nature for imposing

^{1.} See Dr. Beatrice Hinkle's article, Woman's Subjective Dependence upon Man, in Harpers' Magazine, January, 1932, p. 193.

^{2.} Rosa Mayreder: A Survey of Woman Problem, p. 37.

^{3.} Ibid., p. 40.

^{4.} Ibid., p. 46.

upon woman unequal burden "at the cost of rendering all her other capacities inferior to those of men."

Rosa Mayreder, like other extreme feminists, denies that the highest destiny of woman lies in motherhood. "Only an age like this would consider the avoidance of maternity as an objection to the intellectual endeavours of certain women," and with this amaternal outlook she looks ahead for a day when social order will show a golden change "only through women as have been freed of the teleological limitations of the sex and who vary from the prevailing type."

Modern woman denies, therefore, home to be the temple of woman's honour, home-making and motherhood to be her worthy functions, and children any way deserving her care and attention. Unless a woman works in factory side by side with man, she is not a human soul; a woman who has not before her the ideal of a career little resembles ideal womanhood. "Give us labour and the training which fits for labour" is her demand. Olive Schreiner in making this demand has impressed the womankind that they have now become parasites, their various home industries being displaced and that therefore their emancipation lies in running to factories and other industries, and finding a solacing substitute there.

In a nutshell we have shown (in succeeding chapters we have to criticise these views at great length) that the tendency of modern woman is to disparage all that is womanly and to ennoble manly activities and ideals; and therefore a ceaseless pursuit of these has become their daily life. The whole position of these women may be summed up in some such way 5:—

As man makes his living by work outside the home, so must do woman. The difference between man and woman should form no barrier to this, as the difference is only exter-

- 1. Rosa Mayreder; A Survey of Woman Problem, p. 49.
- 2. Ibid., p. 55.
- 3. Ibid., p. 63.
- 4. See Olive Schreiner: Woman and Labour, (1911), pp. 3-113.
- 5. See Charlotte Perkins Gilman: Woman and Economics. Rosa Mayreder: A Survey of Woman Problem. Olive Schreiner: Woman and Labour.

nal. In mental and intellectual qualities woman and man are the same.

Should anyone suggest that motherhood itself is a function worthy of fulfilment, and to this end woman must fight for its social recognition, the vehement answer comes that to regard motherhood as a vocation is an undignified thing; since 'motherliness' is not the criterion of womanliness; and that a woman must try to emancipate herself from the idea of motherliness being the essence of womanliness. Woman's duty to herself lies therefore not in fulfilling this wretched function imposed upon her by unequal Nature, but in doing work like man outside the home.

If a woman happens to be a mother, nature has its own exaction here, but this episode should not be carried further. The child should be handed over to a nurse, or better if the State takes care of it. A woman cannot at the cost of the expression of her personality in outside work attend to her child.

This same argument of equality is forwarded with regard to woman's education. Woman must have the same education as man, her brains being no way inferior to him.

We see, therefore, that the programme of modern women is a complete imitation of that of men. It is a triumph of masculine ideals. Sharply contrasted with these extreme and fanatic views are the feminine ideals of the Scandinavian¹ Feminists who are combating the idea that woman's mission and function are the same as man's. All the political, social, and legal rights which women have achieved are understood only as a means for the ennoblement of womanliness which is a distinct quality and has its own avenues of creativeness. These ideals have been sponsored by Swedish and German women with eminent personalities as Ruth Bre, Frau Lily Braun, and Ellen Key as the pioneers. The ideals of Scandinavian feminism are 'Mutterschutz'—the protection of motherhood. The programme of this feminism "is not the mere imitation"

^{1.} It must not be supposed, however, that these two currents of feminism are "territorial." In Scandinavian and Germanic countries we may find followers of English ideals like Rosa Mayreder; and in English speaking countries we may meet with upholders of Scandinavian ideas, like Lady Emily Lutyens and Ida Tarbell.

of masculine gestures and motion. The programme is the development of a new science of womanhood."

These feminists regard that "the restoration of woman's self-respect is the gist of the feminist movement. The most substantial of its political victories can have no higher value than this—that they teach women not to depreciate their own sex."

Scandinavian feminism has taken all the triumphs of the Woman Movement for their just value. The conquest of the political franchise and economic rights is for them a valuable means toward the creation of a more independent state of mind in the individual woman. "These things are merely way stations in the process of her inner emancipation."

Emancipation of woman as a personality being the basic idea of Scandinavian feminism, they regard motherhood as the crowning glory of womanliness. To this end they demand right of motherhood for every healthy woman. The way in which it occurs should be no concern of society. This naturally involves the question of marriage, which according to the Scandinavian conception must be on 'free' basis, in which woman has the right of free divorce if it becomes retrograding to her personality. We get a full and brilliant exposition of these views in Ellen Key's famous books, The Woman Movement, Love and Marriage and The Century of the Child.

These three works are to-day taken as gospels of a true woman movement. Two of them have been introduced to the English-speaking world by an eminent personality like Havelock Ellis. In his introduction to *The Woman Movement*, he introduces Ellen Key in the following words: "She regards the task of women as constructive rather than destructive; they are the architects of the future humanity, and she holds that this is a task that can only be carried out side by side with men, not because man's work or woman's work is, or should be, identical, but because each supplements and aids

^{1.} Katherine Anthony: Feminism in Germany and Scandinavia, (1914), p. 257.

^{2.} Ibid., p. 231.

^{3.} Ibid.

the other, and whatever gives strength and freedom to one sex equally fortifies and liberates the other sex."

We shall have occasion in later chapters to discuss fully the philosophy of 'Mutterschutz.' Here we can only lay down the broad lines on which it is based:

Child is the centre of Society. And as such this centre can become active and creative only if the mother is physically and mentally fit to nourish and train the child. To this end motherhood in itself should be regarded as a great function and should receive education for its proper fulfilment. As the child ought to receive the full attention and care of its mother, the mother should not be required to go outside the home in search for bread; society should, therefore, contribute to the mother for her function of motherhood on the same level as it does other dignified vocations. In this way alone educated motherhood can bring about a constructive good to society; in this way will be built a social edifice which will be permanent and inspiring.

As regards education, these philosophers regard that "to ripen into the full maturity of perfect womanhood in the teens, in the daily companionship and competition of boys in class hour by hour, weeks and months, is difficult, rare, if not indeed entirely impossible." And as mental stimulus tends to lower nutritive activities and becomes overstraining on the nerves of girls more than in the case of boys, intellectual education for girls must be so adapted as to be compatible with their physical and psychical needs and functions. They, therefore, hold that a girl "must never during all her best years make it impossible for the very best that is in her metabolism, feelings, interest, will, thought, and life to be turned aside to the long and absorbing processes of gestation and nursing;" and therefore "all other interests and every intellectual pursuit unrelated to these functions must necessarily for her be more or less provisional, for all not directly pertaining to motherhood may be superseded, for maternity means physiologically vastly more than fatherhood and can never be so incidental." In the views of these philosophers woman should always be ready to discharge this great function; and mental train-

1. Katherine Anthony: Feminism in Germany and Scandinavia.

ing must primarily be directed towards preparing her for this great function. The modern female education on the other hand "....depletes the system, makes these processes less vigorous and complete, and, when it does so, works incalculable harm." Woman's education must not, therefore, follow the lines of boys. It must be liberal in its true sense and must also prepare a woman for the proper discharge of her duties and functions of maternity and home-making.

To be short, these feminists regard that true feminism will defeat its purpose if it calls forth an activity which represses life; if it degrades, scatters, and reduces the powers to uniformity, in society and mankind; and that true feminism will have achieved its success only when:

- (a) Woman's spiritual life attains a level higher than at which it was in the beginning of the Movement.
- (b) Woman gets finer conceptions, deeper feelings, clearer ideas, a firmer will and a richer association of ideas.
- (c) Woman and man mutually enhance, instead of hindering each other.
 - (d) Woman becomes more soulful than ever she was.
- (e) Woman becomes more healthy, and more beautiful than ner sister in the past.
- (f) And above all, woman performs in more perfect manner the physical and psychical functions of motherhood.¹

Thus we see that while English feminism is trying to identify woman's interests, inclinations and work with those of man, Scandinavian philosophers are emphasising woman's independent individuality and labouring to secure its full expression and growth. The difference is wide. And it remains our task to view and discuss it fully in the chapters that follow.

Here we can only remark that woman's whole perspective of life should be so moulded as to make her a perfect human being as well as a perfect woman. The former requires that she should avail herself of all the avenues of rights and opportunities that have been flung open to her, but not so as to belittle or make difficult her role as a woman. It is only in the ideals of motherhood that her role as a woman can find

its fulfilment and enrichment. All her ideals—educational, economic, marital etc., must be so harmonised as to make her a great citizen as well as a great mother.

Woman to-day is encountered with great responsibilities now that all avenues of opportunities and freedom are open to her. She should realise, in the first place, that it is not in doing what man does that lies the consummation of her life: but that it is in estimating her own individuality, in understanding her own potentialities, her own supreme virtues, and moulding her destinies in the light of her own convictions and feelings, that lies a great future for her as for society. Woman, it seems, has not yet understood her own personality, she has wrongly come to identify it with man's; and that is why her problems are not yet solved, her troubles are not yet over, her dissatisfaction has not yet ended, and she has only complicated the chaotic mess of the modern world. Great dream of feminism will be realised only when, as Mr. Baldwin said when he introduced the Representation of People Bill (1928). "men and women, working together for the regeneration of their country, and for the regeneration of the world, each doing that for which they are better fitted, may provide such an environment that each immortal soul as it is born on this earth may have a fairer chance and a fairer home than has ever yet been vouchsafed to the generations that have passed." In the direction of this realisation lies the supreme fulfilment of feminism

WHITHER WOMAN?

PART II

WOMAN CHALLENGES SEXUAL ETHICS

CHAPTER V

PRUDISH SEXUAL ETHICS

T

THE definite scope and object of morality has still remained an obscurity. Morality, if we take it as the study of what is good and bad in human actions and thus regard it as laying down the canons of right and wrong conduct, we are confronted with one difficulty—what is good? and what is evil? A minute analysis will show that the same action may be good for one and bad for another. When a wolf devours a lamb, it is absolutely good for him, but the lamb would protest against it. The conquest of their country by Italy is to the Abyssinians a most undefendable moral outrage; whereas to the Italians it is a high moral duty that they have discharged. When a capitalist makes his labourers work twelve hours a day, it is quite good for him, but the sweat of the labourers smacks of the capitalist's immorality.

Though morality is thus relative and we cannot discover anything which is absolutely good or absolutely bad in itself, yet we term actions good or bad according to their capacity to diminish or increase the physical and psychical ills in a society as a whole. An action is good or bad according to its effect on social welfare. The end of morality is, therefore, social welfare. But even here we have confined the scope of morality to 'action,' leaving 'motive' out of consideration. If action and its capacity to produce human happiness, to borrow a term from Spencer,¹ become the sole criterion of morality, we are leaving morality to pure accident. A man, who through vengeance leaves all his property to society and thereby disinherits his son, would be praised as greatly moral, while in fact he has done great injustice to his son. So also with a man who fortuitously happens to do a good act though cherishing

1. See Herbert Spencer: Essays, (1907), p. 75.

a wicked motive. On the other hand, a man may have the best of motives, but through misdirection or false judgment might accomplish negative social actions. Good or bad results of an action cannot, therefore, become the sole criterion of morality. Motive is also a determining factor. There ought to be, therefore, harmony between the good and evil results of our actions on the one hand and the goodness and wickedness of our motive on the other in determining its moral character. Here we enter the province of justice. An act may be socially good, and yet quite unjust being actuated by wicked motive, and so cannot deserve the attribute 'moral.' An act, therefore. to be moral must not only tend to social welfare but also must have its ground-work in justice. Here, morality outsteps the province of 'what is,' and judges from a new angle of vision, viz. that of 'what ought to be.' Morality in this sense assumes an abstract role and becomes idealistic.

This Platonic view of morality, however, does not obtain in the social point of view. For society in general it is the prevailing custom that determines the morality of an act. Thus an act is judged not from the point whether it is one which ought to be done in the interests of society and justice but whether it is one which is done and has the sanction of custom. Thus, social tradition, as Hobhouse remarks, becomes at once the dominating factor in the regulation of human conduct.1 Custom being thus the parent of morality, the ideas of morality or the concepts of right or wrong vary from time to time and from land to land. Thus, when it was the general custom for the children to kill their aged parents, that custom was always found to be the best both in the interests of the community and the parents as well; and the action was completely moral. While to-day such action would be grossly immoral, because the aged are kept alive. Formerly in almost all countries the process of justice was carried through torture and pain, but the sense of morality was never offended. To torture the accused in order to extract confessions was considered highly moral. In Blackstone's times, in England, men and women were hanged for petty larcenies. The punishment for treason which the English law in those times imposed could be equalled only with the tortures in ancient China. Less than a hundred years ago intemperance was never considered as anything disgraceful or immoral. And some of the best of the English statesmen were reputed drunkards. Morality, therefore, is not an absolute standard, a stagnant quality—the same yesterday, today and for ever. Though today homicide is an offence both at law and morality, social morality is not the least shocked by the massacre of the thousands under the name of the war and under the garb of patriotism. Morality, as society practises it, is therefore a creature of custom and conditioned by circumstances.

Morality though an offspring of custom is, however, higher than it. For ordinary masses custom becomes morality only when it receives some higher sanction. In the first place. custom arises out of the vital needs of a society under the special circumstances of its culture, time and land, and it is converted into morality when it receives the sanction of religion. Thus custom is only a base metal turned into the coin of morality by the impress of religion on it. Social standards of morality of any community are, therefore, not merely crystallised customs. They are ideals and values impressed upon the individuals by belief in the superior sanction of religion to reinforce the customs and habits which the society approves. They thus pass into legal and moral codes, and become the machinery of social control. But, by no means it must be supposed that these moral standards are the ideal and absolute standards of conduct or that they at all times tend to social good and are based on justice.

Western civilisation, which derives its traditions in art, literature and philosophical thought from the ancient Greek culture, derives its morals from Christianity. The observance of various religious commandments constituted for the ancient Jews righteousness or the standards of morality. The ancient Jews based their moral principles on religious dogmas irrespective of the consideration whether there was any logic, justice or reason behind them. They accepted the commandments with greatest possible sanctity and immutability and never cared to consider the want of logic or reason in them. The Law of

God, for example, lays down: "Thou shall not sow thy vine-yard with diverse seed: lest the fruit of the seed which thou hast sown, and the fruit of thy vine-yard, be defiled." "Thou shalt not plough with an ox and ass together." "Thou shalt not wear a garment of diverse sorts, as of woollen and linen together." "He that is wounded in the stones or hath his privy member cut off, shall not enter into the congregation of the Lord." "Thou shalt not bring the hire of a whore, or the price of a dog, into the house of the Lord thy God for any vow: for even both these are abomination unto the Lord thy God." Now such commandments were received by the Jews as absolute and immutable standards of conduct without any challenge from reason or logic.

As we have already stated, custom becomes a rule of morality with religious sanction. So it was with the ancient Jews. But the religious conceptions of the Jews were analogous to those of the people at a low level of culture. Among all savages traditional custom becomes the rule of morality when a sacred or religious character is attached to it. But religion itself among the savages is nothing but a belief in the supernatural, superstitious and magic ideas. A good deal of importance is, therefore, attached to the customs and observances which have reference to magic ideas and superstition. Abstaining from work at the new moon, or from breaking the bones of a slain animal, or avoiding contact with a menstruating woman are examples in point. The punishment of a social offence is left among the savages to the injured party²; but the breach of a superstitious custom handed down, as it is supposed, by some supernatural being is regarded with the utmost gravity. The customs concern not individual members of a community,

^{1.} See: Deuteronomy (Holy Bible), 22, 9, 10, 11 and 23, also see 1 and 18.

^{2.} Thus among the savages the injury inflicted by a murderer is held to be fully compensated if the loss which he has caused to a given family is made good by presenting the relations of the murdered persons with a substitute for the victim. Thus among the North American Indians the feelings of a mother whose son was brutally murdered were assuaged by her adopting the murderer in place of her slain son. Similarly a widow whose husband had been murdered might be consoled by marrying the murderer. See Briffault: The Mothers, Vol. II. p. 353.

but the whole tribe, and are supposed to bring divine wrath and punishment on the tribe as a whole.

This primitive character permeated the whole moral outlook of the ancient Jews. Their whole moral code was formed not out of discussions or considerations of what is socially beneficial or just, but out of the authority of tradition. Thus tradition with the force of its superstitious sanctity became the social judge of conduct. A rule of conduct, although pernicious to social good and contrary to the principles of justice, became the 'de facto' moral standard with the support of established tradition. It is now evident that to the savage mind morality meant the observance of certain tabus which received their strength from superstition. It is quite deplorable that even today in the civilised nations of Europe certain rules of conduct should possess moral force merely on account of their traditional observance. Tradition as the foundation of morality, in an age of reason and science, is not only unreasonable but outrageously objectionable. "If that principle be adopted, what claims to be moral is liable to be in fact intolerably immoral. And far from being entitled to respect, that honest opinion. which assigns indisputable moral authority to whatever happens to be handed down by tradition from savage times, is an abuse which civilised men and women have the right to object, and an injustice which they are entitled to fight tooth and nail."3

Christianity with its additions of important elements to the Jewish conceptions of morality made a great advance over it, at the same time ignoring some of the Jewish moral principles that took authority from the Law of God. But one and

^{1.} Thus the Aleuts hold that the whale avoids dissolute tribes, on account of which whalers must avoid women during the fishing season. But the whalers may have to suffer for the sins of others as well as their own, for the whale would punish them if their wives were unfaithful during their absence, or if their sisters were unchaste before marriage. Similarly, the Australians hold that certain breaches of custom cause the Erkincha disease and other penalties. See L. T. Hobhouse: Morals in Evolution, p. 419. Also see Westermarck: The History of Human Marriage, 1901, pp. 61-63, according to whom unchastity on the part of a girl is considered by the natives of Loango to bring ruin on a country, and some of the Dyaks think that a pregnant unmarried woman is offensive to the superior powers.

^{2.} Robert Briffault: Sin and Sex, p. 14.

the most important principle Christianity could not get rid of; and that was identifying moral rules with divine commandments, and as such regarding them as inviolable, immutable and not open to discussion. Thus religious dogmatism is the backbone of all Christian ethics, the justice of which is greatly injured and marred. In the sphere of morality, Christianity fiercely repudiates the right of free inquiry and reasonable discussion. Christianity, therefore, after the manner of the ancient Jews, upheld certain tabus which have their source in the superstitious ideas of the savages.

The Western mind, with the impress of Christian ethics over it, attaches such an extreme religiosity to its moral ideas, that they are not held to belong to the province of discussion as in the case of other sciences like biology, astronomy, politics or economics. As Lecky remarks, Christianity in the great majority of cases gives a tone and bias to all forms of action. In spite of its critical tendency, the Western mind accepts all moral issues as sacrosanct on the strength of their religiosity. Any attempt to investigate the truth of them is considered grossly immoral, challenging as it does the very authority of religious dogmatism.

The welfare of men and women ultimately depends upon how they behave towards each other; and the hunt after righteousness was the outcome of a genuine desire to formulate rules of social behaviour which would promote mutual good and harmony. The greatest good of the greatest number is ultimately the goal of all rules of conduct and behaviour. But the moment a rule of conduct is regarded not as a means to promote human welfare, but a categorical dogmatic authority not open to discussion, it forfeits its claim to be righteous and leaves no guarantee that, however good it may be, it will not 'corrupt the world'-to use a Tennysonian expression. Absolutism in morality is as pernicious as it is in government. Consider, for instance, the effect of a dogmatic morality based on religious authority which commands the Malays to eat the heart of their enemies, which enjoins upon the followers of Allah to massacre all non-believers, and which ordains the Hindoos to marry their maidens at the age of eight. It was

^{1.} Lecky: The History of European Morals, Vol. I, see pp. 194-195.

for the fulfilment of this dogmatic morality that Jehovah ordered his son Abraham to sacrifice his own son to prove his faith, causing whole tribes to be annihilated, even drowning the whole of humanity by the flood. The sacrifice of Hindoo widows in the past on the biers of their husbands was a necessary consequence of belief in the dogmatism of morality.

An ethic which is purely founded on superstition and dogmatism and does not meet the question 'why?' on the ground of reasoning is ill-suited for human adoption. The Christian morality that ordains 'thou shalt not kill,' or 'thou shalt not covet thy neighbour's ox' can be taken as the best ethical rules for human conduct based as they are on the principles of justice and tend to social welfare. Social life would be intolerable and even impossible if people did not bridle their desires to murder and steal. But that kind of ordinance that prescribes the observance of sabbath and savs 'on the seventh day thou shalt rest,' were it based on the ground of necessity for rest after a strenuous toil for six days, it would be a fine and just principle of social hygiene; but in reality it lays down this rule not on such a social consideration, but upon a superstitious belief of God having made the world in six days and rested on the seventh, and therefore the breach of this rule is a mortal sin. The stronghold of this morality, deriving as it does its authority from dogmatic religiosity and undiluted superstition over the public mind, becomes manifest when we are told that it was not long since it was a misdemeanour in Scotland to walk in the streets during service hours, and in New London, Massachusetts, John and Sarah Chapman were apprehended and brought before the court in 1670 for sitting together on the Lord's Day under an apple tree in Goodman Chapman's orchard, and that at Bury in Suffolk the bye-laws appointed that boys found in the street on Sundays should be whipped.¹ The inauspicious and ominous character that is associated with the number 'thirteen' still obtains even in advanced cities like Paris, and the thirteenth room in every hotel is always found vacant, with the result that many hotels in Paris have not got a thirteenth room at all, lest it should remain vacant.

1. Robert Briffault: Sin and Sex. p. 22.

One might argue that a rule of conduct, though based on superstition, is commendable if it gives some incidental benefits. No argument is more sophisticated than this. Such tabus being enforced from motives other than human welfare produce effects invariably other than beneficial, whatever incidental advantages they might impart. Observance of Sabbath on the ground of rest and leisure would be a beneficial institution, but becomes on account of its superstitious covering a means of tyrannical abuse. Observance of fast on the eleventh day of every Hindu month is a sound hygienic principle, which has lost all its significance on account of the superstitious character attached to it.

Thus the whole European civilisation on its moral side is founded on the ancient traditional morality of the Jews, which abounds with superstitious ideas, dogmatic beliefs, fear of the supernatural and inconsiderate pursuit of traditions—all reflexes of the savage mind. Western morals are in this sense unmindful of justice or respect for human life or rights, or for honesty, truth, humanity, goodwill or mercy. Western tradition has laid down a fixed standard of moral values the validity of which is unquestionable. They have become an unalterable law of human conduct.

II

A succinct view of the origin and nature of Christian morality in general will enable us to view with a proper estimate and wider comprehension that part of it that concerns itself with sex.

By a crude irony the term 'morality' has in European tradition¹ come to be limited to that kind of moral conduct which is expressed in sexual domain. When people talk of safeguarding public morality, they do not mean or desire the necessity of taking precautions to prevent fraud, putting down

^{1. &}quot;When we speak of morality, we are understood, nine hundred and ninety-nine times out of a thousand, to refer to sexual morality."—Briffault: The Mothers, Vol. III, p. 252. Also, "A great confusion of ideas...has led to the term morality being more and more identified with that of moral conduct in the sexual domain."—Forel: The Sexual Question, p. 450.

war, minimising poverty or social injustice. Even a most heinous murder is looked upon at the worst as anti-social, but not immoral; but a conduct which has reference to sex-expression is at once transferred to the domain of morality and judged in the hot and cold. Morality has come to be understood as the preservation of certain sex tabus handed down from times immemorial. From this point of view, a sexually cold or anæsthetic man is regarded as extremely 'moral' and is highly esteemed. In reality his sexual indifference has not the least moral value. For the same reason an invert is not moral only because he does not even glance at girls; but society would regard him highly moral.

European sexual morality, like other kinds of morality, is a child of tradition. "Our sexual morality," writes Havelock Ellis, "has disregarded natural human emotions and is incapable of understanding those who declare that to retain unduly traditional laws that are opposed to the vital needs of human society is not a morality but an immorality." Christianity placed virtue above all achievements and aspirations. And it identified this with sexual chastity. Thus, as we have already shown in the first part, it upheld virginity, condemned fornication, and praised celibacy. Marriage door was kept open only as a necessary evil that people might not slip into the ditch of fornication. We have already detailed the rules of sexual behaviour as laid down by St. Paul and others.

Christian sexual morality, as we have shown, regards all sexual expression as unclean, and allows it only within the four corners of marriage. And even in marriage sexual intercourse is justified only on the grounds of procreation. On the face of it, therefore, this ascetic morality ignores the psychological element in marriage, namely sexual desire, and so all sexual intercourse outside marriage is condemned, and even within marriage, though allowed, is according to Paul regrettable. The only excuse for marriage, according to St. Jerome, was that it might give birth to virgins; he even went so far as to say that the end and purpose of the man of God was "to cut down with the axe of virginity the wood of marriage."

1. Havelock Ellis: Studies in the Psychology of Sex, Vol. VI, p. 373.

To what extent the craze for sexual purity became prudish is evident from the fact that Christian ethics condemned all cleanly habits and habits of bath as tending towards sexual impurity by making the body attractive.1 Outward dirtiness was taken as the symbol for inward purity and sanctity. "The purity of the body and garments" St. Paul means the impurity of the soul. "When such views on sex prevailed, sexual relations when they occurred became brutal and harsh. The art of love was forgotten and marriage became brutalised. Even as Jesus says to the Sadducees who presented the famous case of the seven brothers who married the same woman in order to raise up seed: "The children of this world marry, and are given in marriage. But they shall be accounted worthy to obtain that world and the resurrection from the dead, who neither marry nor are they given in marriage. Neither can they die any more: for they are equal unto angels; and are the children of God, being the children of resurrection."

Under the influence of ascetic thought marriage was greatly degraded and was regarded exclusively in its lowest aspect. The worst social results of this conception, in the words of the historian of morals, were that "the true love it elicits, the holy and beautiful domestic qualities that follow in its train, were almost absolutely omitted from consideration. The object of the ascetic was to attract men to a life of virginity, and, as a necessary consequence, marriage was looked upon as an inferior state." 2 The Christian fathers kept before themselves a burning ideal of some unknown heaven, unknown salvation, and of some unknown next world free from all earthly miseries and sorrows. And towards this end, self-mortification, self-abnegation, denial of the most natural and imperative desires were practised and advocated as means. And as the physical desire of sex is the most difficult of these to curb and restrain, they laid the most emphasis on it.

The human body is the masterful culmination of Nature's art, after which She has quietly retired being satisfied with the consummation that was reached in the creation of a perfect

^{1.} Havelock Ellis: Studies in the Psychology of Sex, Vol. VI, p. 31.

^{2.} Lecky: History of European Morals, pp. 340-341.

physical grace, intellectual strength and spiritual force in the form of a human being. The bi-sexuality attained its finishing glory in the form of man and woman. She gave man physical strength and virility: while the woman She adorned with physical charm, grace and beauty. Anybody looking at these creations with a contemptuous and reviling eve must be a maniac or insane. Those Christian fathers, who condemned human body as being an evil in itself and the charming physical forms as symbols of gates to hell, must have been no less than maniacs or insane. Talking of womanly beauty St. Odo of Cluny says that if we could see beneath the skin, woman could arouse nothing but nausea; their ornaments are but blood, mucus and bile; and our embracing a woman is just like embracing a sack of dung, which we even refuse to touch with our fingertip.1 Such views surely savour of insanity and neuroticism. They are a negation of the very fundamentals that constitute the loveliness and charm of life. What is tragically ironical is that these very saints have had to put up a most tough fight against these boisterous appetites and at times found themselves painfully vanguished by them. One of them, St. Jerome, got himself castrated and still found it impossible to control his sex-desires. Ultimately he renounced himself to a life in the desert to avoid the temptations of sex-life. Sex-obsession, however, proved too powerful for him, and most pitifully he admits: "I, who, out of fear of hell, had condemned myself to this prison, companion of scorpions and wild beasts, often seemed in imagination among bands of girls. My face was pale with fasting and my mind within my frigid body was burning with desire; the fires of lust would still flare up in a body that already seemed to be dead."2 How insensate then appears the preaching of these saints and their advocacy of wholesale sexsuppression! Being enamoured of a bright heaven and being always in constant fear of a dark hell, these semi-maniac products of humanity, branding all sexual relations as bestial, uncleanly and immoral, served to create a disorder, chaos and muddle in social life which otherwise would have become quite

^{1.} See Havelock Ellis: Studies in the Psychology of Sex, Vol. VI, p. 119.

^{2.} Ibid.

normal and would have adapted itself to the changing conditions. By condemning the Catholic priests to life-long celibacy they forced them inevitably to clandestine relationship, who otherwise would have taken to normal sexual life. This made the followers—particularly those of the Catholic sect—frigid, narrow-minded, suspicious, hypocritical and superstitious.

The Catholic Church went even further than the doctrine of St. Paul and others. Not only sexual intercourse outside marriage was bad, but even as between husband and wife it is a sin if it does not lead to pregnancy. So the motive that could justify sexual intercourse is the desire to have children. The immorality of this moral principle is that it is quite indifferent whether such intercourse is against the wishes of the wife, whether it burdens her with pregnancy after pregnancy, whether it is injurious to her health, or whether it leads to the birth of deformed, ugly, insane, idiotic or diseased children.

Dr. Bevan's view¹ that the Christian sexual ethics were only the stabilisation of the Greek sexual ethics rests on a misinterpretation of the Greek social institutions. Chastity was, no doubt, imposed upon women and was regarded as the essential virtue of wives. But this claim for chastity was based not on any ethical standard but in the desire to maintain an exclusive, pure Greek race. As we have already pointed out in our first part, it was the principle of the State that obliged the wives of Greeks to remain chaste in order that any foreign blood might not disturb the homogeneity of the Greek race. But this chastity was never considered as a necessary moral attribute. As Briffault remarks: "Their virtue as wives and daughters was viewed as a family obligation towards their husbands or relatives rather than as an ethical quality, and we find no heroic view of the seriousness of transgression and of the dishonour attaching to it."2 And further he emphatically says that "the idea of morality 'par excellence', that is of sexual morality as it has come to be regarded in modern Europe, as a virtue transcending in importance all other moral obligations, while disregard of it constitutes corruption and sinwas, when the basis of Western culture, thought, and civilisa-

^{1.} See Dr. Edwyn Bevan: Christianity, (1932), pp. 50-55.

^{2.} Robert Briffault: Mothers, (1927), Vol. III, p. 348.

tion were laid in Greece, as yet unborn." Our contention is further strongly supported by the fact that Greek opinion and custom at times sanctioned maternity outside marriage if it was likely to lead to healthy children.²

Sexual purity as a moral virtue was never a part of the social institutions of the Romans either. In the days of patriarchy, chastity on the part of woman was considered not as a 'moral' but a 'civic' virtue. Sexual virtue was a civic and secular ideal: and the demand for fidelity on the part of woman was also a reciprocal obligation upon the husband.3 But the religious and mystic character that is associated with sexual morality with its consequent conceptions of 'impurity' and 'sin' was absent in Rome as it was in Greece. The freedom in the later Empire in matters of sex has led some authors to believe that the general tone of morals then was low and that there was laxity and the women were given to licence. This is clearly a mistake. On the other hand, free from prudish restraints, Roman women worthily retained the position of their husbands' companions, counsellors and friends.4 Dill, a recognised authority on Roman society, states that Roman woman's position, both in law and fact, rose during the Empire; without being less virtuous or respected, she became far more accomplished and attractive: with fewer restraints, she had greater charm and influence, even in public affairs, and was more and more the equal of her husband. "In the last age of the Western Empire, there is no deterioration in the position and influence of woman."5

It is now clear that the conception of sexual purity belongs purely to Christianity and is not a growth either of Greek or Roman morality. Christianity looked upon sexual enjoyment as inherently impure and regarded fornication as a deadly sin. The Church, however, realising the difficulty of controlling sexual instinct, sanctified marriage as the only legitimate channel for its expression. There was a division of opinion and a

- 1. Robert Briffault: Mothers, (1927), Vol. III, pp. 349-350.
- 2. See G. Lowes Dickinson: The Greek View of Life, (1912), p. 164.
- 3. Robert Briffault: The Mothers, Vol. III, pp. 350-352.
- 4. L. T. Hobhouse: Morals in Evolution, p. 216.
- 5. Prof. Dill: Roman Society, p. 163.

great controversy on the question whether marriage was permissible or not; and several of the fathers protested against the view that it was against the principles of Christian faith; but they were one and all agreed in regarding it as an evil, albeit a necessary evil. Marriage was accordingly permitted, but not its dissolution. Marriage henceforth became a sacrament; and no matter whether one of the conjoints was a drunkard, insane or diseased, the sacredness of it rendered it indissoluble. No doubt, under certain circumstances, separation was allowed, but then the right to remarry was for ever sealed.

Protestantism was an advance over and an impulsive revolt against the ideas of the Catholic Church. The most important thing it did was to secularise marriage. Marriage, Luther emphatically declared, is a 'temporal worldly thing,' which does not concern the Church, and eliminated the sacramental character from it.1 Hence, Protestantism allowed divorce under certain circumstances. But even the Protestants could not get rid of the idea of the impurity of sex. The notions about sex remained as they were. So Protestantism, more than the Catholic Church, condemned all sexual expressions outside marriage and regarded fornication as a mortal sin from which there can be no absolution. By secularising marriage, Luther showed some knowledge of nature that though it may be possible for human beings to repress their actions. they cannot repress their feelings and desires. But what he did was only to restore marriage to the clergy.2 He only transferred the spiritual powers in these respects of the Church to the State. Protestant principles, to quote Howard, "released the State from its shell of worldliness, ascribed to it ethical tendencies, and made it the bearer of morality." Beyond this Protestantism could not go. Marriage still remained a public affair and not a private concern. As Havelock Ellis points out, the steps taken by Protestantism involved a considerable

^{1.} G. E. Howard: A History of Matrimonial Institutions, Vol. I, pp. 387-388.

^{2.} Luther made the first innovation in this respect by marrying a nun.

^{3.} G. E. Howard: A History of Matrimonial Institutions, Vol. I, p. 389.

change in the nature of marriage, but not necessarily any great changes in the form. This was because "it fell back on the general principles of Canon law, modifying them to suit its own special attitude and needs." Lutheran doctrine of marriage as a lawful wedlock has shut its eyes to the worthless children produced by ill-matched and impure marriage, to the tyranny of the husbands over their wives, and has absolutely ignored the element of love in marriage. The effect of the Lutheran doctrine of marriage is, as Ellen Key bitterly remarks, "today countless women are still being sacrificed to this doctrine of marriage; their exhausted wombs are a poor soil for the new generation: their crushed souls a broken support for the growth of new wills."2 Though Protestantism showed some sanity by eliminating the sacramental side of marriage and by regarding it as a contract, still the idea that it is a public affair, and that once entered, it became a lifelong bond irrespective of the consideration whether the cementing element of love was there or not, led it to ordain that it should be solemnised in Church after which its termination was impossible.

As both Catholicism and Protestantism are based neither on reason nor on human considerations, moral principles of both of them deserve to be re-examined and recast. As a rational human being, should not one frankly ask himself what it was that led the Church to condemn fornication? Are there any valid grounds that led the Church to view with contumely all sex-relationships except within a particular boundary rigidly laid down? The ascetic idealism of the Church, founded as it was on the superstition and fear of the unknown, conceived sexual act as impure, although this act becomes tolerable after fulfilling certain preliminary conditions. Thus the whole idea is based on superstition. As we have already stated before, these anti-sexual preachings are inculcated by those persons who, there is strong ground to believe, must have suffered from diseased conditions of the body or mind. Christian ethics on sex are founded on superstition as much as the belief of the Pelew Islanders that perforation of the nose gives eternal bliss. Commenting on the superstitious and illogical element in the

^{1.} Havelock Ellis: Studies in the Psychology of Sex, Vol. VI, p. 442.

^{2.} Ellen Key: Love and Marriage, p. 14.

Christian sexual morality, Briffault remarks: "The principles and the standards having reference to sex which are current in modern Western tradition and which have assumed the exclusive connotation of 'morals' are neither the product of accumulated human experience nor of a general sentiment or tradition common to all humanity, but are the outcome of a special doctrine which arose under particular conditions in a sect of fanatics mentally abnormal and diseased, who were in favour of castrating themselves and of abolishing procreation, and most of whom would, had they lived at the present day, have been removed to asylums for the insane." ¹

The present European sexual morality is a heritage of this type of morality. It abhors nudity as being the symbol of evil, it condemns all natural relationship with woman except when sanctified by particular forms, and therefore looks upon woman as the mother of all human ills.

Christian sexual morality has even to-day permeated the whole sexual view-point of the Western society. It has, for the last so many centuries, remained the final authority on all sexual matters. The baneful effect on humanity of this morality was that "it begot ignorance, superstition, discomfort, disease, demoralisation; it destroyed the finest of pagan art,... and induced immorality." Morality, a danger!—this was the warning that Nietzsche uttered when he saw social growth warped under the influence of the morbid ethics. "Our moral values," he wrote, "are signs of decline, of disbelief in life, and of a preparation for pessimism."

Women have been the worst sufferers under this sexual morality. Men have slowly emancipated themselves from it; but a rigorous observance of it is demanded from woman. A man can sow his wild oats, as the term goes, anywhere; but woman must limit her sexual life within the four walls of marriage. Virginity is her most sacred obligation; she is then the very embodiment of all purity, all honour, It is not the concern of

^{1.} Robert Briffault: Sin and Sex, p. 73.

^{2.} Draper, in his History of Conflict between Religion and Science, quoted by Arthur James Todd: Theories of Social Progress, (1918), p. 429.

^{3.} Nietzsche: Works (edited by Dr. Oscarlivy), (1924), Vol. XIV, p. 214.

society whether this virginity saps the very vitality of the woman, reduces her into a physical wreck and turns her mental garden into a barren tract. Society ignores sexual aberrations in the case of a man: but a woman must marry—whatever may be the results of such marriage on her happiness—or suffer perpetually the pangs of celibacy. Ruth Bre has boldly and vehemently described this crippled existence of modern woman: "On the one side: the legal bargain of the marriage market; a bargain that gives no guarantee of love, of health, of fidelity; a bargain existing concurrently with prostitution, venereal diseases, abnormalities, and self-abuse. On the other side: pale-lipped hunger, a perpetual malaise, sleepless nights, and by day a heavy listlessness, an absolute inability to concentrate the mind on any work; and weeping of the woman, who is ripe for love but has never known it, at each recurrent summit of bodily function-all this drives many women to self-inflicted death. Is this sexual health? Is it tolerable?"1

Every woman, therefore, must marry: she has no other alternative. She must surrender herself to the embraces of a person, whom she would even loath to kick away. She must suffer the tyrannies of sexual life from a man who is diseased or insane, a drunkard or an idiot. She cannot challenge his rights; she cannot repudiate his loathsome embraces. Society has sanctified them under the most supreme and sacred name of marriage. Such disgustful, lawful rapes society is seeing with its bare eyes. This is the worst type of immorality. But if the woman has the foresight to see the ugliness of an institution which is most dear and sacred to society, then she must condemn herself to a lifeless life. All youthful dreams of her adolescent days she must forget. The splendour that she wove in her vouthful imagination round an ideal sexual life she must tear to pieces. She must live in celibacy: that is the highest fulfilment of her moral obligation towards society, though to her it becomes a moral death.

Woman under this sexual morality must accept whatever children the man gives her. It is not her choice. She must bear and produce, that is her only duty. The children may be

^{1.} Ruth Bre, quoted by F. Muller-Lyer: The Family, p. 268.

ugly, diseased, filthy, criminal; she has to bear them all. They may reduce her physique to bones and skin; they may cost the home its comfort and happiness; but she cannot question these.

This morality denounces woman to a life of ignorance. Chastity before marriage and fidelity within it being her obligations, she must not know anything of sexual life. She must live in absolute ignorance as to the fundamental facts of sex-life. Ignorance of sexual facts is her great virtue. She may in this way contract disease from her diseased husband, or give birth to diseased children. But this all she must take as a divine scourge. She must bring up her own children—both boys and girls—in an atmosphere of absolute ignorance. They must be taught that sex is impure and even a reference to it is a sign of moral degradation.

Modern women have revolted against this type of sexual morality. With their enlarged education, their study of real factors that go to make a healthy social life, their deep interest in the fundamentals that constitute life, their active participation in political and social life, their individualistic attitude concerning social institutions, their desire to face human problems with sympathy and toleration instead of by prejudice and contempt, modern women are rudely shaken by the pseudo aspect of the traditional sexual morality. In the press, as well as on the platform, they are demanding a new standard of sexual morality.

A morality which is not based on human consideration, since it throws the unmarried mother into the ranks of social pariahs; which is anti-social, because it is anti-sexual and considers all sexual enjoyments as the manifestations of sinful desires; which is unjust and cruel, because it facilitates the tyranny of one sex over the other; which is opposed to natural and social needs and instincts, because it makes divorce an odious and disgraceful affair by compelling the parties to go to the extreme measure of committing adultery and then washing their dirty linen in the open market;—this morality is contrary to social needs, welfare and interests. Modern women regard this morality as ghastly, monstrous and wicked. They want a thorough overhauling of the whole machinery of sexual mora-

lity. "Sex morals for women," they declare, "have been onesided; they have been purely negative, inhibitory and repressive. They have been fixed by agencies which have sought to keep women enslaved; which have been determined, even as they are now, to use woman solely as an asset to the church. the state and the man."1 They want sexual morality to run through new channels conducive to social welfare and making society rational and tolerative; they must also fulfil the demand for the growth of personality. Modern feminists' demand for personal enrichment to become the prime object of social morality becomes clearly evident from the words of Beatrice Hale. when she trenchantly admonishes the present morality as having become only "a decoration bestowed on men and women of continent habits," but under which in truth "a content man who lacks temptation to be anything else may be a perfect monster of immorality in every other respect, while a woman whose temperament has urged her into an irregular union may be obeving her own inner law, and may be, in all but conventional reputation, a highly moral person,"2

"We, and not men, must fix the standard in sex; for we have to play the chief part in the racial life," says Catherine Hartley.³ "Ever since the idea of the emancipation of woman came upon the world's stage," writes Ellen Key, "women have begun, consciously and directly, to share in the transformation of existing morals and to demand a new morality; particularly in regard to the relations between the sexes. A century has now seen women with ever increasing energy for the renovation of sex-morals." What is the nature of the new sexual morality which the women are evolving in the society? In what way do they want the traditional sexual morality to be renovated? They want the whole fabric and basis of sexual morality to be recast. In the following pages we shall consider the various aspects of this new sexual morality. For the present, we are giving only the outlines of them.

In the first place, women want the new sexual morality to

- 1. Margaret Sanger: Woman and the New Race, (1920), p. 179.
- 2. Beatrice Hale: What Women Want, (1914), p. 266.
- 3. Catherine Hartley: The Age of Mother Power, (1914), p. 345.
- 4. Ellen Key: Renaissance of Motherhood, p. 19.

be founded on human considerations. It must take into account human weaknesses and drawbacks and, therefore, breathe a spirit of toleration and sympathy. It must tend to social welfare without impairing the potentialities of personal growth. It must not distinguish one sex from the other, because the moral needs and obligations of both of them are the same. There must be, therefore, absolute equality of standard of sexmorality for both sexes.

Secondly, sex must never be considered as impure in itself. Sexual enjoyment in its rational form is a natural fulfilment of a most natural desire. All ugly ideas about the uncleanliness of sexual life must disappear from society.

And towards all these ends modern women demand that: Sexual education must be imparted to both boys and girls.

Sex-relationship is not the concern of society, if it does not infringe the rights or outrage the instincts of any of the conjoints nor involves the birth of a child. Sex-relationship becomes a concern of society if it ends in the birth of a child, for whose welfare society has a right to interfere.

Motherhood of physically and mentally healthy children must in itself be regarded as the fulfilment of a noble function. The circumstances under which it has occurred is none of the concerns of society. Unmarried motherhood of socially useful children must not be regarded as a shameful thing.

Contraceptive methods, where they are used in the interests of the individual and society, must not be condemned. And towards this end, society ought to open institutions to impart proper knowledge of birth control to persons who, both from the individual and social points of view, need it.

Marriage must be regarded as a worldly affair to promote individual happiness and social welfare, and as such cannot be a lifelong indissoluble bond where it fails to promote either of these ends. These can only be fulfilled if love is regarded as its basis. Marriage without love is a mockery. Mutual consent, therefore, ought to be allowed a ground for divorce.

To make marriage a stable institution for the promotion of individual happiness and social good, companionate marriage ought to be allowed. This will facilitate the conjoints an opportunity to try each other's physical and mental qualities in order to see their mutual adaptability; the question of children, in the meanwhile, to be solved by the adoption of contraceptive methods. If the companionate proves a success, the parties are to enter into marriage with the right to divorce by mutual consent—a right which will be rarely used on account of each other's full understanding. Such marriage would be found more happy and stable than the monogamic marriage of the present which allows divorce on filthy and disrespectful grounds.

This is the new sexual morality. It has its ground-work in reason and justice. Individual happiness, which has been relegated to subordinate importance, is the prime concern of these new ethics. The old morality can no longer survive, based as it is on superstition irrespective of the needs and cravings of the individual. The individual had become only a cog in the machine; he was rendered lifeless. The new sexual morality will keep his interests always forwards. "The new sexual morality knows," writes Ellen Key in her Love and Marriage, "that in a wide sense civilisation only attains lasting power over nature, when it combines higher emotions of happiness with the ends in pursuit of which harsh means may be demanded. That creed of life, which makes the mission of the race co-operate with personal happiness and love, will also demand of the latter the sacrifices which the former render necessary." The followers of this creed believe that the happiness of the individual is, above all, a most important condition for the progress of the race.

CHAPTER VI

PRUDISH SEXUAL ETHICS (Continued)

POETS and authors, we everyday hear singing in high tunes the sacred, sweet and divine character of motherhood. They are all blind whether this motherhood has burdened society with the cost of diseased and anti-social children; whether it has been enforced upon its owner against her wishes; whether it has cost her her health or has reduced the family to a financial crisis. Irrational society, on the other hand, condemns children, however charming, intelligent, clever, healthy and lovable, because they did not come into the world under particular circumstances—and could they control it?—to eat the fire of shame and scandal. This is immoral morality. Thousands of abortions, infanticides and child-exposures in the world have their real authorship in victimising social morals.

And here we are reminded of the tragic story¹ of Frieda Keller, a young girl of nineteen, who was seduced by the proprietor of the café in which she was employed, and who gave birth to what society calls an 'illegitimate' child. The sense of social scandal and shame bore so heavily upon her that in spite of all her love for other children she was forced by social morals to end her agonies by putting an end to her child's life. She was subsequently tried and found guilty. But the judges showed her mercies by commuting her death sentence to that of transportation for life.

And now, what is the philosophy of a case like this which we meet practically every day in life? It is society with its unsophisticated morals that forces a Frieda Keller to commit the murder of her child. It is the ugly social morals that cause her to look upon her child as the living symbol of all her sin. Although Frieda Keller was fond of her sister's children, as we are told, she did not love her own; and took no notice of it.

Why—why should she? Had she no heart? Had all the deep springs of motherly feelings dried up in her heart? And if they had dried up, here is society responsible for it. would neither maintain her child as she told in the court, nor would allow her to accept it as her own. The shame with which illegitimacy is branded by the low morals of an advancing society, the open and rigorous contempt practically amounting to excommunication that society casts upon illegitimate motherhood-these compelled this innocent, helpless and miserable girl to sacrifice her motherhood by putting an end to her child's life—the product of her very flesh and blood. Did the judges, the solemn guardians of justice, take this into consideration? Did they criticise society? Did they make a plea for recasting social morals? And O! the tragic irony of it!—they poured large mercies upon her by commuting her death sentence to a life one-where she should rot all her life, suffering the cruel scourges of an irrational moral code.

Dr. Goodsell¹ tells us that the Christian Church harshly condemned the practices of abortion, infanticide, and child-exposure. One should like to honour and at the same time pity the high motives of the Church. It is the anti-human ethics of the Church that are responsible for abortions and child-murders. One has only to travel through the statistics of infant mortality in different countries and the figures would be a fine criticism on the morality of the Church handed down. If we examine the statistics of infant mortality of legitimate and illegitimate children, we discover that mortality of the illegitimate children far exceeds that of the legitimate. In Denmark 213 illegitimate children die to every 100 legitimate; in Norway, 199 to 100; and in Sweden, 178 to 100. In England and Wales for the years 1915-1917 the rate of infant mortality under one year was per 1,000 live births, 195.8 illegitimate to 94.1 legitimate.2 In Australia, infant mortality for the years 1925-30 of nuptial (legitimate) children was 50.23 and of ex-nuptial (illegitimate) children 92.4, the percentage of ex-nuptial on nuptial rate being

^{1.} Dr. W. Goodsell: The Family, p. 168.

^{2.} Statistics taken from V. F. Calverton: Bankruptcy of Marriage, p. 189.

184.¹ In New Zealand, "the proportion of illegitimate infants among those dying within the first year of life has been found to be greater (in some years substantially so) than the proportion of illegitimate births."²

These figures throw some light on the effect of unjust morality. The ignoring of the illegitimate children, treating them with scorn and ridicule, is it moral? is it human? Under this morality thousands of children,³ who, if they survived, would make the best products of humanity, are being sacrificed. The increased mortality is without doubt a consequence of an ethic which degrades and weakens the mother and thwarts the life and growth of the child. In Germany, for instance, according to Calverton,⁴ in the one year 1912 there were 183,857 children born, of which 41,027 died under one year of age. The mortality rate for that year of the illegitimate children was 22 %, for legitimate children it was 12 %. In the same country the proportion of still-born illegitimate children is more than twice that of still-born legitimate children.5

The high amount of social and individual suffering, apart from a high infant mortality which results from this cruel morality, is seldom understood and realised. To victimise the child because its parents are unmarried is the morality of the devil. The unmarried mother, from the moment of her conception, is compelled to outstrip all the tender feelings of her womanly heart, conceals pregnancy and becomes anxious to

- 1. Journal of the Royal Statistical Society, Vol. XCV, Part IV, pp. 691-692.
- 2. New Zealand Official Year Book, (Fortieth Issue, 1931), pp. 125-126.
- 3. It is quite germane in this connection to learn the statistics of illegitimate births, whose fate, because they did not come into the world under particular circumstances prescribed by society, is presettled against them. In the United States 40,388 illegitimate children were born in the year 1925 (Statistical Abstract of the U. S. A., 1926, p. 81). In Wales, England, Scotland and Ireland, illegitimate births in the year 1929 were respectively 29, 1,307, 7,165, 1,216 (Seventy-fourth Annual Report of the Registrar-General, p. xx). In New Zealand the figure for the year 1930 was 1,371 (New Zealand Year Book, 1932, p. 100).
 - 4. V. F. Calverton: Bankruptcy of Marriage, p. 189.
- 5. Elizabeth Chesser: Woman, Marriage and Motherhood, (1913), p. 56.

get rid of the child. It is no wonder then that the criminal ranks are more often recruited from amongst the illegitimate children, abandoned by their mothers and ignored by society. It is not only the child but the mother also that suffers. is regarded as fallen by society. In rescue-homes where she takes recourse her position is unfortunate; she is no more than a delinquent. A powerful sense of shame and of having committed a most immoral act makes her shun society. Her physical constitution is shaken and her mental peace is destroyed. In such homes she is never given the care that would encourage a salutary character. She has to hear daily sermons of morality. It becomes difficult for her to get work, which is sufficient to make her courage weaken and crumble. If under these circumstances she takes to prostitution, it is quite justifiable. Overpowered with shame, condemned by society and deprived of her child, with broken spirits the unmarried mother has no other resort but the horrid and degrading brothel.

Feminism is fighting to-day these ghastly morals. It is one of their demands that the right of motherhood ought to be recognised, the way in which it has occurred is no concern of society if the children born are healthy in body and mind. Children are not responsible for their own birth, and therefore the social right of the child to enjoy a healthy social life begins as soon as it is conceived—the more so if the possessor of it is incapable of looking after it. No pregnancy ought to be considered immoral which leads to healthy children. When every pregnancy and every birth of a good child are looked upon by the society with honour and respect, when every mother is protected by law and assisted in the education of her children, then will society have the right to judge severely of cases like one of Frieda Keller.

In Europe and America it is found that many men and

1. An investigation of the Nuremburg prison reported that 33% of the first offence thieves and 38% of the habitual thieves were illegitimately born. A census of the girls in the correctional institutions of Bavaria in 1905 reported 30% of them as being illegitimately born. Another study of nearly two thousand delinquent youths discovered that 411 of them were illegitimately born.—See Katherine Anthony: Feminism in Germany and Scandinavia, pp. 135-136.

women of intelligence and culture cohabit together but are afraid to conceive children lest they should receive cruel treatment from society. Such men and women would as a matter of fact contribute more to social welfare by bringing into the world healthy children of a sound mind. But social morals as they exist are a great barrier. "One fundamental reason why I demand the respect of society for men and women who live loyally together, even though they might be unmarried, is that the rights and happiness of unborn children are involved," writes Judge Lindsey. He continues: "If the parents insist on doing things that way, it is clearly wrong for society to visit on them a punishment that makes them regard it as necessary that they have no children. Very often they are precisely the kinds of persons who ought to have children, because they have desirable physical and mental qualities to transmit. Why force them not merely to avoid the parenthood they often desire, but also when accidental pregnancy takes place, to resort to the abortionist."1

Healthy motherhood should, therefore, be worthy of social respect; the channel through which it occurs is no concern of society. The present sexual morality puts a premium on those sexual acts which do not lead to pregnancy. Thus a double standard of morality is created for men and women. A man for whom the chief sexual pleasure lies in the sexual act escapes penalty, while a woman whose chief sexual pleasure lies in procreation is visited with penalty. This is perhaps the most unfortunate and the most unnatural result of the patriarchal regulation of society. "Motherhood ought to be restored to its natural sacredness. It ought to become the concern of the woman herself to determine the conditions under which the child shall be born "—these pertinent and thoughtful remarks of Havelock Ellis,² one of the great authorities on sex subjects, is worthy of emulation.

The question of abortion is not far off from this subject. Western law forbids abortion and punishes it. Innumerable abortions are still committed under the fear of social morals. In this way society loses many children of healthy body and

Judge Lindsey: The Revolt of Modern Youth, (1929), p. 219.
 Havelock Ellis: Studies in the Psychology of Sex, Vol. VI, p. 419.

mind. It is only a change in social attitude towards illegitimate pregnancy that would save the life of these children. It is in the interests of unborn children threatened with murder before their birth and with disgrace after it, that the social stigma now placed on illegitimate pregnancy be removed. Another vital consideration for society is that where pregnancy is enforced by rape or against the will of the woman, the right of abortion ought to be allowed. Society is, no doubt, entitled to demand that a mother has no right to kill the child in her womb which she has voluntarily conceived; but if it is proved before a court of law that the conception is involuntarily enforced through rape, the matter stands on an altogether different footing.

It is gratifying that with the disappearance of the idea of the sacredness and indissolubility of monogamic marriage, the stigma attached to the illegitimate mother and the illegitimate child is also disappearing. In U. S. A., some states like North Dakota are abolishing the distinction between a 'legitimate' and an 'illegitimate' child. This state has declared that every child will inherit from both of its parents; the only necessity is that the mother should establish paternity within a year after the child's birth. Another state, Nevada, has provided for the maintenance of the illegitimate child under the Workmen's Compensation Act. The old morality is slowly giving place to new.

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Age of innocence, we are told, is fast disappearing, and along with it, age of ignorance too. Traditional morality regards that all that has connection with sex should be kept a secret. It is not a matter to be mentioned in the public, much less to be discussed. One should not refer to the sexual organs by their very names. A reference to them and that also by their plain names is taken with horror. They are the most impure parts of the body, and should be tolerated only to fulfil the biological purpose of reproduction. Any other manifestation is immoral and degrading.

This hush-hush morality is more prominently observed in the case of children. The children must grow in blank ignorance of the most fundamental facts of their sexual life.1 They never see their parents naked, and after a very early age they do not see even their brothers and sisters naked. Their most natural inquiries about the sources from which children come are met with false and fantastic stories. They are told that the baby was found in the garden or that it was brought by a fairy or a stork or that the doctor brought it. These falsities, however, do not satisfy the children. Their active imagination begins to work, and they invent their own stories as to the origin of babies. It is a pity that modern civilisation should be so backward to that of the Egyptian father, who three thousand five hundred years ago spoke to his child: "Thou shalt never forget thy mother who carried thee long beneath her heart as a heavy burden, and after thy months were accomplished, she bore thee. Three long years she carried thee upon her shoulders and gave thee her breast to thy mouth. She nurtured thee nor knew offence for thy uncleanliness. And when thou didst enter school and wast instructed in the writings, daily she stood by the master with bread and beer from the house."2 It is really an irony of time that this wisdom and insight into the psychology of children should be grossly lacking among people who call themselves civilised.3

Eminent psychologists have confuted the idea that children have no sexual life. Sex-life begins in infancy long before it has any localisation in the erogenic zones.⁴ It was Prof. Sigmund Freud who, more than anyone else, boldly asserted this

- 1. How ridiculous it looks that in schools, children are taught all about their anatomy—the exact number of their bones, the nature and purpose of their spinal cord, the constitution of their brains, etc., but not a word is spoken about their sexual organs, as if they were quite non-existent or, for the matter of that, quite useless.
 - 2. See L. T. Hobhouse: Morals in Evolution, pp. 186-187.
- 3. Our savage brothers prove to be more sensible in this respect. The Melanesians have no tabu on sex in general; there is no putting of any veils on natural functions, and never in the case of a child. The children run about naked, their excretory functions are treated openly and naturally; and further small children at the age of three and four are cognisant of their genital sexuality and of the fact that this will soon be their pleasure as much as their other infantile plays. See Malinowski: Sex and Repression in Savage Society, (1927), p. 55.
 - 4. Stanley Hall: Educational Problems, Part I, (1913), p. 391.

truth. According to him1 it is biologically improbable, even absurd, to assume that children have no sexual life, meaning thereby sexual excitement, desires, and some sort of satisfaction and that they develop it suddenly between the ages of twelve and fourteen. "This would be just as improbable from the view-point of biology as to say that they were not born with genitals but developed them only in the period of puberty." Sexual life of children begins with suckling that has no other object but obtaining sensual gratification—gratification due to the excitation of the mouth and lips, and hence, these parts of the body are called erogenous zones and the pleasure derived from suckling sexual.2 Sexual life of a child begins from its very birth, and so it is quite natural that it desires to know of it when it attains the power of understanding. With advancing age towards puberty the urge to know about sex-life becomes urgent. And when the boy or the girl fails to get it in a plain and simple manner from his or her parents and relatives, they take to other sources. But in this lies moral loss both of the prudish parents as well as the children. The children gather the requisite information in a morbid and rubbish fashion from maid-servants, depraved companions or faulty and misleading pamphlets. Judge Lindsey brings in an amount of evidence to show that he found many manuscript books in the possession of children of both sexes in which had been written the crudest sexual things. He considers that nine-tenths of school boys and girls, in town or country, are very inquisitive regarding matters of sex, and, to his amazement, he found that this was as present in girls as in the case of boys.

It is especially in the case of girls that this morality is more scrupulously observed. The traditional idea holds itself that a girl who is cold, reserved and frigid in matters of sex is the best girl. Thus from the earliest years a distorted and wrong notion of 'virtue' is ingrained in the girl's heart. But often the result of such ignorance is disastrous both for the family and the girl. A girl's sexual impulse, we gather from Havelock

^{1.} Prof. Sigmund Freud: Introduction to Psycho-analysis, (Stanley Hall's Translation. 1920). p. 269.

^{2.} Ibid., p. 271.

Ellis' Studies, is as strong as that of her brother, and so she is not less likely to escape from the contamination of evil communication, so that the scruples of foolish and ignorant parents that they would sully their daughter's purity by proper instructions are exceedingly misplaced. It is absolutely wrong to believe that girls are naturally cold and quite indifferent to sex matters. Every normal girl in the early teens, like her brother, craves and needs to know the facts of sex-life, each in her own way. Adolescence is a period, especially in the case of girls, when great care need be taken in directing the expression of life-forces. In all events ignorance will work disaster. It is healthy education on sex-matters and at the same time emphasising the dignity of sex-life that will be conducive to the healthy moral life of a girl. Many a fair young girl is irredeemably ruined on the very threshold of life disgracing both herself and her family from ignorance. In moments of temptation she succumbs to them without palpable resistance, and lo! ignorance exacts its cruel toll. Even though the parents are under the impression that their daughters are indifferent to and ignorant of sex-matters, the truth is quite the contrary. The intense natural craving for knowledge is probably universal among girls at puberty. Stanley Hall¹ narrates an incident how a lady teacher in the grades found on her desk a letter signed by five of her best girls from ten to twelve years old, which read: "Please explain to us how men originate." This was, however, taken with great alarm by the lady teacher, who took the note to the master. The master thought it too grave a question to deal with upon his own authority and finally took it to the superintendent. The superintendent was no less confounded and approached the school committee who, after sapient deliberations, suggested that the teacher should ask the parents of the girls to answer the question to their daughters. This incident enlightens us over the craving for sex-knowledge which an average healthy girl on the threshold of her adolescent life possesses, and also over the fact how it is rarely met. The school authorities probably thought it immoral to impart the required instructions within the precincts of the school. It is quite axio-

^{1.} Stanley Hall: Educational Problems, Part I, p. 449.

matic, as is the opinion of Drs. Schwab and Veeder,¹ that with the vast majority of children, whether boys or girls, sex-matters are being discussed among themselves in the adolescent days. So care must be taken that the adolescents look upon the subject from a correct view-point and accurately, and that their knowledge is not perverted or incorrect one derived from obscene stories and tales.

With the approach of puberty, the whole physical organism and especially the reproductive organs of the girl undergo great transformation. There has been a tradition handed down for many generations that this perfectly natural physiological episode in the life of a girl is a period of shame.² Nothing could be more harmful to the mental view-point of a girl than this attitude. It is, therefore, essential that every girl should be prepared for this development. She must be taught things regarding menstruation. All girls must be taught clearly and authoritatively the hygiene of the lunar month, just briefly before it, and when the first experience comes, more clearly, so that they may not commit errors which they are likely to commit due to ignorance, which are often costly to health. " No period of girlhood," says Stanley Hall,3 "is so critical or so sensitive." The mental reaction at puberty consequent upon ignorance is farreaching, and wrong impressions may last for years imperilling the general physical health of the girl.

That the disastrous effect of ignorance on the sexual life of women is not a mere fiction or a phantasy is proved by the evidence of many a sexologist and medical authority. For our purposes we shall select a few ones to bear out our contention.

To what extent ignorance has covered up the sexual life of Western woman becomes evident from the information of a hospital instructress of nurses to Gallichan, "that she has met women who do not know how children are born." This blind ignorance according to Gallichan is a great barrier between a woman and her happiness in marriage. "The re-birth of love

^{1.} Drs. S. I. Schwab and B. S. Veeder: The Adolescent—His Conflict and Escapes, (1929), p. 27.

^{2.} Ibid., p. 20.

^{3.} Stanley Hall: Educational Problems, (Vol. I), p. 409.

^{4.} Gallichan: Sexual Apathy and Coldness in Women, p. 73.

is impossible unless we have destroyed all the morbid resistance to a frank acceptance of the natural and pure in sex." He has brought in the testimony of Lawson Tait, Balls Headley and other specialists in the maladies of women to prove that sex ignorance is the prime cause of several of the physical diseases to which women were prone. The author also shows that this ignorance makes child-birth more difficult and leads to sexual incompetence and increases sexual anæsthesia.

Morbid dread reared up by ignorance and sex-tabus further, the author points out, is "the source of hysteria among the women of our time and often accompanied by heart-trouble, intestinal trouble and other physical symptoms."²

The same authority further points out that most of the psycho-neurotic manifestations in women, often setting up sexual frigidity, are the effect of "the ignorance, prudery, false ideas of morality and refinement, and superstition, in which the vast female population are reared up." Thus "neurosis and sexual anæsthesia are the price that we pay for our neglect of scientific knowledge."³

Dr. Galbraith in his *Four Epochs of Woman's Life* finds it not an uncommon occurrence for girls who know nothing of their menstruating function to get into a tub of cold water to stop the flow, with the result that, if this practice is carried long, the girl's health is permanently ruined.⁴

Bernard A. Bauer,⁵ in his book *Woman*, when dealing with 'Adolescence', observes: "Before the first menstruation the girl is mentally and physically a child, but its onset produces a complete change. Great harm may be done if the girl has not been properly prepared and enlightened.....The first menstruation causes a severe emotional shock, whether the girl has been prepared or not." He therefore warns that if she has not been prepared (which, he remarks, is usually the case) she broods over it and feels she is suffering from some illness. The

^{1.} Gallichan: Sexual Apathy and Coldness in Women, p. 73

^{2.} Ibid., p. 74.

^{3.} Ibid., p. 52.

^{4.} Dr. A. M. Galbraith: The Four Epochs of Woman's Life, (1917), p. 68.

^{5.} Dr. Bernard A. Bauer: Woman, (1929), p. 125.

resultant worry causes severe depression, almost bordering on melancholia. Further he draws attention to the horrible effects on the married life of this adolescent girl whose ignorance seeks to give her the impression that there is some hidden degradation in the intimate relationship of the husband and wife.

The veil of ignorance and secrecy, with which parents cover up the sexual life of a girl, is equally deprecated by Deyer, the author of Sex. He points out that menstruation is a function whose nature and hygiene every girl ought to know. But the facts today are quite disappointing. "It is noteworthy that most mothers very reluctantly talk freely with their own daughters upon this subject, for very many girls receive but meagre instruction from the proper source and thus often fall victim to some serious trouble in life."

For a period of two years Dr. Hamilton was engaged in digesting the great mass of material—over 80,000, separate responses—and preparing his source book, A Research in Marriage.

At the very outset of his work, Dr. Hamilton expresses definitely what should be the sex-relationship of the husband and the wife, if their married life should be happy. He² states: "The physical relation between a man and a woman should end in an explosive sort of climax for the woman quite as much as for the man. A surprisingly large number of married women are ignorant of this, because somewhere between one-third and one-half of them have never felt such a climax." Dr. Hamilton states that some notion of how large a proportion miss the climax may be gathered from the reports of the women in the search he undertook. He states that out of one hundred women forty-six had never experienced anything like a climax. Further he points out that it is not a question of sexual desire, but of ignorance and tabus. He warns, therefore, that "we must always keep in mind that sexual desire is in itself not sinful." And therefore though there is the desire in woman, its fulfilment is not possible where her mind is covered up with ignorance and superstition. The result is there is a kind of nervous tension of unsatisfied desire which goes far towards wrecking the mind

1. Deyer: Sex, (1932), p. 16.

2. Hamilton: A Research in Marriage, (1929).

as well as happiness. The vital importance of this cannot be overstressed; for Dr. Hamilton states that out of forty-six women who could not reach the climax, no less than twenty were seriously neurotic. On the other hand, only one of the fifty-four who knew the climax was nervously ill.

Greatly instructive in this connection is Katherine Davis' Factors in the Sex Life of Twenty-two Hundred Women, which is a non-medical inquiry from the sociological point of view, and Dickinson and Beam's A Thousand Marriages which is a report of a gynæcologist from a personal examination of the sexual life of women who came to him in the first place as patients, thus giving an all-round picture of the sexual situation today.

In the former book, Davis emphasises the dire need of today of proper general sex-instruction for the young.¹ In her study of the sexual life of one thousand women she found that happiness in marriage largely depends upon the proper preparation for it.2 In Dickinson and Beam's book we receive more enlightenment on this matter. In the very foreword we are told that "the largest part of the troubles of marriage and of the perils of sex is due merely to ignorance and superstition," and that there is larger "number of women who are the victims of this ignorance and false traditions."3 The authors found fear as the most prevailing cause of unhappiness in married life. "Some impact upon the sex-side of life to the child or to the little girl lasts for ever. Married women at all ages say that they cannot get over the effect of first menses, first ugly news about sex; accident to friend, sister or mother; the first departure from the cautions made on a religious or ethical basis...." The authors further point out that the effect of extensive educational and religious background was toward the cultural tabus, withdrawal and isolation.4

It now becomes clear to us that blind ignorance combined with the wrong ideal of virtue greatly affects a girl's happiness

^{1.} Dr. Katherine Davis: Factors in the Sex Life of Twenty-Two Hundred Women, (1929), pp. 62-68.

^{2.} Ibid., p. 67.

^{3.} Dickinson and Beam: A Thousand Marriages, (1932), p. xii.

^{4.} Ibid., p. 442.

in marriage. The innocent girl has all the while cherished the ideal of aloofness in all sexual matters. She knows nothing truly of her husband, of the forces of love; and the worst of all this is that she is not aware of her ignorance. She believes that she possesses a certain character. She envisages a future in accordance with this character. She does not know her physical relationship with her husband. And when with such dark ignorance she enters the marriage door, the facts of married life become appalling and shocking to her. So highly intelligent a woman as Madame Adam has stated that she believed herself bound to marry a man who had kissed her on the mouth, imagining it to be the supreme act of sexual union; and it has frequently happened that women have married sexually inverted persons, not always knowing but believing them to be men, and never discovering their mistake.¹

The necessity of imparting sex-education to children is, therefore, stressed by distinguished sex-psychologists of authority. Sex-education in its largest sense includes all scientific, ethical, social² instruction which may help young people prepare to solve for themselves the problems of sex that inevitably come in some form or other in the life of every normal individual. The necessity of this sex-education calls for action more urgently in the case of girls. Girls should be taught greatest reverence instead of shame for this function (viz. sexual function). To them must be explained the physical changes of puberty, marriage and maternity, how the child grows, what food and care the mother, and afterwards the baby, will need, etc.

Now the source from which sexual education should proceed, and the way in which it should be imparted, depends upon the circumstances of each case. When children with their little minds full of curiosities begin to ask questions about sex, they should be met with as much rational and realistic attitude as possible. "Answering is the major part of sex-education... First always give a truthful answer to a question; secondly, regard sex-knowledge as exactly like any other knowledge."

^{1.} Havelock Ellis: Studies in the Psychology of Sex, Vol. VI, p. 79.

^{2.} Some would like to include 'religious' also; but in the West religion in the matters of sex has done more wrong than good.

^{3.} Bertrand Russell: On Education (1926), p. 170.

This will create in children a natural unassuming attitude towards sex; and if, along with this, significance and dignity of sex-life is brought home to them as they grow in years, sex-life would be more happy than what it is to-day. Stanley Hall who has made an extensive study of the adolescent psychology makes a fervent appeal for sex-training of children in his famous book, Adolescence. According to him, this education must proceed from the father to the son and from the mother to the daughter. "It may be that in future this kind of initiation will again become an art, and experts will tell us with more confidence how to do our duty to the manifold exigencies, types and stages of youth, and instead of feeling baffled and defeated, we shall see that this age and theme is the supreme opening for the highest pedagogy to do its best and most transforming work, as well as being the greatest of all opportunities for the teacher of religion." At Williams College, Harvard, he had made it a duty in his departmental teaching to speak very briefly but plainly to young men under his instruction. believe," he says, "I have nowhere done more good." He, however, warns that it is a painful duty and requires tact and some degree of hard and strenuous common sense rather than technical knowledge.1

Freud has little sympathy with the fear that simple explanations made to young children will awaken premature or abnormal interest,² but thinks that concealment particularly calculated to do this. It is false, according to him, that children

- 1. Stanley Hall: Adolescence, Vol. I, pp. 459-465.
- 2. I. N. Van der Hoop, a psycho-analyst, gives his own experience that there is nothing to fear for those children, who have always received rational answers to their questions and have thus been gradually initiated. "If once their curiosity has been satisfied," he says, "they will not think so much about such matters as those children who are left to search in the dark." See I. N. Van der Hoop: Character and the Unconscious, (1923), pp. 93-94. Bertrand Russell has also found that children do not take morbid interest in sex-matters, if they are initiated into it in a natural way. His own children, one a boy of 7 and a daughter of 5, were never found to take more interest in sex than in inquiries about engines or aeroplanes. Their natural curiosities about sex were frankly met, and consequently they did not find more interest in sex than in engines and aeroplanes. See Bertrand Russell's article: Tabu on Sex Knowledge, in Sexual Reform Congress Proceedings, (1929), p. 399.

have no interest or intelligence for these matters unless it be artificially awakened. He would have, therefore, this instruction conveyed directly and not indirectly. In our opinion, it is not without truism that boys and girls might take undue interest which may lead them to morbid revelry and sensual enjoyment. But this, we are sure, would happen only in the case of boys and girls from whom all sexual facts are prudishly and mysteriously veiled, and when they at last find the opportunity of gratifying their long-repressed and perfectly natural curiosities, and when with the sudden and new enlightenment they become excited. Otherwise in the case of normal children who are brought up in an atmosphere free from prudishness and hush-hush morality, the results of such training will be quite beneficial.

Apart from the question of satisfying the curiosities of children, the age at which definite sex-instruction is most favourable is the period preceding puberty. It is the period of puberty that, with intoxicating sensations and numerous obsessions and imaginations—some amorous and erotic, others purely harmless but malformed—is likely to lead astray a boy or a girl. So the days preceding puberty are just the proper days when boys and girls may be warned of the danger that lies ahead and how to overcome it. "Experience must have shown," says Prof. Freud, "that the task of guiding the sexual will of the new generation can be solved only by influencing the early sexual life of the child, the period preparatory to puberty, not by awaiting the storm of puberty." The whole subject of sex, after puberty, is so electric that a boy or girl cannot listen in a scientific spirit, which is perfectly possible at an earlier

^{1.} That honesty and frankness in discussing matters of sex do not lead to moral or mental degradation is proved by the results of the Smith College School for Psychiatric Social Work. Students from this college are given special lectures on sex-matters at the School of Social Work with an open and frank attitude. The students are found to take a real and absorbing interest without, however, showing disastrous or degrading results either in morals or manners. See Harry Elmer Barnes: Sex in Education in Sex in Civilisation by Calverton and others, (1929) p. 306.

^{2.} Prof. Sigmund Freud: An Introduction to Psycho-analysis, p. 269.

age," says Bertrand Russell.1 The nature of the sexual act, therefore, the boy or the girl must know before attaining puberty. Iwan Bloch, one of the greatest sexologists, advocates earlier elucidation at about ten years, which in his opinion may be associated with the general instruction in natural history with reference to the reproductive process of animals and plants: and then very gradually up to the age of fourteen all important points in this department including an account of the venereal diseases can be explained. He finally remarks: "That which is good and useful in this department of knowledge cannot be too often repeated."2 According to Havelock Ellis, the mother should initiate the child in sex-knowledge before the advent of puberty. At this age she should place in the hands of her son and daughter manuals expounding the physical and moral aspects of the sexual life and the principles of sexual hygiene. The manual that the son or the daughter is given should at least contain information summarily but definitely about the sexual relationship3 and should also comment warningly but in no alarmist spirit on the chief auto-erotic phenomena.

Some psychologists⁴ hold that sex-instruction is exclusively the matter for parents and the home and not a subject for the school. While others⁵ opine that sex-instruction is impossible in many homes, as the parents are not willing and have not sufficient knowledge to properly guide their children, and therefore it should be included in the curriculum of the school.⁶

- 1. Bertrand Russell: On Education, p. 172.
- 2. Iwan Bloch: The Sexual Life of Our Time, p. 689.
- 3. Bertrand Russell has found that girls acquire a new respect for sex and take pride in their being girls when they come to know of the part played by women in creating children. Bertrand Russell: Education and the Social Order, (1932), p. 121. Also Dr. Slewelly who says: "A right-minded girl with a clear understanding of her organs and herself has a sense of her importance to the race." Dr. W. L. Slewelly: Sex for Parents and Teachers, (1921), p. xi.
 - 4. Drs. Schwab and Veeder: The Adolescent, etc., p. 26.
 - 5. Maurice A. Bigelow: Sex Education, (1916), pp. 21, 22.
- 6. According to Geddes and Thomson, in ideal conditions sex education should be imparted at home. But as things stand, sex education will have to be given in school, and that preliminary to it such subjects as biology, nature study, human physiology, domestic science ought to be taught. See Geddes and Thomson: Sex, (1927), p. 163.

Whatever it may be, in our opinion one most important thing must not be lost sight of. The person who undertakes the sex-education of the child is invested with a great responsibility that of inspiring the child with true moral and ethical ideals. During puberty sex has a stupefying effect, it is a source of inspiration or may become a cause of degeneration, and at times, all the future life of the adolescent is determined by the curve which the line of sexual life takes. So the teacher in sex has a great opportunity, the greatest that he can ever get. The flower of sex that blossoms in the body has its spiritual counterpart, which at the same time blossoms in the soul. It is, therefore, a concern and a responsibility of the teacher to realise that it is at puberty that he is called upon to inspire or to fortify the great ideal aspirations which at this period begin spontaneously to arise in the youth's or maiden's soul.

CHAPTER VII

MARRIAGE ON THE CROSS?

"Ring out the old, ring in the new Ring in the Christ that is to be."

-Lord Tennyson in In Memoriam.

I

words, splendidly describes the attitude of modern woman toward marriage. Monogamic marriage as it exists is challenged for its sanctity and usefulness. The new ideals of marriage, which the modern woman is evolving and attempting to practise, have seized the world with a horror-complex almost amounting to pessimism. The Russian Czar was not more shocked when the first time his eyes drunk with iron rule saw in the word 'Bolshevism' the signal of his terrific downfall, as is the world today which in the marriage-revolt of its fair sex sees the shadows of an impending dissolution of morals—the ruin of society.

Traditional solution of the problem of sexual relationship in terms of marriage is disfavoured by woman. Modern woman is facing the problem in a direct and unconventional fashion. Sexual relationship was never a problem for the woman in the past. It was a burden—may have been a boon (?)—that was loaded on them by the dead hand of tradition and which, in their own turn, they quietly carried to their daughters, none knowing what it was, what it meant, what its implications were. It was all a 'Merry-go-round' affair. They were given in marriage, and they married, and all the heaven or the hell of it they welcomed—its sanctity was impenetrable. This atti-

tude has died long since. We have to study the view-point of the moderns. The marriage institution which they are assailing tooth and nail, we have to see what it is and why it is required no longer.

H

The present marriage institution and law in the West are based on the principles of the Canon Law of the Catholic Church. The Canon Law was formulated on a strict and liberal reading of the texts of the New Testament and aimed at substituting this Christian legislation for the civil law of marriage of the Empire. We know that the later law of Rome considered marriage as purely a private act. No intervention of any State official, no registration or other public record was required. The two parties, and the two parties only, were to be concerned. Thus marriage was purely a civil act to which no religious or ecclesiastical rite was essential. Marriage was based purely on the consent of the contracting parties.

Marriage with consent, however, attained its true dignity. According to Bryce, the conception of marriage was high and worthy one. Based as it was on the freedom of choice with which neither the State nor the Church had anything to do, the relationship rose into a true and dignified life-long partnership in which husband and wife were deemed equal.

As marriage was considered solely as a private concern, it could be terminated by the will of one party only. Each party promised only that he or she would remain united to the other so long as he or she desired to. This was only the logical consequence of the idea that marriage should be free. Divorce was accordingly effected at the pleasure of the husband or wife—the doctrine of equality between the sexes being impartially applied. So that the wife could as freely divorce her husband as the husband could divorce his wife.

With the advent of Christianity, the whole conception of marriage and divorce underwent a revolution. As we have

^{1.} Bryce: Studies in History and Jurisprudence, Vol. II, (1901) p. 400,

already stated, the Church looked upon all sex life as impure and regarded women as inferior and subordinate to men. The attitude of the Church towards marriage, consequently, was very narrow-minded and puritan. "There is no more painful spectacle in history," writes J. F. Nisbet, "than the attitude maintained by the Church towards marriage during the first ten centuries of the Christian era." And remarks Bryce: "To pass from the Civil Law of Rome to the Ecclesiastical Law of the Dark and Middle Ages is like quitting an open country intersected by good roads for a tract of mountain and forest where rough and tortuous paths furnish the only means of transit."2 The Church, however, did not try to disestablish the whole principle and practice of marriage all at once. was not till the tenth century that Canon Law became supreme in matters of marriage and divorce. But the influence of the Church is noticeable in the fact that Justinian greatly pruned the liberties of divorce and limited it to the conditions under which (1) the husband was impotent, (2) either the wife or the husband entered a monastery, and (3) either of them was in captivity beyond a certain length of time. Thus we see that Justinian was greatly influenced by the principles of Christianity and so withdrew the liberty of divorce by consent. And though he subsequently allowed either party to divorce the other on several grounds, the principle of consent was not recognised.

Thus though the Roman Emperors were influenced by the church doctrines, actual interference of Church in marriage was not attempted. It continued to be a civil act, so that from Justin to Leo the Philosopher at the end of the 9th century the Civil Law remained independent, and shows within the Christian Empire a certain continuing separation of Ecclesiastical and Imperial Law.³ What the Church did was only to offer benediction to those entering matrimony. The Church

^{1.} J. F. Nisbet: Marriage and Heredity—A View of Psychological Evolution, (1903), p. 110.

^{2.} Bryce: Studies in History and Jurisprudence, Vol. II, p. 416.

^{3.} Dr. J. F. Worsley-Boden: Mischiefs of the Marriage Law, (1932), p. 79.

considered that she had an ethical mission to fulfil, and she wanted to place marriage under the word of God.¹ The priests, however, never questioned the validity of marriage in which a benediction from the Church was not solicited. The civil character of marriage, therefore, continued for the first four centuries. The ancient civil forms were accepted and nuptials were more often celebrated in the bride's home than in the Church, and a priestly benediction was not deemed essential.

From the end of the 4th century to the middle of the 10th the Church slowly introduced religious principles in marriage, though in fact it remained a civil act and its administration rested with the State. The newly-wedded pair attended a religious service in the Church, took the sacrament and received benediction from the priest. Between the tenth and twelfth centuries ecclesiastical aggression made great progress2 which largely affected marriage as a civil contract. An elaborate ritual was developed. The priest directed the entire elaboration; the ceremony was performed before the church door. But even during this period validity of a marriage was not questioned because of the non-performance of the religious ceremony. Thus, according to Nisbet,3 down to the 11th century marriages were celebrated without ecclesiastical interference. The idea of marriage as a sacrament was not yet definitely adopted or enforced. It was in the 12th century, when Peter the Lombard established the institution of the Seven Sacraments one of which was marriage, that the Church adopted this view with results that have profoundly influenced the Western society down to the present times. The Council of Trent accepted the sacramental view of marriage. And thus from the thirteenth century marriage entered a new phase. Antagonism arose between private and ecclesiastical marriages. The Church strove to gain control of the celebration and began to legislate against clandestine marriages and in favour of publicity.

^{1.} See Dr. George E. Howard: A History of Matrimonial Institutions, Vol. I, (1904), p. 293.

^{2.} See Howard: A History of Matrimonial Institutions, Vol. I, pp. 304-314.

^{3.} J. F. Nisbet: Marriage and Heredity, p. 46.

Indissolubility of the union was, however, the most significant principle introduced by the Church in the marriage institution of the West. The spiritual authority of the Church in matrimonial causes rested on the literal interpretation of the teachings in the Old and New Testaments and fortified by the views of the ascetic Fathers. The view of the indissolubility of marriage rested on the preaching of the Lord as given in the Gospel: What God hath joined together no man should put asunder. "Till death us do part" in the Prayer Book Marriage Service is the Christian ideal of permanent union. Divorce, therefore, as a complete dissolution of matrimonial tie was not allowed by the Church. But according to the conception of the Church, marriage was based upon consent but was consummated by sexual intercourse. Thus a divorce was granted where one of the parties was an impotent or of near consanguinity, to which absence of consent was later added. This divorce was, in fact, nothing but a declaration that the marriage had been null from the beginning. The kind of divorce which, in fact, was only a separation, was granted on the grounds of adultery, impotency, cruelty, entering into another religion and other grounds; but in all these cases the right to re-marry was denied.

The principles of this type of Canon Law were substantially incorporated by the marriage-laws of all the European countries. In England until the invasion of William the Norman, customary law allowed complete divorce on the grounds of adultery, desertion, impotence, affinity and captivity. This liberal Anglo-Saxon law of England was displaced by the adoption of Canon Law principles which remained in force until 1857 when the Matrimonial Causes Act was passed. In France also, divorce as such did not exist; only actions for nullity of marriage could be had in the French Parliament, which had recourse to Canon Law with all its fiction, devices and trickery. It was the Revolution that effected profound changes in the divorce laws of France. In 1792 divorce was established by law and made very easy. The Code of Napoleon regulated the matter and allowed divorce for five causes only. This law was abrogated in 1816, and the power of the Church was practically restored, although limited by the law. Again in 1884

divorce was made legal, and absolute equality between the sexes was established. In Germany too, a divorce law was passed in 1900 unifying matrimonial law for the whole Empire which placed both sexes on the footing of absolute equality.

In England, the Matrimonial Causes Act of 1857 effected vast changes in principle by transferring jurisdiction in matrimonial causes from the Church to the State. It amended the substantive law in one important point by allowing complete divorce on the ground of adultery-divorce not in the canonical sense of a mere separation but an absolute dissolution of marriage, with the right to re-marry. This Act allowed divorce to the husband on the ground of his wife's adultery, but at the same time denied the wife the same ground of divorce unless it was also combined with cruelty. This injustice was removed by the Matrimonial Causes Act of 1923 which was subsequently re-embodied in the Judicature (Consolidation) Act of 1925, under which either party may divorce the other on the ground of adultery alone. Under the Matrimonial Causes Bill passed this year, in addition to the existing ground for divorce, namely adultery, are added three further grounds—desertion, cruelty and incurable insanity. Clause No. 1, however, provides that no petition for divorce should be presented unless three years have elapsed since the date of the marriage.

Marriage in the opinion of the Church being the only inevitable channel for expression of sexual life, it was bridled with numerous restrictions, an exit from which was made impossible. This principle has percolated throughout the centuries that followed, and is still predominant in social morality, though in fact the doctrine of the indissolubility of marriage no longer holds. The principle of adultery, which the Church recognised in granting a separation and which today is sufficient ground for its complete dissolution, indicates only a type of social morality which condemns all sex-expression outside marriage. Granting of the same right to woman does not make any amends of the defective conception of marriage. Today woman is fighting the marriage institution not because of its proprietary basis which with her own economic independence no longer exists, but because of the principles, on

which it has survived for the last so many centuries and which fail to meet her demands, being quite short of making marriage a success and a thing of which she should be proud. Marriage, as it exists, has altogether ignored her psychological needs; her biological it has but insufficiently fulfilled.

To get into the marriage, it is very easy for the girl. The broad-minded (?) society has recognised the most liberal principle of consent in marriage. The Church is deprived of its control. The couple goes to the Registrar and gets it registered. A simple procedure to follow. But once the girl enters marriage, the door is locked. The girl may afterwards find that she was misconceived in her estimate of the man. She may discover that he is an utter scoundrel or a reckless drunkard, a tried criminal, or he may be discovered to have some filthy disease of body or insanity of mind. But no! she has to put up with him. She cannot go back to the Registrar and say: "My marriage is a failure; relieve me from it." He has no power to do The civilised world, no doubt, after a period of nearly a hundred years saw through the tyranny of marriage; and it has offered a solution to the girl to get out of the tyrannical marriage. But the way open is disgustful and objectionable.1 Should the gravest and most urgent occasion arise necessitating the dissolution for the protection of the woman from a murderous or drunken husband or due to the husband's confinement in a lunatic asylum or in jail, a most elaborate, solemn and stupendous legal machinery must be laboriously set in motion. The Registrar, as we know, who has the power to 'marry' is helpless in this respect. The poor wife has to go through lengthy and costly legal procedure. The miserable girl watches the proceedings conducted before the judges who solemnly go through the case as if assembled for a murder trial. After a hot discussion of a number of problems most of which

^{1.} And lo! some hot-headed critic might pertinently and sarcastically question: "Is it otherwise for a man? Has he at his command a swifter course?" Certainly not! But the monstrosity of social morality will ignore—nay sympathise with the man, who on finding that his marriage has failed obtains a complete recompense for it in the arms of the street girl. But for the woman? She must rot within the four corners of her marriage, though in fact it may have become a 'hell' to her.

are entangled with legal and other technicalities, the poor girl's married life is searched through all its minutest details, and then the judge, learned as he is, may gravely warn the girl and with all his reluctance, after a sermon on morals and with a full sense of the gravity and boldness of his act, may grant a temporary separation—a conditional decree 'nisi' to be made absolute, if after mature consideration there appears a reason for its necessity after six months' time.

But this is not all. Law and morals of society do not care whether the life of any of the conjoints is wrecked in marriage. That is no consideration at all at least with the English law. The unhappy woman, if marriage has become intolerable to her, must, in order to convince the judge of the necessity of divorce, wait till her husband commits adultery or force him to commit and then bring with her a paraphernalia of evidence to prove that her husband has committed adultery. She must thus bring her dirty linen into the open market of the court and wash it there. She must make her married life an object of trenchant scandal both in the public and the press.

This is the tragedy that a woman has to face in a divorce proceedings. In many cases the woman who is termed an 'adulteress' is in fact the offended party who finding that there is no escape from the brutal and neglectful treatment from her husband is compelled by social morals to commit adultery in order to get rid of her husband's tyranny. Social morality in the name of law not only compels her to commit adultery but subjects her to gross insults.

Such then is the sacrosanct institution of marriage in most of the European nations. More women are persecuted as wives than as witches two hundred years ago. Conscientious women have become dissatisfied with marriage. That marriage in its existing form has become a failure is quite evident from the rising figures of divorce in the West. But the most astonishing and instructive feature of it is that woman is leading in divorce figures. The demand for divorce from her is outnumbering the demand from man. The following comparative divorce figures for males and females in some select countries will speak for themselves:—

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA.1

Year.				Divorces granted to husband.	Divorces granted to wife.
				Per cent.	Per cent.
1889]	35.1	64.9
1890				34.4	65·3
1891				35·1	64.9
1892				34.4	65·4
1893				33.6	66.4
1894			!	33.4	66.6
1895				33.3	66.7
1896				33.6	66.4
1897				33.0	67
1898				33.4	66.6
1899				32.9	67·1
1900		• •		33.4	66.6
1901				32.8	67.2
1902				32.6	67.4
1903				32.8	67.2
1904				33.5	66.5
1905				32.7	67:3
1906				32.5	67∙5
1916				31·1	68.9
1922		• •		32.0	68
1923				32.2	67:8
1924				31.5	68·5
1925				30-1	69.9

ENGLAND AND WALES²

Peri	od.	No. of Men divorced.	No. of Women divorced.
1876-80	••	 56	48
1881-85		 68	60
1886-90	• •	 80	89
1891-95		 110	104
1896-1900		 172	173
1901-1905		 262	247
1906-1910	• •	 365	337

^{1.} Statistical Abstract of the U. S. A., (1927), p. 84.

^{2.} Seventy-fourth Annual Report of the Registrar-General of Births, Deaths and Marriages in England and Wales, (1911), p. xvi.

CANADA¹

Year.				No. of Men divorced.	No. of Women divorced.
1901 1911		• •		337 839	324 691

The divorce figures in the West show that marriage in its existing form has become unsatisfactory and consequently failed to solve the problem of sexual relationship, and more so in the case of women. It is the rigorous laws, the products of a narrow morality, that are making marriage an unhappy institution. The partners have to take life-long responsibilities of the most intimate and difficult kind. One becomes bound to another person on whose whims, good-will, affection and judgment one has to hang one's happiness and at times even one's honour. Individual liberty becomes a sham. Even if dissensions arise threatening the very happiness of the partners, they have to stick to each other under the fear of economic ruin in a home that has become a hell. And ultimately when they desire to part, they cannot be free of one another until they have faced the obnoxious proceedings which expose their most private affairs; and still then, as Dr. Muller-Lyer remarks. "they have to leave the decision as to 'guilt' or 'innocence' in their marriage to a stranger who judges according to witnesses' evidence or personal principles or prejudices, but who is himself mortal and liable to error and cannot know the real intimate history of their lives together."2

The double standard of morality which society observes between men and women by ignoring the sexual aberrations of the man while at the same time tying up with the girdle of marriage chastity the sexual life of woman, together with the monstrosity of marriage laws that make exit from an unhappy marriage difficult and scandalous, is opposed to the growing instinct of individuality in woman. She is reluctant to enter marriage lest it might cost her her whole freedom and reputa-

^{.1.} The Canada Year Book, (1928), p. 111.

^{2.} Dr. F. Muller-Lyer: The Family, p. 265.

tion. Mutual love, regard and sympathy are the essentials for the stability of marriage. Should they be lacking in marriage, it becomes a veritable hell for her. Marriage as it stands, therefore, does not favour her. Love, regard and sympathy become undermined, and the woman has to sacrifice her sentiments and individuality. "It is the form of modern marriage that frightens most people Modern individualism draws back from the undeniable LOSS of FREEDOM which legal marriage entails."

It is because the traditions of Canon Law are persistent in the marriage law² that marriage has today become a failure. A successful marriage requires mutual devotion and appreciation, temperamental and sexual compatibility, together with an appreciation of each other's interest and work. No marriage is worth the name unless it satisfies the three social and individual needs-that of the continuation of race by the production of children of sound physical and mental qualities: that of satisfying the erotic life of the couple in a way that would not necessitate its satisfaction outside; and that of creating a balance in the life of the couple by mutual adaptation. Those forms of sexual life, therefore, which fulfil these essentials must become the standards of morality and marriage. And this is not possible unless the parties cohabit and test each other's compatibilities. Ellen Key has boldly and brilliantly put forth this idea in her Love and Marriage. "Only cohabitation," says she," can decide the morality of a particular case—in other words, its power to enhance the life of the individuals who are living together and that of the race. Thus sanction can never be granted in advance Each fresh couple, whatever form they choose for their cohabitation, must themselves prove its moral claim."8

Modern marriage fails to offer any such opportunities and is, therefore, counted a failure. Mutual compatibility and satis-

- 1. Iwan Bloch: The Sexual Life of Our Time, p. 217.
- 2. "Marriage is still regulated by laws based upon the Christian concept of the sexual act as being unclean and sinful."—George Ryley Scott (Fellow of the Royal Anthropological Institute): Marriage in the Melting Pot, (1930), p. 146.
 - 3. Ellen Key: Love and Marriage, pp. 16-17.

faction of erotic personality have assumed a prominent importance in the modern-day demands of woman. The old idea that woman has but a feeble erotic personality and that her sexual instinct is not so strong as man's is rapidly being discounted under scientific exposition. A healthy sex life is as physically and psychically necessary for a woman as it is for a man. Dr. Henry Kisch, who has made a comprehensive study of woman's sexual life especially from the physiological and pathological points of view, has discovered that a woman's impulse towards physical contact and toward copulation is just as powerful as that of man.1 Other reputed sexologists like Bloch,² Forel,³ Weininger⁴ and Malchow⁵ also opine that a woman's sexual needs and desire are no less strong than those of a man. The wide-spread belief that a woman does not possess sexual passions or has not sexual needs is entirely fallacious.6

Marriage has throughout ignored the sexual nature and needs of woman⁷; and her personality it has discounted alto-

- ,l. Dr. E. Heinrich Kisch: The Sexual Life of Woman (translated from the German by Dr. M. Eden Paul), (1926), p. 168.
 - 2. Iwan Bloch: The Sexual Life of Our Time, pp. 83-84.
 - 3. August Forel: The Sexual Question, pp. 92-94.
 - 4. Otto Weininger: Sex and Character, pp. 87-92.
 - 5. Dr. C. W. Malchow: The Sexual Life, (1926), p. 75.
- 6. The popular belief is due to the fact that (1) woman's sexual passion needs to be awakened by repression, (2) that on account of traditional concept of morality she has to suppress her eagerness or desire, (3) because her sex-life is subject to periodic functions, (4) that woman's seximpulse and organs are, comparatively to man's, deep-rooted. See in this connection Ralph De Pomerai: Marriage, Past, Present and Future, (1930), p. 219.
- 7. Mark the pertinent observations of the sexologist whose wisdom is past challenge: "A woman may have been married once, she may have been married twice, she may have had children by both husbands, and yet it may not be until she is past the age of thirty and is united to a third man that she attains the development of erotic personality and all that it involves in the full flowering of her whole nature. Up to then she had to all appearances had all the essential experiences of life. Yet she had remained spiritually virginal, with conventionally prim ideas of life, narrow in her sympathies, with the finest and noblest functions of her soul helpless and bound, at heart unhappy even if not clearly realising that she was unhappy." Havelock Ellis: Little Essays of Love and Virtue, pp. 128-129.

gether. Marriage gives her no escape at all if her husband happens to be cruel to her or deserts her. Cruelty and desertion, as Worsley-Boden¹ observes, indicate that marriage has failed in principle. But what society offers to her as option is a permanent separation. In the case of incurable lunacy or incorrigible drunkenness, she has but to choose between celibacy or illicit intercourse, for the law gives her no solution. It must also be remembered that adultery, which has become an equitable ground for the wife also, may be only an accidental and isolated offence. while desertion, cruelty, impotence and insanity are the symptoms of a worse disease from which marriage ought to be saved; but in which cases society gives her no relief. The ground of adultery which has its associations with the idea of 'sin,' derived as its concept is from an alleged saying of the Lord which we have already pointed out, shows only the influence of canonical ideas about the sinfulness of extra-marital relationship. But what becomes most disgustful is that adultery being recognised the only substantial ground on which either party may seek a divorce, the aggrieved party is perforce compelled to commit it to get an escape from the incompatible marriage. Just, therefore, when the radical ground is fundamental—disagreement, want of love, desertion, cruelty or some such outrageous act that makes healthy married life impossible the parties must come before the court as adulterers. Thus, adultery, as is so often the case, does not become the cause but the unhappy consequence of the matrimonial breakdown. Thus the conception of marriage as a sacrament is, in spite of the abolition of canonical control, the ruling element in marriage which regards marriage as indissoluble even when it has failed in fact.

The present divorce laws in England give one an impression that society takes divorce as a disease, when, as a matter of fact, it is a remedy for a diseased marriage. The present multiplication of divorce is not an index to the laxity of morals, but is an indication of failure of marriage on account of many causes, an exit from which is as indispensable to society as to the parties concerned. It shows the modern spirit of

arriving at a proper standard of values. We may go even further and say that acceptance of the doctrine of divorce in its full implication is showing the greatest regard for life. The growing figure of divorce is, therefore, far from alarming. It shows "the modern spirit, and is essential to the progress of the world towards a larger standard of justice, individual liberty, and happiness." The increasing number of women who are piling up divorce figures are instinctively realising that a mode of living cannot be in accordance with the highest morality if it is destructive of life and personality; and still many are compelled to cling to the filthy married life and enforced to suffer the embraces of their diseased, drunken or insane husbands by the strict divorce law. It is no wonder, therefore, that marriage should become what Henry James pointed out in the *Nation* as early as 1870 "the hot-bed of fraud, adultery and cruelty."

Marriage, as it stands at present, is therefore of a coercive nature. It is because, as we have repeatedly emphasised and again emphasise, the Western institution of marriage "is the composition of Hebraism, Roman Law and Teutonic standards incorporated by the mediæval church into its control of marriage."2 The advancing woman whose sense of morality and justice is far advanced has discredited the marriage institution in its existing form and demands a complete overhauling of it. The best representation of this new thought is to be found in Ellen Kev. She was the first of the enlightened feminists to expose the flagrant injustice of the marriage institution. the risk of social scandal, she boldly put before the world her views on marriage and sexual relationship. Though the world treated her with sheer contempt and canker, the thinking section of it soon understood the motives that inspired her writing and realised the impotence of the marriage institution to promote individual advancement. Thus Havelock Ellis calls her one of the chief moral forces of the times. And Bernard A. Bauer hails her as an enlightened pioneer of a new school of thought pertaining to marriage and morals. It was through

^{1.} Cecil Chapman: Marriage and Divorce, (1911), p. 130.

^{2.} Dr. Arthur W. Calhoun: A Social History of American Family, (1919), p. 234.

her efforts that the marriage laws in Sweden and Denmark immensely changed so as to fit individual needs.

Ellen Key challenges, with her insight into human nature, the very foundation of monogamic marriage that the West has received from tradition. Traditional monogamic marriage does not recognise the 'sovereignty of the individual' and thus constantly comes into conflict with the progressive woman, rendering her life imbecile. Love, therefore, ought to form the only foundation of marriage. And once this principle is understood in its true aspect, the individual becomes solely responsible for marriage. Should he or she find that marriage lacks the foundation of love, divorce ought to be allowed. Since inception of marriage depends upon the personal choice, so should be its continuation. Ellen Key, thus, demands a free divorce.¹

Once it is admitted that love constitutes a fundamental tie in the union of marriage, nothing can hold together the partners—much less the law—when this bond becomes shattered. Constant bickerings and continuous conflicts make the marriage a travesty. Under these circumstances it is not only in the interests of the individuals but also society, that the partners part in a fair manner. To hold them together under constraint till it drives one of them to commit adultery is a degrading sexual morality. "True marriage," as Carson has well remarked, "ends when the natural bond of affection has been severed; and morality demands that such a marriage should be legally dissolved."

Ellen Key, the disciple of Nietzschian philosophy that recognises importance of the individual irrespective of the criticism of others, has attempted to treat marriage problem in the frankest of manners. Sacredness of sex-relationship, according to her, has been mocked by the social mould into which it is cast. Marriage on the basis of monogamy ought to go, and must become an expression of the claims of human life. But this is impossible under the present marriage and divorce institutions. If marriage is for the individual and not the individual for mar-

1. Ellen Key: Love and Marriage, p. 366.

2. William E. Carson: Marriage Revolt, (1915), p. 6.

riage, incompatibility must be regarded a sound reason on which he or she can bid farewell to it. This is to introduce the element of consent in marriage as well as in divorce. According to the progressive woman, woman's fidelity to her own personality, truth, courage and chastity is more important than any fidelity to conventional morality; and therefore, when a woman finds her fidelity to these difficult in marriage, she ought to be allowed to dissolve it.

If the main thesis of Westermarck's work is correct that marriage is not an artificial creation but an institution based on deep-rooted sentiments conjugal and parental,1 it will last as long as these sentiments last. Should these sentiments be found to be lacking, no laws in the world can save marriage from its destruction. Divorce should, therefore, be taken as the necessary remedy for a misfortune that threatens the dignity of marriage, and as preserving the dignity by putting an end to an unsuccessful union. And mutual consent can alone form the most respectful ground on which the couple can part. his comparatively recent work, Westermarck has given his considered opinion strongly in favour of the dissolubility of marriage by the mutual consent of the partners.² A responsible officer like Mr. Plowden, a Metropolitan Magistrate, had to make a pertinent remark while giving evidence before the Royal Commission on Marriage of 1909. He said: "Without divorce I look upon marriage as a dangerous, mad gamble I should be in favour of granting divorce for any clear breach of marriage contract and by mutual consent where the marriage has failed."3 It is strange that society should persist in regarding a criminal act or unmoral conduct on the part of one of the spouses as a more proper ground or excuse for dissolving the marriage than the mutual agreement of both.

Modern woman makes this demand for free divorce. She has become conscious of her own personality which is as great

^{1.} Dr. E. W. Westermarck: The History of Human Marriage, Vol. III, p. 377.

^{2.} Dr. E. W. Westermarck: Three Essays on Sex and Marriage, (1934), p. 335.

^{3.} See the Rt. Hon. Lord Merrivale: Marriage and Divorce, (1936), p. 45.

as man's. She has realised that mutual love and respect alone can make marriage a life-long union on the basis of freedom.¹ This she realised as back as the close of the last century. She declared even then "that marriage is nothing more nor less than a crime if it is entered upon without that mutual attraction and deep love which makes the union sacred."² It is entirely a false fear that free divorce will be destructive of society. Modern woman considers divorce simply as a means to end unhappiness and the horrors of conduct that unhappiness breeds. For in her opinion marital unhappiness is the breeding ground of immorality, and self-inflicted or tolerated unhappiness a crime.³

It is interesting to note that in Norway and Sweden, where separations are granted on the mutual request of both parties. and where such separations may become absolute divorces after three years either on the request of both parties or, if circumstances warrant, on the request of one party only, divorce is comparatively rare.4 The figures of the latest available census show only 6 divorces per 100,000 population in Norway and 8 in Sweden; whereas in England the rigidity of the divorce law shows a tendency to increase the divorce figures. For instance, in 1911 with a population of 36 millions there were 860 decrees of divorce per annum averaging one divorce per 8,400 families; whereas in 1933 with a population of a little over 40 millions there were 4042 decrees, and in 1934, 4199. representing an average of, say, one decree per 2,000 families. Japan presents a striking situation in this respect. Those who fear that divorce by mutual consent will flood divorce courts with applications have to learn much from Japan where a divorce is obtainable by mutual consent with notice to the

^{1. &}quot;If it is true that 'woman is not an undeveloped man but diverse,' that diversity will best express itself through her freedom to act as responsible agent; and only when so expressed, can we justly measure its character and amount. Such freedom is the basis of marriage as an ethical sacrament, and that conception of marriage is accordingly bound up with the general liberation of women."—L. T. Hobhouse: Morals in Evolution, p. 231.

^{2.} Marie Corelli and others: The Modern Marriage Market, p. 43.

^{3.} Mary Borden: The Technique of Marriage, (1934), pp. 250-58.

^{4.} See Cecil Chapman: Marriage and Divorce, p. 146.

Registrar. The divorce, it will be seen from the following table, is tending to fall.

MARRIAGE AND DIVORCE IN JAPAN¹

1904-08			Marriages	Divorces
			399,378	62,131
1909-13		• •	434,768	59,023
1914-18		• •	456,074	58,495
1919-23			514,833	53,998
1925	• •	••	521,438	51,687

Thus when marriage in Japan is increasing, divorce is decidedly falling. In 1933 the number of marriages in Japan proper was 486.058. The number of divorces in the same year was 49,282, or 2,155 less than in 1932. Before 1920 the number of divorces surpasses the 100,000 mark in a year and the proportion per 1.000 population was from 2.0 at the lowest to 3.0 at the highest, but it has kept a rate lower than 1.0 since 1920. The fears of society are, therefore, unwarranted. And even if free divorce results in abuses, they cannot be often worse than those that accompany the present monogamic marriage—" marriage which is degraded to the coarsest sexual habits, the most shameless traffic, the most agonising self-murders, the most inhuman cruelties, and the grossest infringements of liberty that any department of modern life can show."2 When the fundamental purposes of marriage are frustrated, dissolution—and that too honourable³—ought to be permitted. And this principle is not recognised so far by the civilised West.4 It is high time for the society to realise that persistence in the bond of an unhappy union is a disaster both for the individuals concerned and for society at large.5

- 1. See the *Japan Year Book*, edited by Takenolen, (1927), p. 41 and (1935), p. 65.
 - 2. Ellen Kev: Love and Marriage, p. 290.
- 3. "Although much is heard to the discredit of systems where incompatibility and mutual consent are in operation, yet these grounds are the ultimate resort of every reformer who realises the profundity of the problem."—Worsley-Boden: Mischiefs of the Marriage Law, p. 10.
 - 4. With the exception of Belgium, Norway, Switzerland and Russia.
- 5. J. A. Goldsmith: Companionate Marriage from the Medical and Social Aspects, (1934), p. 60.

III

"The future of the relation between the sexes and of marriage institutions lies with woman," Briffault1 sums up the whole problem of sex-relationship in these words. Marriage, as it exists, has failed to meet the demands of woman by denying her free divorce, should an occasion arise. Woman, therefore, has attacked the very foundation of marriage, and attempts to set up altogether a new foundation. It must be borne in mind that the new phase of marriage which is appearing in society through woman's efforts is not one with which society is entirely unfamiliar. It did exist in the past. It is found to be existing in the present. What woman is seeking to do is to give it a cultural moulding and make it a conscious fact so as to harmonise individual needs and social demands. marriage implies "a delicate and difficult adjustment of passionate and emotional relationship,"2 this delicate and difficult adjustment is possible only under an atmosphere of freedom as well as responsibility.

After an extensive study of the human institution of marriage among various tribes and in various lands, Westermarck's conclusion that marriage is not rooted in family but family in marriage brings out a very striking and illuminating truth. It is this, that marriage binds the parties and becomes a social concern only when the child comes in. Till then it is only a sex-relationship and does not deserve to be called a marriage. Marriage, therefore, is not merely a cohabitation, temporary or permanent, of two persons. "Marriage centres in the child, and has at the outset no reason for existence apart from the welfare of the offspring."3 This principle finds its existence among primitive people, for whom mere cohabitation with a woman does not constitute marriage until after the birth of a child. Briffault4 gives a number of cases derived from several authorities to illustrate this fact

- 1. Robert Briffault: The Mothers, Vol. III, p. 516.
- 2. See Malinowski's article on Marriage in Encyclopædia Britannica, 14th Edition, Vol. XIV, p. 945.
 - 3. Havelock Ellis: Studies in the Psychology of Sex, Vol. VI, p. 421.
 - 4. Robert Briffault: The Mothers, Vol. II, pp. 84-86.

Woman wants today social recognition of the underlying idea of the above principle. Society should have nothing to do with any sexual relationship which is harmful to nobody. As long as a sexual union is with mutual consent and does not involve injury to a third person, there is no reason why it should not be considered a private act. "So long as the sexual rights of others are not interfered with and no undesirable children result," as Dr. Norman Haire puts it, "the sexual relations of two mutually consenting adults must be considered the private concern of the two individuals involved." Sexual act should be left to individual discretion. Sexual act is of no more concern to society than any other physiological act. And it is an impertinence, if not an outrage, to seek to inquire into it. Society has a right to interfere only when there is no mutual consent or for safeguarding the interests of children if they result. "Not what goes into the womb, but what comes out of it, concerns society."2 The whole social morality should concentrate itself not upon the vagina but upon the child; or, as Ellen Key as representing women says, the whole sexual morality ought to revolve round the child. Now that woman has become responsible for her own morals, it becomes not only intolerable but meaningless for society to pry into her most intimate physiological or other acts. She becomes responsible to society only when her act involves the well-being or otherwise of society by bearing a child. "Relations between adults who are free agents are a private act, and should not be interfered with by the law or by public opinion. The idea to be aimed at is that all sexual intercourse should spring from the free impulse of both parties based upon mutual inclination and nothing else."3

Modern conditions necessitate that this new morality finds a place in society. Regulation of sexual intercourse through marriage has condemned innumerable women to an irrational type of permanent celibacy. Western morals with a deep im-

^{1.} Dr. Norman Haire: The Future of Marriage, p. 95, (with some change in words).

^{2.} Havelock Ellis: Studies in the Psychology of Sex, Vol. VI, p. 147.

^{3.} Bertrand Russell: Styles in Ethics in Our Changing Morality, pp. 12-15.

pression of certain Christian tabus have, by imposition of a sterile celibacy on a numberless women, rendered their life unhappy and sometimes disgraceful. The great excess¹ of women over men in the West calls for a saner morality. This will be done if society keeps from interfering with the sexual unions of mutually consenting persons. Society should clear itself off the idea that sexual intercourse by itself is impure. If judicious non-procreative sexual intercourse between two married persons is neither harmful nor immoral, it inevitably follows that it cannot of itself be harmful or immoral when indulged in by unmarried persons. "The only thing that discriminates married from unmarried intercourse is the absence of the formality of a legal or religious ceremony. Such a ceremony, however, manifestly does not affect the characters of the persons concerned, the health of the coitus, nor the morality or immorality of sexual intercourse."2 When it is shown that sex-instinct is as powerful in woman as in man, that a normal satisfaction of her sexual life is absolutely necessary for her for a healthy life3 both physical and mental, it appears not only unjust but brutal to subject her to an unnatural mode of living.

1. The following figures will give some idea as to the number of women who are condemned to a compulsory lifelong celibacy by an irrational sexual ethic:—

England and Wales—134 million women more than men in a population of 38,000,000.

France— $2\frac{1}{2}$ million women more than men in a population of 40,000,000.

Germany— $2\frac{1}{4}$ million women more than men in a population of 60,000,000.

Ireland—The excess of women over men is 6,000 in a population of 4,000,000.

—See Ernest Barker: National Character and the Factors in its Formation, (1927), p. 109.

2. Ralph De Pomerai: Marriage, Past, Present and Future, p. 327.

3. "The doctrine of chastity being the special and natural virtue of women is entirely false. Complete abstinence from love cannot be borne by women through a long period of years without producing serious results in the body and the mind...In many women the penalty is paid in an increasing and wearying restlessness of mind and body. We have also to face the fact that prolonged and enforced abstinence may act to cultivate a morbid obsession with sexual things."—C. G. Hartley: Motherhood and the Relationship of the Sexes, (1917), pp. 230-231.

The monogamous marriage, as it exists today in the West, is buttressed with prostitution and maintained with the help of countless clandestine relationships, which makes its moral attitude one of disgustful deception. Hypocrisy is inevitably bound up with this type of morality.

Unable to find a solution of her sexual relationship in the monogamic marriage as it exists, woman is trying to meet her marriage problem on the principle of sexual relationship described above. It has already become a fact, and more and more impetus is being given to it by thoughtful writers both men and women. To understand clearly this new relationship, we shall take a concrete case of a girl who describes her new relationship herself. She is a young graduate girl, successful in her profession, very alert mentally, very frank and outspoken, and living with a married man separated from his wife. The young woman has become the husband's self-chosen helpmate, and does not contemplate marriage. She says:

"I see no reason for any public ceremony, nor is there from my point of view any advantage in legalising our relationship. I believe that two people can live together without being married and have the same attitude toward the problems of their united lives that two married people will have. The ceremony itself does not affect the attitude of two people toward each other. It is merely an economic security for the woman, as the marriage law stands today. I could not live with any one if I felt the need of legal protection. Therefore for me the ceremony is undesirable. The fine thing about the association between J. and me is its freedom

"The beauty of our relationship is that we are doing just what we want with no compulsion about it any way. I would not even be willing to allow J. to have any jealousy. If I choose to go with other men, I shall; of course, I give him the same liberty. I may not wish to be intimate with other men while living with him, but at least want to do just as I please.

"I believe that the methods of contraception have been developed to a point where, if used correctly, pregnancy is impossible. I would not have a child, unless I planned for it....

"No, it is not difficult at all to live together. I love housekeeping, if I don't have too much of it, so long as

it is not an obligation, merely something that I choose to do while going on with my real work. I cook for J. and do his mending, just as if we were married. Like all the rest of relationship I enjoy it, because there is no 'ought' to it."

This categorical case of the graduate girl clearly illustrates the attitude of modern women toward marriage and morality. Ideas of morality are fast changing. Morality has been thrown into the melting pot and what shape it actually takes is for the future to see. But the size and construction of the pot itself allow us to draw some conclusions as to its likely mould. For the new generation of women, morality has ceased to be grounded on superstitions. The elements that constitute the present traditional morality are in a rapid process of dissolution.

Enlightened and thoughtful social reformers have come to see an artifice existing in society, impeding and arresting the course of human development. An attempt is, therefore, at work to raise a natural philosophy whose exponents are to be found from the idealistic feminist Ellen Key to the physiologist and psycho-analyst Sigmund Freud. Ellen Key is the defender of love, exhibiting no scepticism with regard to the sex-spell and demanding for it the right of way; while Freud advises to follow the voice of impulse.

Guided by such great personalities, modern women are stepping on an altogether new tract. An act which is not at all injurious to society is becoming a matter of individual choice, however revolting it might appear to the slaves of conventions. "We must remember," warns Dr. Norman Haire, "that standards of conduct depend ultimately on social convenience: Generally speaking an act which is beneficial to society is 'right'; and an act which is harmful to society is 'wrong.'"²

This moral philosophy, unconventional as it is, may not appeal to some; but it has definitely come to stay in thought and is evoking response in action among the new generation of women. Marriage is unfavourable to woman as a healthy sexual and moral companionship, as long as rigours in divorce

^{1.} See Ernest Groves: Marriage Crisis, (1928), pp. 156-159.

^{2.} Dr. Norman Haire: The Future of Marriage, p. 15.

law stand. As long as the legal code does not allow divorce by mutual consent and make it convenient and least expensive, marriage will remain a great hazard for woman.

According to Count Keyserling,1 a complete marriage is the synthesis of biological, eugenic, sociological, ethical and religious ideals. Choice of proper partners, he has, therefore, repeatedly stressed as a condition precedent to make a marriage complete in the above sense. Choice of a proper partner, whether for a man or for a woman, is impossible unless and until they live together and study each other's temperament and character. Proper partnership also requires mutual sexual compatibility. It is only when sexual and temperamental compatibilities become a fact that the partners can really love each other and the partnership can be said to exist on a solid foundation. With the birth of a child the partnership develops into marriage, whatever may society call it. Marriage on this free basis alone can become successful and conducive to individual and social welfare. The existing monogamic marriage, in this sense, becomes a life-long tyranny, if the partnership does not happen to be mutually compatible. Woman, therefore, wants to solve her marriage problem on the above principle. She cohabits with a man by whom she is attracted and who, she thinks, will prove her proper mate and partner. Both study each other's tastes, characters and temperaments, in the meanwhile using contraceptive methods. she finds, after some experience, that the partnership is mutually compatible, she and the man go to the Registrar and register it as marriage, so that the interest of children should not suffer. If, on the other hand, the partnership proves to be a failure, they can leave each other honourably without any expenses.

This is the ideal of marriage for the modern woman which, as Ellen Key says, is "the free union of a man and a woman who through mutual love desire to promote the happiness of each other and the race." Marriage has come to mean, for

^{1.} See Count Hermann Keyserling's article, The Proper Choice of Partners, in Count Keyserling's Symposium: The Book of Marriage, (1927), p. 290.

^{2.} Ellen Key: Love and Marriage.

the modern woman, a system of legal and social tyranny which is maintained "by those sadistic impulses which are natural to all men and women and which are reinforced by the repressive sexual conventions under which we live." There has come, consequently, a demand for personal moral discipline. Women find that love, generosity, tenderness and creative freedom are all inhibited in them by the present marital and parental traditions. Women, therefore, have undertaken to see that laws are framed which shall release and encourage these emotions and thereby promote freedom and happiness in the place of bondage and despair.

"The most satisfying relationships in life," writes Dora Russell, "are those which, entered upon with complete freedom of choice, thereafter absorb the personality to the full, employing our mental as well as our physical faculties We have to evolve a system of laws and custom that will produce men and women capable of clear and definite choice, passionate sincerity and honesty in love; yet equally capable of giving and exercising freedom without becoming trivial and socially irresponsible."2 A clear representation of modern woman's thought we see in these words of one who is by no means, as the words themselves evince, an upholder of licentiousness. This only shows that modern woman is taking marriage relationship seriously, fully comprehending its import, significance and purpose. The remarkable fact about women has been their departure from puritan anti-social standards. Dora Russell remarks in another place: "Released as they felt from traditional humbug by their establishment as equal citizens, they have sought knowledge and clear exposition of problems before deciding in which direction they would move."8

The problem of marriage, on this basis, has been reduced to its utmost simplicity. Marie Stopes⁴ suggests that two young

^{1.} Dora Russell in her article Marriage and Freedom in the Sexual Reform Congress Proceedings, (1929), p. 25.

^{2.} Ibid., p. 27.

^{3.} Dora Russell in her letter to Judge Lindsey, see Lindsey: Companionate Marriage, (1928), p. xxi.

^{4.} R. De Cuchtemeare: Judgment on Birth Control, 1931, p. 162.

people entering into marriage should give themselves a year or two to know each other, to play together, read together, and to develop their love. She believes that this would inestimably strengthen the bonds between the two by the time they definitely desire to shoulder the responsibilities of parenthood. Marriage on this basis is a feasible arrangement, if only sanity would give it a chance. Of course, more than one objection could be raised against this innovation. It may be easy to accuse with immorality such departures from the traditional code. It must, however, be remembered that, however unconventional this departure may look, love can become real and sacred only under this relationship. This new relationship is more moral than the forced relations of persons who are married, who cohabit, with their love dissipated.

Advocacy by women of this new type of sexual companion-ship has found its veteran champions among distinguished sexologists and thinkers. Edward Carpenter had long ago outlined this suggestion which Judge Lindsey with facts and figures later reinforced. Such relationship may, no doubt, according to Lindsey, be accompanied with some irresponsibility; but it is, he says, comparatively negligible to the irresponsibility which the present marriage system fosters. Husbands irresponsibly tyrannise over their wives for no reason on earth than that law gives them power. Church and State only encourage this by refusing humane divorce; and where they do permit, circumstances under which it is done do not make it possible for the parties to lead a normal life altogether.

Judge Lindsey, therefore, frankly advocates companionate marriage. It is meant to establish the sexual relationship of the young. In putting forth his proposals, the judge has considered all the economic, social and moral conditions of the modern world. The wise judge points out the economic difficulty of young people to shoulder marriage responsibility. He is also aware that transformation in the social standard of women has necessitated a transformation in the erotic relationship. "A new ideal of love has arisen out of the type of sexual relationship which is based upon comradeship and an intellectual-physical community of individual attractiveness and

self-completion." ¹ He, therefore, proposes that young people should enter a new type of marriage to be distinguished from the ordinary marriage by three characteristics: First, that there should be no intention for the time being to bring forth children, and accordingly the best possible information on birth control should be obtained by the parties; second, that so long as there are no children and the wife is not pregnant, divorce should be possible by mutual consent; and third, that in the event of divorce the wife should not be entitled to alimony. He holds that if such an institution were established by law, a very great many young people, for example students of universities, would enter upon comparatively permanent partnerships involving a common life.

Thus Lindsey only gives a strong support to what has already become the ground-work of thought and no less of practice of the rising woman. Companionate marriage, though it has not vet received the countenance of law, has received full support of social philosophers. Bertrand Russell² goes even further than what Judge Lindsey proposes. In his opinion, no man or woman should enter upon the serious business of marriage intended to lead to children without having had previous sexual experience. He holds that the first experience of sex should be with a person who has previous knowledge, and therefore it is absurd to ask people to enter upon a relationship intended to be long, without any previous knowledge as to their sexual compatibility. He fully supports the view that marriage should be recognised only after the birth of a child. Another social thinker, Hobhouse, who traces the whole evolution of marriage tie, points out that free relationship which is now to be found in some cases in society is a stage in which it should not be feared that the union is "less intimate, because less mechanical, between two free and responsible persons," and further remarks that in this free union "equal rights of both are maintained, based not on magical sacrament but on the most sacred relation."8

^{1.} Judge B. Lindsey: Companionate Marriage, (1928), p. 135.

^{2.} Bertrand Russell: Marriage and Morals, pp. 132-133.

^{3.} L. T. Hobhouse: Morals in Evolution, p. 232.

Herbert Spencer long ago discredited the present marriage system in which union in the name of law is considered more important than union in the name of affection. His genius anticipated, therefore, a time "when union by affection will be considered more important, and union in the name of the law the least important, and men will hold in reprobation those conjugal unions in which union by affection is dissolved." And that time has already arrived, mainly through the emancipation of women.

These new sexual innovations, some may call waywardness of modern youth. They may call it "a crafty and a deliberate attack on the institution of marriage." 2 Monogamic marriage survived through a long period in history only through the domination under which woman was kept. The whole fabric of monogamic marriage was based on the false ideas of 'virtue' enjoined upon woman in which she quietly acquiesced. But now that woman has come to her own, now that the shell of ignorance and predominance is broken and woman is facing the realities of life, the success of future marriage hangs clearly on the attitude of woman. Her attitude is decidedly that of an offended party. The conclusion of Brunetiere that "the history of marriage is the history of a relation in which women have gradually triumphed over the passions, prejudices and selfish interests of men"3 has come more true today. Those who are praising the virtues of monogamic marriage and regard the present attitude as an attempt to make "immorality more respectable" have little knowledge

- 1. Herbert Spencer: Sociology, Vol. II, p. 410.
- 2. T. B. Partington: Sex and Modern Youth, p. 116. Instead of being "a deliberate and crafty attack on the institution of marriage," modern methods are a deliberate and a wise improvement on it can be recognised when we learn from Lindsey that in many cases of cohabitation without marriage that have come under his observation, the arrangement has apparently created a condition of mutual independence and respect between persons "who might not have maintained it in marriage." See Judge B. Lindsey's article Wisdom for Parents in Sex in Civilisation, p. 198.
- 3. Brunetiere quoted by R. de Maulde la Claviere: The Woman of Renaissance, (translated by George Herbert Ely, 1900), p. 7.
 - 4. T. B. Partington: Sex and Modern Youth, p. 116.

of human psychology and particularly that relating to the sexinstinct. With all the highest ideas of 'virtue' in the form of sexual frigidity which was imposed upon the Victorian women, they were more libertinous, more frivolous and more passion-hunting than modern women who are resolutely free and yet restrained, who, though realistic in their attitude, are yet thoughtful and considerate. Modern woman does not want the superfluities of life. Love has come to occupy a prominent part in her sexual life. She understands the significance and value of love. People have vet to learn what love means in married life. "Love is doubtless the last and most difficult lesson that humanity has to learn." 1 And still we meet with half-baked sermonisers who preached: "The idea that marriage should cease when love ceases is a doctrine abhorrent and blasphemous, because it forbids the performance of this supreme duty of maintaining and enhancing the spiritual life of the world." 2 How the couple could maintain and enhance the spiritual life of the world in an atmosphere of mutual antagonism, the great philosopher alone knows. The spiritual life could be fulfilled only if they separate and find the true consummation of their love in the company of some other person. And here is another philosopher who solemnly says that the pledge of lovalty is in itself a great 'spiritual force,' possessed of the most potent educational influence over the human sex-relationship.3 What a piece of pedagogy! When the whole 'spiritual force' has gone bankrupt with the extinction of mutual love, 'pledge of loyalty' to maintain it! What a bankruptcy of insight and knowledge of human psychology!

Love between the sexes is both physical and psychical. The physiological aspect society has throughout ignored and disapprobated. Society has proved, in this wise, hypocritical. With Remy De Gourmount we would say that even in its physical aspect, "love is profoundly animal; and therein is

^{1.} Edward Carpenter: Love's Coming of Age, pp. 105-106.

^{2.} Felix Adler: Marriage and Divorce, (1915), p. 17.

^{3.} Dr. F. W. Foerster: Marriage and the Sex Problem, (translated by Dr. Meyrick Booth, 1912), p. 66.

its beauty." I regard love," says Bertrand Russell, "as one of the most important things in life; and I regard any system as bad, which interferes unnecessarily with its free development." The free sexual relationships that modern women are forming in the Western world are grounded on love, both physical and psychological. It promotes mutual happiness, mutual respect and mutual independence. The most unique thing that it facilitates is mental restraint. One fails to understand how this natural relationship is going to harm society any way. It is for the first time that woman is launching a campaign of experiments in the province of sex. The world should have some patience. Let the world wait for some time and see the results of such experiments, if it fears that it would end in promiscuity.

That free sexual relationship does not mean promiscuity or any lack of moral standard in its true sense, is well brought out by Milched Carter in the *New Leader*. Says he: "..... because these young people think naturally and speak frankly about sex, that does not mean that they have a lower conception of it than the older generation Nor do they seek promiscuous relationship. But they do not believe that this experience is made moral by a legal ceremony and that it is immoral without it. They do not believe that it should be necessarily postponed until after marriage, or that unmarried people should necessarily be without it. The morality of the act depends upon the reality of the mutual sense of unity and not upon legal contract."

The difference between the Victorian standard of morality and the modern is that while the former was based on coercion the latter has its basis in naturalness. While the Victorian morality demanded fidelity only from the wife leaving the husband to his own choice, modern morality demands it from both the parties. And this is possible not through coercion or predominance of the one over the other, but only through mutual honesty and respect.

^{1.} Remy De Gourmount: Natural Philosophy of Love, (1926), p. 6

^{2.} Bertrand Russell: Marriage and Morals, p. 96.

^{3.} New Leader, December 1928.

Companionate marriage has made possible two things. First, a frank companionship between man and woman in which physical and mental attitudes of each other may be fully understood; and secondly, if the companionship turns out mutually harmonious, its final consummation may be effected by bringing forth a child and making it legal. It is, therefore, made of two stages, during the first of which the couple can enrich their personalities by mutual association as well as independence and freedom to follow other pursuits in life; the second stage steps in when both become sure that they can shoulder the responsibilities, financial and others, and after which they bring forth a child. Contraceptive methods have most opportunely served to facilitate these two stages.¹

It is extremely difficult to instil in social conscience these conceptions—a conscience for whom tradition has been the

1. It is interesting and greatly instructive to note that in this respect some of the primitive tribes have proved saner and wiser than the people who make an unimpeachable claim to civilisation. Thus in some communities prenuptial intercourse is not meant to lead to marriage (as among the Masai, Guayeuru and Guana of Brazil), where two prenuptial lovers are not supposed to marry. Among some other tribes, prenuptial mating is a method of courtship by trial and error, and it leads gradually to stable union and is finally transformed into marriage. Thus among the Trobriand Islanders sexual freedom is considerable. It begins very early, children already taking a good deal of interest in certain pursuits and amusement which come as near sexuality as their age could permit. This is by no means regarded as improper or immoral. Later on, when boys and girls have reached sexual maturity, their freedom remains the same. In fact, at this age both sexes show a great deal of experimental interest. With advance of time, however, the intrigues of the growing boys and girls, naturally and without any outer pressure, extend up length and breadth, and the ties between the lovers become stronger and more permanent. The long love intrigue becomes a matter of public interest as well as a test of their mutual compatibility, and finally their companionship is concluded by the marriage of the two. Similar forms of prenuptial selection are found in other tribes, viz., Igorot of Luzon, Akamba of East Africa, Munshi of North Nigeria. This leads youths and girls to exercise a mature choice based on attraction of personality rather than sexual appeal. See Encyclopadia Britannica, Vol. XIV, Ed. 14, p. 241. Among the ordinary people of the Melanesian society also, according to Riverse, there is a distinct evidence of the existence of trial marriage. See W. H. R. Riverse: The History of Melanesian Society, Vol. I, (1914), p. 383.

law. Woman is not, however, abashed by social ostracism. She has found sympathisers and supporters among some of the greatest social thinkers of the modern times. August Forel, Iwan Bloch and Havelock Ellis have been some of them. As the President, Sexual Reform Congress (1929), pointed out, these three personalities have proved the outstanding geniuses and authorities in the realm of sexual problems. They have penetrated sexual problems in all their layers with rare psychological insight and practical experience.

Demand for a 'new morality' has been the raison d'être of the Scandinavian feminism. Feminism in this sense has found its unqualified supporters among the above three reputed sexologists. Iwan Bloch sees in 'free love' alone the stability of a true and healthy morality. The traditional morality created irresponsibility and economic subjection. If, on the other hand, a free woman were to be placed by a free man, their very freedom would give them a sense of profound responsibility and their love would be productive of happiness both of themselves and their children. For him love is the spiritual force of life; and he visualises in the future children brought forth by love a fine race.

Ellen Key's beautiful philosophy of love, her advocacy of 'free love' and her hope to see in this the rise of love to an ever greater love have found in Bloch a whole-hearted admirer. He entirely supports Ellen Key's main thesis of her philosophy that 'erotic monism' comprehends the entire unitary personality and, as such, must have its indestructible foundation in the unity of marriage and love. Finally he challenges the adherents of coercive marriage morality to disprove that the cultured classes, and even the pillars of the throne and the altars, have any times been immune from free love relationships and illegitimate children. Marriage fanatics would be horrified to learn the figures. "It is my opinion," he concludes with a warning to society, "to represent in a brief work the role of free love in the history of civilisation, and to adduce proofs that free love is very well compatible with a moral life." He envisages a time when, with progressive differentiation and with the re-shaping of economic conditions, free love will become an evolutionary necessity and will find a normal justification

for those who at present judge and condemn it from the point of view of long outworn social conditions.¹

To August Forel,2 sexual morality must be based on a 'natural human morality.' A sexual appetite or act must not, in the first place, infringe rights and liberties of others, and it must, as far as possible, try to promote the happiness of the neighbour and the welfare of society. He further elucidates his point by a few striking illustrations. A man of bad disposition, through a momentary sexual passion, seduces a girl, makes her pregnant and then disappears. The act is socially negative and injurious. A virtuous girl marries a depraved drunkard through religious consideration to save him. In this case also, though all is moral for society, the girl having 'married' the man, the act is absolutely negative. The effect on the children will be pernicious. A man with marked hereditary taints, impulsive, psycho-pathic, and possessed of a strong sexual appetite marries an honest girl from a good family. If it leads to the procreation of children of bad quality and makes the wife unhappy, the act is socially negative, however moral it may be for society. The most significant illustration is that of a man, healthy in body and mind, capable, hard-working and full of ideals, finding a suitable companion. They both undertake as much work as possible, especially social duties, and procreate at sufficient intervals as many children as they can support and without injury to the health of the wife. This is morally an ideal sexual companionship, whether the conioints are in social sense married or not.

A true marriage does not require priests, when the parties are physically and mentally sound. A just and lasting sexual ethic, according to Forel, does not require "severe external constraint of so-called moral laws, nor the threats and punishments of hell, nor the promise of paradise, nor the moral preachings of the priests, parents or pedagogues, nor an exalted asceticism." It is only when the sexual life of man and woman rises above the present state, being freed from the bonds of mysticism and religious dogmas, and is founded on a loyal

^{1.} Iwan Bloch: The Sexual Life of Our Time, pp. 236-278.

^{2.} August Forel: The Sexual Question, pp. 451-455.

and unequivocal human morality that recognises the wants of humanity, that a true sexual ethic can arise.

In Havelock Ellis, Scandinavian feminism has found its enlightened critic and defender. He recognises that civilisation has reached a stage when sexual wants and appetites of human beings require a different morality for their healthy satisfaction and regulation. In his recently published article¹ he makes a clear case for the modern women who have their own ideas concerning sex-comradeship and do not hesitate to contemplate a companionate marriage. And he considers this profound change in the sexual status of women as quite normal. If the movement for simplifying divorce is not proceeding rapidly, in his opinion, the formation of such non-legal unions under the name of 'companionate' is the only opportunity for the modern vouth disgusted with the traditional morality. What Havelock Ellis wants society to do is "to recognise them as worthy." "The open recognition and acceptance of a 'companionate' is today an urgent demand of social hygiene. It is, under modern conditions, a great benefit to the individual, and it inflicts no injury on the community." He fully shares the idea that such a companionate should be voluntarily terminable and with the birth of a child become legal.²

The views of H. G. Wells as a great force in the social life of modern world are worth mentioning here in this connection. Regarding the problem of sexual relationship, Wells has in his composition an extreme individualism, though in other respects he is an acclaimed socialist. He resents needless invasions of private life. "The sexual conduct of an adult is his or her own affair so far as it does not affect the collective welfare." It is, as we have emphasised, the collective well-being which, in his opinion, justifies the intervention of the community.³

At the close of our first part we have pointed out that to Scandinavian feminism 'Mutterschutz' or 'the Protection of Motherhood' has been the dearest cause. In a later

^{1.} See Marriage Hygiene, May 1937, p. 276.

^{2.} Havelock Ellis: Studies in the Psychology of Sex, Vol. VII, pp. 499-500 and 509.

^{3.} H. G. Wells: After Democracy, (1932), p. 146.

chapter we will have occasion to criticise this idea thoroughly. Here it parenthetically concerns us because its demands are for a 'new morality.' The most convincing ground on which the 'companionate' should find its appeal with society is the supreme importance of maternity free from all the tabus of the conventional morality. These Scandinavian feminists, inspired by soul-stirring writers like Ellen Key and Frau Ruth Bre, claim right of motherhood to be the most sacred and supreme of womanly functions which could not flower up under the tabu morality of the past. Healthy expression of motherhood is possible only when it is the result of a harmonious sexual life of its possessor. It is only then that children, as the products of a harmoniously consummated sexual life, both in its physical and psychological aspects, of their parents, are assured the best chances of a careful physical and mental culture. Mother, who according to Havelock Ellis is the supreme parent and who in this age of ours of learning and knowledge is more enlightened than her ancestors, will come to love her child in a way which cannot be conceived, if she is mated with a man whom she loves and in whom she confides. This can be guaranteed only if her marriage is not a fortuitous episode but a sequel to a happy and a harmonious partnership with a man of her choice and love.

This is the century of the child, said the seer of a new and bright morality, Ellen Key. And this requires that the new morality that has occupied this whole chapter finds a respectable and worthy place in Western social life, more in the interests of the mother whose very position is a flowering of all that is sweetest and best in woman.

IV

While discussing companionate marriage, we have had an occasion to remark that contraception has greatly facilitated its success. Of course to muddle-headed moralists the idea of contraception gives a horror of sin. At an age which is not ripe for undertaking serious responsibilities in life and at which sexual urges are at their maximum, any method which makes possible the satisfaction of the physical urge and at the same time prevents conception is only an improvement over the

crude methods used by primitive people for the solution of a great problem. Contraception, like infanticide, is based on a realisation that life is stern and that individuals without effective weapons are helpless in the unequal fight. These effective weapons consist of education, education resources and health. In this way modern people are achieving the same results as were achieved by the ancient tribes by recourse to inhuman and crude methods. As Dr. Murchinson remarks, "our brother, the primitive man, faced the problems of social existence just as seriously as we face them; but he was forced to use much cruder weapons than we would tolerate today."

Apart from these considerations, anti-conceptional methods will occupy a greatly useful place in the social morality of the future. Primarily anti-conceptional methods are recommended for social hygiene, which tend to regulate conceptions and improve the quality of the race.

Catholic morality looks upon anti-conceptional methods as not only unnatural but sinful. All intercourse which does not lead to procreation is a mortal sin. This idea is, as we have already pointed out, based upon all pleasure being evil. But as sex is a necessary evil, all its expressions must appear within the sacred bounds of marriage and must not be indulged in except for the noble purpose of procreation. If this shatters the health of the mother, leads to defective, diseased, ugly or insane progeny, it is all a blessing of God. But obstruction to conception is a mighty evil. The Church, therefore, harshly condemns every kind of anti-conceptional method.

This morality is still persistent and predominant in the West. The Report on the Ethics of Birth Control published a few years back bears on every page of it the stamp of this Christian outlook and mentality. Unfortunately the Church ethics have not recognised the due value of sex-impulse. In the foregoing chapters we have commented sufficiently on this attitude of the Church. What the theologians did not recognise is that this desire is "as much divinely implanted as the power of procreation," and therefore to forbid its gratification

^{1.} Dr. Carl Murchinson: Social Psychology, (1919).

^{2.} Harold Cox: The Population Problem, (1922), p. 175.

for its own sake is to defy the Divine Will. Apart from this theological objection, it is said that contraception is unnatural and is void of the æsthetic sense.

Both of these objections are unconvincing. We are living in an age of radios and robots. Are these not encroachments upon the ways of Nature? Is not driving in a motor car or using a watch a violation of natural laws? Is not flying in an aeroplane-which Nature never designed us to do by refusing us wings,—an act outstepping of Her laws? If they are not, then contraception also is not a violation of natural laws. It is a means of regulating conceptions and making life happy. Is it in keeping with Nature to bring into the world diseased and ugly children making both themselves and society unhappy? Is it in keeping with Nature to procreate children which cannot be brought up by the procreator and are therefore left to the mercy and charity of society? Is it quite natural to burden the wife with repeated pregnancies which make a travesty of her existence? The æsthetic argument has no force. Artificial teeth and spects are as contrary to æsthetic as contraceptives; but the poetry of love does not suffer much from their use. And when one is short-sighted or long-sighted one has to use spects. Artists do not cease to be artists because they use spects.

It is in the interests of society that contraceptive methods be practised. As Prof. Karl Pearson long ago pointed out, those strata of population which are physically and mentally less desirable are at the present time more fertile than the more social types.¹ And there is nothing astonishing in this. For, as Havelock Ellis² points out, feeble-mindedness is largely handed down by heredity, and feeble-minded persons are more prolific. Thus in a family of three hundred and nineteen persons, one hundred and nineteen were known to be normal. The families tended to be large, sometimes very large, most of them in many cases dying or growing up weak-minded. The huge year-

^{1.} See Lieut.-Col. H. Everitt: The Falling Birth Rate and Its Significance, (1909), p. 8.

^{2.} Havelock Ellis: The Task of Social Hygiene, (1927), pp. 32 and 35.

ly crop of ugly, blind, diseased and insane children is a product of this prudish morality that condemns all birth-control methods and forbids instruction in it to the needful people. In England alone, the number of the blind increased from 25,840 in 1919 to 62,727 in 1931 and the whole figure for the United Kingdom for 1931 was 72,727. This miserable stock of humanity is a living poignant criticism on the type of morality that is still ruling the Western civilised mind.

Our discussion on birth-control is due to the fact that more than any one's else it has become woman's important problem. It is she who is the medium of racial expression and she ought to see that every child which she brings out is an asset and not a burden to society. She must refuse to conceive if she thinks that her child will only add to social problems. Woman, therefore, must have her freedom-freedom born out of a sense of responsibility—to determine whether she is fit to become a mother and, if so, of how many children. Maternity is, no doubt, as Cuchtemeare² points out in the robe of a preacher, a normal and physiological function and the natural end of her sexual cycle and that it is necessary to her health and well-being. But this same philosophy must consider its limits. Maternity carried to an extent bevond what it could sustain³ is disastrous both to the woman and the family. After a rapid series of undesired pregnancies, sexual relations become a nightmare to the wife. She gains an attitude of depression and defeat. She comes to feel that she is a helpless victim of blind, cruel forces over which she has no control. The advances of her husband become, consequently, repulsive to her. This breaks down the marital happiness both of her and her husband.

- 1. See Eugenic Review, July, 1932.
- 2. R. de Cuchtemeare: Judgment on Birth Control, p. 129.
- 3. That all is not well with mothers is brought out by Marie Stopes who discovered that out of 100,000 supposedly healthy mothers that she treated in a public hospital, no less than 1,321 were found to have a lacerated cervix and the total of this and other injuries and deformations was so great as 3,164 or approximately 1 in every 3. See Marie Stopes' article Birth Control in Sexual Reform Congress Proceedings, (1929), p. 106.

Regardless, therefore, of what man's attitude is, this problem is woman's. It is she alone who each time goes through the ordeal of death each time a babe is born. "As it is the right neither of man nor the state," thunders that unrelenting defender of birth control, Margaret Sanger, "to coerce her into this ordeal, so it is her right to decide whether she will endure it. That right to decide imposes upon her the duty of clearing the way to knowledge by which she may make and carry out the decision." In another place, she says on her own testimony that contraceptives have enabled many mothers to regain mastery over the condition of their lives and helped them to fulfil their maternal functions in a far happier and more efficient fashion.

The new morality of modern woman, therefore, will have nothing to do with the old saying, "Where God sends mouths, He sends meat." "We cannot throw on the Deity," writes the enlightened Christian, Dean Inge of St. Paul's, "the responsibility for bringing unwanted children into the world and leaving them to the State to clothe, feed, and support by outdoor relief."3 The morality of birth-control, according to this sagacious moralist, depends on the motive. Judged by this test, the modern woman stands completely vindicated. The old morality gives no choice to the individual woman. She may in order to 'save' herself become a victim to the higher authorities, or become eternally 'damned' by deciding to solve her own problems. If she wants her sexual behaviour to obey the strict laws of ecclesiastical dogmas, she has no choice except between uninterrupted procreation and rigid continence. These irrational dogmas are a negation to modern woman's life. Her motives, therefore, justify her new morality. By the use of contraceptive methods, her whole sphere of life, and especially the sexual, she elevates from the level of purely fortuitous events to intelligent regulation.

^{1.} Margaret Sanger: Woman and the New Race, p. 100.

^{2.} Margaret Sanger: The Civilising Force of Birth Control. See Sex and Civilisation, p. 587.

^{3.} William Ralph Inge: More Lay Thoughts of a Dean, (1931).

CHAPTER VIII

MORALS IN DISSOLUTION?

EPILOGUE TO PART II

"God fulfils himself in many ways."

-Lord Tennyson in Morte D'Arthur.

HEN morality has to deal with an impulse like the sex, which is "so central and so essential," and which is so deep-rooted and all-embracing that it controls and pervades the whole human species (leaving aside the sub-human) from the savage Trobriander to the celibate genius, the true libido of Freud, and in terms of which many of our inexplicable life phenomena find their wonderful explanation (as the genius of Freud points out), morality will achieve its true end only if it harmonises social welfare with individual good. Morality in the past interpreted the sex-instinct only as a reproductive instinct, and tried to regulate it only in terms of its reproductive capacity. Individual quietly and supinely acquiesced in this morality, which became still more repressive with the incorporation of Christian ideas buttressed by the unqualified asceticism of the mediæval Church fathers. Thus the old morality, apart from multiplying the evils of society, rendered the individual a helpless tool in the hands of destiny, and turned his tender love incipient and low. This ascetic morality rendered the life of woman miserable. That more than anything else a full and healthy satisfaction of sexual instinct is essential for the consummation of moral life was ignored by it. All pleasure was measured in terms of evil.

The disgustful effects of this morality we have already pointed out. Ill health, disease, constant frictions, degraded motherhood and broken homes have been its ravageous con-

^{1.} Havelock Ellis in his Introduction to Sex in Civilisation, p. 15.

sequences. But the worst effect of this morality was upon the individual himself. It wrecked his very individuality. The growth and development of his personality were sacrificed to the supposed interests of society. This happened even more tragic in the case of woman. For, when the man could, in the most testing times, give vent to his most turbulent passions in the arms of a street girl, the woman had to burn her passions in the fire of social morality. The repression of individuality is the worst of the cruel results morality has ever achieved in the whole of its life-history.

More than being a machine age, ours is an age of science -an age of thinkers. It might be that the individual acquiesced in the traditional morality—conscious though he was of its antihuman character—because he took it as the very law of God. because its sanctity and truth he could not challenge. But since the close of the last century the science of sexology has enormously developed. Researches in psycho-analysis have exposed the unsoundness, brutality and the lack of scientific support in many of the ordinances of the traditional morality. The very existence of the traditional morality is thus rendered shaky. With the scientific exposition of the working of the sexual phenomena in human life, the world is seized with an unusual sensation. The puritan section has become pessimistic, while the youth has become vitalised. Human weaknesses, which with their association with the idea of sin were rendered horrible. have now become the ground-work on which to raise the beautiful shrines of toleration, sympathy, love and help.

The effect of sex on our psychology is now beginning to be accepted as a fact, in spite of its obstinate opponents. The influence of sex as a visible or invisible and invincible force underlying psychological life¹ is awakening social conscience to the necessity of a radical change in morality. Man is an animal preoccupied, governed or blinded by sex-impulses, sometimes entirely and always with respect to a very considerable part of his mentality. And now these results have formed part of official science. The irony of the whole situation is that

^{1. &}quot;Under most of our acts is hidden a more or less obvious sexual motive."—Jacques Fischer: Love and Morality, (1927), p. 224.

the dissociation of mental processes of love into their constituent elements shocks society on account of its tabu mentality.

Individualism is the inevitable law governing the amorous life of man. It is because of the obvious truth that the combination of powerful and contradictory forces, acting upon the formation of the sex-impulses, ends in making human beings quite different from one another. It must, therefore, be remembered that the sexual morality of mankind does not obey any fixed rules, as among the animals, and that individual character plays an important part in it. The human being is, at every moment of his existence, very uncertain of the sexual law; and so the strictest observer of morality may meet with an unexpected obstacle which will bring about a complete change in his way of regarding love. It is due to social hypocrisy that people pretend to believe that the amorous life of man can be reduced to a common type, the manifestation of which is what we call morality. Practically this is not the case.

The vital forces of life are replete with rich potentialities. Their free expression may involve some destruction; but ultimately constructive forces will find their way. The great truth abides that life regulates itself. By a peculiar course of events, Western society has come to possess from earliest times some people of 'wisdom' (?) who were no better than sceptics and maniacs. These so-called men of wisdom employed strenuous measures to restrain the free expression of life's vital forces. But life cannot brook this long. In countries where prostitution was sought to be checked with rigorous assiduity, it spread widely like the germs of plague; while in countries where least prohibition was laid down, it also minimised.² So also, where divorce laws are most rigorous, the number of divorces is also swelling; while liberal divorce laws have been found to strengthen marriage ties.³

- 1. Jacques Fischer: Love and Morality, p. 253.
- 2. See Havelock Ellis: The Psychology of Sex, Vol. VI.

^{3.} Thus in the State of New York where divorce is allowed only on the single ground of adultery, the divorce has doubled in twenty-six years; while in Norway where divorce is allowed by mutual consent, an extremely low rate of divorce is found. See M. B. Messer: Family in the Making, pp. 329-30.

People want life to be restricted, systematised, disciplined and conventional. They want to reduce life to the position of railway lines. Railway lines are useful; but they have no æsthetic sense about them, nor are they sources of inspiration with all their systematised parallelism. Vital forces of life are like the currents of a monsoon river—sometimes calm. serene and pleasing, other times violent, boisterous and defiant. But these very currents are full of rich vitality, natural usefulness and æsthetic beauty. What people forget is that water finds its own level. Let life regulate itself. Artificial regulation has done more harm than good. Regulation of life can be permitted only when an act is injurious to the individuals themselves or to society. (Here the moral question ought not to be confounded with spiritual). Thus if we ask society what harm is there if two persons—a man and a woman—of healthy body and cultured mind cohabit together without undergoing any legal ceremony, society can give no rational reply. Because because . . , it will say, it is a long custom. Superstition has thus become the ruling force of social morality. Do they think that the man or the woman suddenly undergoes a change. they cease to be human beings and assume supernatural personalities, as soon as they go through the legal ceremony? They remain human beings as they were. On the other hand. if any change takes place at all, it is for the worse. The man begins to feel that he has some 'rights' over the woman; and the woman is given to understand that she has some 'duties' towards the man. The principle of love is thrown to the winds. The sufferer is the wife. She has to private her individual tastes and inclinations. She becomes after her husband's wishes. This is what the modern woman resents and repels.

Nietzsche¹ has defined the evolution of mankind in three stages. Mankind, he says, is in turn a camel, a lion and a child. The camel carries, bears what is heavy, dutifully submits, originates nothing, endures everything. The lion wants freedom, gets it, does away with all masters, still is not able to create. The child, however, can; it rises in innocence and oblivion of the past. It is like a wheel turning its own

energy. The child plays and is equal to the play of creation. Here, the camel represents the old morality, useful but limited in power; the lion the critical, destructive spirit, also useful but limited in strength; the child, positive creation. Man's mind in its historic course has passed through these stages; and now it is the age of the child. And as to how the mind shall create, what it shall produce, says Nietzsche, there is in the nature of the case no outside law. In a moral aim one puts forth one's supreme choice. Morality has, therefore, no other basis than that of voluntaristic, and for the matter of that, æsthetic one. This is the most naturalistic view of morality according to which there are no 'oughts' or 'oughts not' transcending life, but life itself is the ultimate standard and so all morality ought to be fixed by the demands of life.

"Scientific investigation shows that our moral ideal must ultimately be synthetic, because it must include all elements of permanent value in life. It must include the ideal of self-development, because an ideal social group is a collection of personalities each of whom is an 'end' in itself. It must include the happiness of every human individual; for we could not assure the most harmonious social life unless all individuals are treated as 'ends' and the feelings of individuals are respected." It is essential that the old conceptions of morality which reduced the individual to the position of a mere cog in the social machine give place to a new morality based not on any immutable standards but on a true appreciation of his needs and feelings and a belief in his potential greatness.

For the rising generation, morality is not the law of God—the same to all. It is the choice of the individual. As Dr. Money-Kyrle writes, "the individual of the future will become the arbiter of his own morality." By recognising this great principle we are standing the individual on his own feet instead of on the social crutches which, though serving him sometimes as his support, have chequered his progress. By leaving morality to his choice, we are paying the greatest respect to the indivi-

^{1.} Charles E. Wood: Cultural Evolution (a study of social origins and development), (1927), p. 223.

^{2.} R. E. Money-Kyrle: The Development of Sexual Impulse, (1932), p. 189.

dual—believing in his power of judgment and fully confident of his brilliant potentialities. We are thus giving back the individual his lost confidence. After a few stumbles the individual, gathering experience and knowing the pitfalls and dangers, will march ahead with a progress which the pages of history have not known.

"The appeal of the present morality is to men's fears rather than to their hopes." While the new morality being an appeal to the individual himself is sought to be grounded not on his ignorance, superstition and fear but on sound education and hope. With education, the individual will know his responsibilities. While under the old morality the individual tried to solve his sexual problems by evading them, today the new morality is enabling him to meet them in their very face. Possessed of education and with the concomitant awakening of the sense of responsibility, the individual is attempting to solve his moral problems with a frankness and boldness which alone are required in this field.

Many women and men of exceptional gift, who, according to Hartley,² are standing outside of marriage and evading parentage on account of their consciousness of an increasing intolerance against the make-shift morality imposed upon their sexual life, will find in this new morality a response to their long overdue needs. Morality ought to promote loyalty, honesty, veracity and justice among individuals, without which "there can never be anything more than a shabby semblance of social order." The present morality, on the other hand, promotes hypocrisy, injustice and dissimulation.

In the opening chapter of this Part, we have remarked that the motive of an act is one of the important constituents of morality. The new morality does not ignore this great and essential factor. It wants to promote social good without stunting the growth of the individual. The motive with which modern women are out against the institutions so dear and ancient to

^{1.} C. E. M. Joad: Thrusymachus or the Future of Morals, (1925), p. 89.

^{2.} C. Hartley: The Truth about Woman, (1913), p. 359.

^{3.} Dr. C. A. Ellwood: An Introduction to Social Psychology, (1920), p. 274.

society is aimed at purging the ugliness by which they are deformed.

Freedom is the watchword of this new morality. That freedom in sex-relationship to persons, who are brought up in an atmosphere of education which has awakened in them a full sense of their responsibility, will lead to chaos is entirely a misplaced fear. If human beings were so very weak, then nothing could restrain them from licentious indulgence. On the contrary, it is the social restraints that have invited reactions when sex-impulse finding imperfect and chequered expression has run amok. Life, we repeat, regulates itself, and when all its fundamental natural demands find their natural satisfaction, anything like over-indulgence becomes an exception.

There is no reason, therefore, to fear that women are leading Western society to moral degradation. Sex-relationship is more and more sought to be adjusted in accordance with individual needs and circumstances. This will tend to make marriage more and more stable, freedom becoming its strongest bond. Marriage in this new form will become truly monogamic and more permanent on account of its formation after mutual adaptation between two conscientious and responsible persons than the monogamic marriage of to-day which is only a semblance of its name and which changes its form with the aid of disgraceful events like compulsory adultery.

The worst thing that traditional marriage has achieved is the idea of exclusiveness that it has fostered on the side of man. The result has been that the girdle of chastity is fastened round the sexual life of woman. Hence new morality is founded on the idea that sexual life of woman as of man should be free and that marriage should exist only for children. If in future a fine race is to be born to rationalise the whole social system which has today become demoralised on account of capitalism and exploitation, the parents must be enlightened persons who see in their marriage a consummation of their mutual love. And Ellen Key, the enlightened apostle of this new morality, waits for the day when "sexual union will not depend on the the form of cohabitation that makes a human couple become parents, but only on the value of the children they create as new links in the chain of the generation," and when "instead of

divine codes of morality of the sexual relations the desire and responsibility for the enhancement of the race will be the support of morals."

On the ashes of the dying morality is emerging out a new morality which attempts to understand the instincts, the needs and the weaknesses of the individual. "Ways of life which in the past were useful and socially acceptable mores have become mischievous and socially unacceptable neuroses,"2 because they fail to meet the individual aspirations.³ As civilisation means the differentiation of individuals, the emergent morality will place the individual's demands above the social, unless the individual has by his own act necessitated interference for the protection of another's interests. This morality, therefore, does not seek to make marriage binding unless, as Mr. Havelock Ellis4 has suggested, there is a preliminary stage of noviciate sufficiently intimate to ensure mutual knowledge. And even with such a safeguard, the new morality would give facilities for the exit from marriage, unless the interests of the child call in for a thorough consideration.

Transitional period is always fraught with mishaps, being a critical and testing period. Today the Western world is in the midst of it. If during this transitional period, some persons are found to go wide the mark, it is purely due to its reactionary character. Today's chaos will be tomorrow's order, once the sensation of reaction goes away. What the modern woman has done is to introduce as a proper weapon a technique of dry and caustic analysis in the sphere of social morality. And it must be remembered that "behind this somewhat repellent battle-front there is a wealth of aspiration and altruistic urge quite as attractive as anything that the orthodox lay claim to in this respect." As Marie Stopes wisely puts it: "What

- 1. Ellen Key: Love and Marriage.
- 2. Floyd Dell: Love in the Machine Age, (1930), p. 7.
- 3. We on this very oft-stressed reason would say with Bernard Shaw that what is wanted is not a supermorality which "will appear to them to be mob-morality, but a class-morality and even an individual morality."

 —G. B. Shaw: The Need for Expert Opinion in Sexual Reform. See The Sexual Reform Conference Proceedings, (1929), p. 437.
 - 4. Havelock Ellis: Psychology of Sex, Vol. VII (1928), p. 508.
 - 5. Alec Craig: Sex and Revolution, (1934), p. 75.

stands out as new, and therefore as essentially characteristic of the time, is rational application of scientific thought to the problems of marriage, the phenomena of sincere young people consciously endeavouring to understand each other's problems and think out practical measures with good-will."

There ought, therefore, to be no fears that morals in the West are dissolving or even dwindling. On the other hand, it might aptly be said that they are evolving. Evolution is the Law; and nothing can escape its operations.

WHITHER WOMAN?

PART III

MISGUIDED IDEALS

CHAPTER IX

EDUCATIONAL IDEALS

HOW later English feminists have been entirely misguided in their ideals of 'emancipation' is evident from their educational ideas of which the modern educational system for girls is a living proof. The early feminists had a well-defined perspective of 'emancipation' and they did not allow their aspirations and ideals to run amok. As early as 1864 wrote Miss Emily Davies1: "We are not encumbered by theories about equality and inequality of mental power in the sexes. All we claim is that the intelligence of women, be it great or small, shall have full and free development...., the object being the awakening and strengthening and adorning of the human spirit." Diametrically opposite have been the ideas of the later feminists whose educational and other ideals have fallen in the same lines with men. Under the assumption that the female brain was capable of equal intellectual pursuits to the male, the modern educational system for girls is a complete imitation of the educational system for boys. As the Committee appointed in 1923 to consider the differentiation of curricula between the sexes remark: "Basing their policy on the belief that girls could equal boys at least in intellectual matters if favourable conditions were afforded, the leaders of the (Women's) Movement implicitly assumed that what had been done for and by boys was

^{1.} See the Year Book of Education, (1932), pp. 230-231. And wrote George Eliot in 1868 to Emily Davies, the foundress of Girton College, urging her not to forget in her efforts to promote the education of girls that they are fundamentally different from boys, and that difference of sex is an important part that should not be overlooked in formulating an educational system for girls. "We can no more afford to part with that exquisite type of gentleness, tenderness, possible maternity, softening a woman's being with affectionateness, which makes what we mean by the feminine character, than we can afford to depart with the human love, the mutual subjection of soul between a man and a woman—which is also a growth and revelation beginning before all history."

in general suitable for both sexes." A complete lack of feminine ideals and a thorough imitation of manly ideals have consequently been the most outstanding features of the educational system for girls. The two typical curricula that we have

Time-Table of a large Modern Boarding School for Girls

Form	Upper V. 1.	Upper V. 2.	Upper V. 3.	V. 1.	V. 2.	V. 3.	Lower V. 1.	Lower V. 2.	Lower V. 3.
Average Age	Y. M. 16 6	Y. M. 16 9	Y. M. 16 4	Y. M. 14 6	Y. M. 15 0	Y. M. 15 3	Y. M. 14 0	Y. M. 14 2	Y. M. 14 4
	hrs.	hrs.	hrs.	hrs.	hrs.	hrs.	hrs.	hrs.	hrs.
Religious Instruction Eng. Lang. &	2	11/3	11/3	11/3	11/3	1 1 3	11/3	11/3	11/3
Lit. History Geography Latin	2 2 1 ¹ / ₃ 3 ¹ / ₃	2 13 13 23	1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1	15 15 15 25	13 13 13 23	15 15 15 25	2 1 1 3 1 3 3 2 3 3	2 11/3 13/3 23/3	2 13 13 23
Greek French German Arithmetic)	2 2 3 2 3 2 3	2 3 2 3 2 3	2 3 2 3 2 3	22 23 23	23 23	23 23 23	23 23 23	2 2 2 2 2 3	2 3 3 3
Algebra Trigonometry	4	4	4	4	4	4	4	4	4
Chemistry	4	2	2	11/3	11/3	$1\frac{1}{3}$	2	2	2
Botany Art Music &	$\frac{2}{1\frac{1}{3}}$	$\frac{1\frac{1}{3}}{1\frac{1}{3}}$	2 1 1	 1 1	1 1 3	1 1	 1½	::: 1 1	$\frac{\dots}{1\frac{1}{3}}$
Singing Ear Training Part Singing	1 1 3	$\frac{1\frac{1}{3}}{1\frac{1}{3}}$	1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1	11/3 11/3 	1 1/3 1 1/3 	1 1 3 1 3	11/3 (400x40	1-incidents	1 1 3 3
Manual Ins- truction Needle work	1 ¹ / ₃	1 1 	2 2 3	1 1 3 3 3	11/3	11/3	1½ 3	1 1 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3	$\frac{1\frac{1}{3}}{1\frac{1}{3}}$
Physical Exercises Drill, Dale-	1 1	1 1	11/3	11/3	1 1	11/8	11/3	11/3	$1\frac{1}{3}$
rose or Dancing. Elocution	1 1	13	1 1	11/3	113	1 1 3	1 1	11/3	11/3
(Special)	11/3	11/3	11/3	11/3	11/3	1 1	3	2/3	3

Home Work 12 to 15 hours weekly.

^{1.} See The Report of the Committee appointed to consider the Differentiation of Curricula between the Sexes in Secondary Schools, (1923).

Time-Table of a County Secondary School for Boys.*

Form		пс	IIB	IIA	IVB	ША	II 4S	IVB	IVA	L.V.B. L.V.A.	L.V.A.	A. Reser-Upper ve. VI.1	Jpper VI.1	Upper VI.2	Sc VI.A	Sc VI.2
Average Age		Y. M. 10-9	Y. M. 12-2	Y. M. 11-4	Y. M. 13-0	Y. M. 12-9	Y. M. 13-4	Y. M. 14-0	Y. M. 13-11	Y. M. 15-0	Y. M. 15-0	Y. M. 16-10	Y. M. 16-2	Y. M. 17-4	Y. M. 16-5	Y. M. 17-2
English Language Literature Literature History Geography Latin French German Hallan German Hallan Mathematics Chemistry Physics Music and Singing Physical Exercises Economics Shorthand Accounting Accounting Home Work	B	2:::: 2::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::	477	477 · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · ·	444 :4 : :46 : :4 :4 : : : : : : : : : :	444444 # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # #	성성급 : (Acc : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : :	ಜ್ಞಭಜ್ಞಭ್ಯ : :ಫ಼ಜ್ : :ಫ಼ :ಫ಼ : : : : : : : : : : : : : : :	성급성 :쌇쌇 :숖º : :및 :및 : : : : : : : : : : : : : : :	6244844 : :48 : :44 :44 : : :01	6 2 4 :	සන්න් :හු : :ආය : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : :	다. 다	ಷ್ಕ ಬಳ್ಳು : ಈ ಹೆಸಿದ್ದಾರ್ಯ : : : : : ಪ್ರಕ್ಷಣ ಕ್ರಮ ಪ್ರಕ್ಷಣ ಕ್ರಮ ಪ್ರಕ್ಷಣ ಕ್ರಮ ಪ್ರಕ್ಷಣ ಕ್ರಮ ಪ್ರಕ್ಷಣ ಕ್ರಮ ಪ್ರಕ್ರಣ ಕ	고 : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : :	84 : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : :

* See The Report of the Committee appointed to consider the Differentiation of Curricula between the Sexes in Secondary Schools, (1923).

produced above, one of a boys' and the other of a girls' secondary school in an English county, will speak more than what we could point out.

It remains to be seen, therefore, how far the present type of education given to girls on the lines of boys is consistent with their own nature, how far it is capable of promoting true womanliness in them and how far it prepares them for life, as true education, according to Thorndike, is meant to do. This naturally leads us to investigate whether man and woman are any way different in the essentials of psychological constitution.

One need not be told that physical constitution is quite different in man and woman. These differences are quite patent. What is most important to a student of educational psychology is whether there are psychological differences that demand different types of education for the sexes. We shall, therefore, go through a few authorities.

Dr. Helen Thompson in her work *The Mental Traits of Sex* has embodied the researches that were made to obtain a complete and systematic statement of the psychological likenesses and differences of the sexes by the experimental methods. The individuals who furnished the basis of the research were students of the University of Chicago. They were all juniors, seniors, or students in the first year of their graduate work. The students chosen were between 20 to 25 years of age. They were told nothing about the object of the test except that they were for the purposes of determining psychological norms. The entire series of tests was applied to 50 students—25 men and 25 women.

The experiments fell into seven groups, dealing respectively with motor ability, skin and muscle senses, taste and smell, hearing, vision, intellectual faculties and affective processes. We are here concerned with only the last two in order to know whether they determined any psychological differences. Memory in its purest form was better among women than

^{1.} Dr. Helen Thompson: The Mental Traits of Sex, (1903), pp. 97-135 and 161-182.

among men. In ingenuity, men surpassed women. The relation of the sexes in different subjects was as follows:—

English Literature: Women much superior.

History: Men a little superior. Physics: Men much superior.

Mathematics: Women very slightly superior.

Biology: Women a little superior. Chemistry: Both sexes equal.

In total amount of general information there was no difference between men and women who had taken the same course of education. The women were somewhat the better informed in literary and the men in scientific subjects; but this, says the author, was probably due to selection of studies and not to sex. Social consciousness seemed to be more predominant in men than women. Social gatherings ranked higher among men than among women, and their relations to their fellows seemed to be of more value to men than to women. Religious consciousness was more predominant among women than among men. More women than men had strong religious beliefs and regulated their actions by religious standards. Belief in omens, presentiments and superstitions was more prominent among women.

As regards emotional nature, the form of its expression, the degree of its impulsiveness, there seemed to be no difference. The only difference was that women seemed to have a greater tendency to inhibit the expression of emotion and to act from reason than from impulse. Day-dreaming was practised more by women than by men. Men were more frank than women, and women displayed a good deal of embarrassment. In intellectual interest, easiest and hardest branches of study, and methods of work, only trifling divergences were evident.

The author's own conclusion from these results is that intellectual differences between the sexes are those of degrees only and the results of social environment. It must be noted, however, that she is not carried away by this consideration. She is quite sensible when she says: "The question of the future development of the intellectual life of women is one of social

necessities and ideals, rather than of inborn psychological characteristics of sex."

The profound physiological differences which distinguish the sexes are, in the opinion of Prof. Welton,2 the correlates of equally important mental differences. While man lives by reason, woman's outlook, he says, is moulded and determined by feeling. "She approximates the emotional temperament even when she does not show it in all its fulness." Intuition is a special quality of woman; and therefore, she does not care for abstract thought. It is not that she does not generalise, but that "she generalises without preparatory analysis." He cites the example of so eminent a woman as Hume de Sevique who acknowledged that "abstract reasoning was repugnant to her." Man, therefore, he points out, analyses and applies principles deductively, but a woman takes the special case and its value for feeling. The differences in the mental outlook of the sexes become, according to the observations of this author, clear from early life. A little girl of four is essentially a little girl; and a little boy is a little boy. The girl, says he, is precocious in speech, is less often troubled with stammering. Her play has not the force and expansion of movement which characterise the boy's; it is comparatively quieter and assumes a definite meaning.

Welton sees intellectual distinctions also. Intellectual distinctions colour the learning of the two sexes as soon as the studies provide an opportunity for their respective intellectual qualities. Thus girls do well in all that demands neither originality of thought nor abstraction. They, therefore, keep pace with boys, or even surpass them, in the earliest school studies most of which are concerned with concrete wholes. They learn by heart with ease, take delight in neatness and in the embellishment of their written exercises, they work out with accuracy all detailed processes with the general form of which they are familiar or which they can imitate from an example. They appreciate beauty of feeling and of form; and that is why study of literature has a special appeal to them, and they can show

^{1.} Dr. Helen Thompson: The Mental Traits of Sex, p. 182.

^{2.} See Prof. J. Welton: The Psychology of Education, (1912), pp. 128-135.

here more progress at an earlier age than what boys could do. Their earlier attempts at composition are superior to those of boys, because they are more imitative of what they have read in books; whereas the composition of the boy has more direct expression and is rendered in the briefest and boldest way and in the colloquial language of every-day life. He never attempts to embroider as do the girls. Even in the ordinary thing like lying, they show their respective differences. Boys lie, but as a rule they lie clumsily; whereas girls lie artistically. And Welton's experience and observation show that girls lie more frequently than boys and from more personal impulses. Boys would often lie to save another person, a spirit that lacks in girls. Girls moreover lie with ease and grace, while boys show a great lack of skill and assurance.

These mental and intellectual differences, says Welton, are sadly ignored by the advocates and promoters of equal education to the sexes. He is, therefore, against co-education. Boys and girls, he says, may be taught together in the same subjects only in the earliest age—say, up to ten years of age; because in these years "the matter put before them gives little scope for their characteristically different modes of apprehension." But the intellectual differences come into prominence with advance in age. Soon boys and girls begin to retard each other's progress—the girls being held back for slower boys in some subjects, and, in their turn, impeding the advance of the boys in other subjects. So, different schools for the sexes with different curricula would seem to give the best intellectual results. And this, he says, "is very marked out by my own somewhat extended observations."

Not only because boys and girls differ in their psychological constitution that they should be given different education and in separate schools, but there is also another reason against coeducation which Welton emphasises. "As the psychological differences between man and woman are so intimate, so deep and so all-pervading, that the real training in character and in out-look in life of the one sex cannot be given by the other." And this consideration is, he points out, most significant with the approach of adolescence. A man cannot be a really sympathetic guide to a girl, nor a woman to a boy, "simply because the man has never been a girl nor the woman a boy." This

difficulty in the way of co-education, he says, might be minimised by the employment of both men and women on the staff and by a fair alteration of men and women teachers. What he deprecates is the idea on which the co-educational system rests. To quote his own words: "Really at the bottom of the advocacy of mixed schools lies the idea which, for the reasons I have given, I believe to be profoundly mistaken, that the evolution means the gradual elimination of the differences of sex."

One point, however, Welton makes clear. It is this, that it must never be supposed that woman is an imperfectly developed man. That woman differs from man in intellect does not mean that she is in any way intellectually inferior to him. To deduce intellectual inferiority from woman's inaptitude for abstract thought is to apply a false standard to reach a wrong conclusion. "Neither is inferior to the other. Each is essential to life; and in this difference of attitude, as in all that follows from it, man and woman are complementary. There is no question of superiority or inferiority; and any course of action based on the assumption that woman should try to become intellectually like man rests on a very insecure psychological foundation."

Another ground¹ on which Welton proposes a different type of education for women is their functional difference from men. The functions of men and women, he says, are essentially distinct. Evolution does not mean the identification of sex qualities, but their more perfect mutual adaptation. "Equality in value of complementary functions, not the obscuring of differences already established, is what the whole cause of man's evolution leads us to expect." So, in another of his books,² he sadly deprecates the tendency of the course of women's education which seeks to prepare them for various forms of professional and commercial life which, he points out, involves strenuous intellectual application during the years of adolescence and thus becomes trying on their nerves. In his opinion the present education on the same lines as males disturbs the nervous equilibrium of girls and thus injures their health. This

^{1.} Prof. J. Welton: The Psychology of Education, p. 128.

^{2.} Prof. J. Welton: What do We mean by Education, (1915), see pp. 170, 171.

break-down of health may become serious in the rough and tumble of competitive examinations, and still more so when the competition is with boys.

Welton regards a system of education inefficient which does not prepare the girl to be fit for actual life; and this, in his opinion, will be achieved not by the present type of education, but by a system which lays emphasis on preparation for efficient wifery.¹

In his *The Mixed School* Howard has to some extent studied the psychology of the sexes. He first draws attention to the present educational system in which boys and girls, in fact, study very much the same thing even when their schools are separate. Not only in the kindergarten courses, but in all the succeeding stages of education, there is, he says, no difference in curriculum. "Broadly speaking, boys and girls follow the same syllabus; they use the same text-books; they are taught by teachers with identical qualifications; and they are prepared for the examination at the end of their course." He also draws attention to the fact that the pioneers of higher education for girls aimed too exclusively at copying the existing type of education for men, without considering carefully whether the needs of men and women were the same.²

Howard does not admit much intellectual³ difference between the sexes. He does not find any inherent differences between the sexes in the higher intellectual capacities. The girl is superior to the boy at all ages, both as regards vocabulary and speed of reading. As regards comprehension of what is read, the boy is superior from 5 to 7, the girl at all other ages up to 11. In spelling and dictation, the girl has an advantage at all ages. In mental arithmetic, the girl is slightly inferior at all ages. In written arithmetic, she is markedly inferior throughout, particularly in problem work. In speed of writing and quality of writing, the advantage lies with girls, particularly between 10 and 11 years of age. In drawing, the girl is inferior till about 12; at 13 she is about equal to the boy; at 14 she is some 3% better. In speed of handwork, there is little to

^{1.} Prof. J. Welton: What do we mean by Education, p. 171.

^{2.} Howard: The Mixed School, p. 98.

^{3.} Ibid., pp. 126, 132.

choose between the two. In both speed and quality of composition, the girl is always ahead of the boy.

Though Howard denies intellectual differences between the sexes, temperamental differences are to him fairly clear. Thus he points out that the girl places a greater value upon feelings, the boy is less emotional and more practical. The girl is more subjective in her outlook, the boy more objective. Hence girls are more sensitive to praise or blame than boys. The girl is more passive in her outlook, the boy more active; so that the girl will accept a statement upon authority, when the boy wishes to argue about it. The girl also seems to have a certain power of rapid intuition. She 'jumps to conclusions' and reasons back from them to test their accuracy, while the boy works out his conclusions logically. The girl has a greater power of memorisation than the boy. It is, therefore, due to temperamental differences that the interest of the sexes differs. Girls, for instance, seem more interested in persons, boys in ideas; girls in the concrete, boys in the abstract. And this is why girls are more interested than boys in some branches of literature. whereas boys show a greater liking for mathematics :-- and consequently their mastery in these respective subjects. Unlike intellectual differences, these temperamental differences are according to Howard innate-environment and training having nothing to do with them.2

Howard, we have so far seen, does not believe in intellectual differences, but admits the existence of temperamental differences. And though he does not see any intellectual distinctions, nowhere does he advocate the same system of education for boys and girls. And the grounds he gives we shall put shortly.³ Girls are liable to fatigue more readily after puberty when the amount of hemoglobin in the blood becomes lessened. This fact, he says, is of far more importance than is generally believed. For this, he cites Dr. Adami who has summarised his observations as follows:

Girls in general (1) are not so strong physically as boys, (2) are highly strung and liable to nervous strain which pos-

- 1. Howard: The Mixed School, pp. 137, 140 and 145.
- 2. Howard: The Mixed School, p. 106.
- 3. Ibid., p. 108.

sibly is associated with the fact that physiologically they are liable to heavier drains upon the circulating calcium of the blood, and (3) with their thinner blood with lowered hemoglobin content after puberty, they are nearer to the threshold of anæmia.

This consideration of her physiological aptitude, in the opinion of Howard, must weigh when laying down a particular system of education for girls. "The sex-changes during adolescence are followed in the girl by recurring periods of strain when general efficiency may temporarily be impaired." He, therefore, fears a risk of over-straining the girl through unsympathetic treatment at this period; moreover, there is a definite risk which, in his opinion, may fail to do her abilities a full justice at a moment when she especially needs it.

Howard, therefore, suggests² that as far as games and physical exercises are concerned, the sexes should be entirely separated as soon as their physical differences become significant. And as regards intellectual education, first, boys and girls may be separated for those subjects which are usually only studied by the one sex, and secondly, wider choice of optional subjects may be given in girls' schools, and thirdly, over-strain on the part of the girl may be minimised by an easier optional subject.

Peter Sandiford³ and Dr. Daniel Starch⁴ have dismissed the question of intellectual differences between the sexes as being of little importance. To the former, the best evidence seems to indicate that the central tendencies of scores by boys and girls seem to coincide; and to the latter, the differences, if they exist at all, are probably qualitative rather than quantitative. "Both men and women have the same reflexes, instincts and capacities with the exception of certain aspects of the sex-instinct." Similar opinion is expressed by Dr. Freeman who says that sex-differences in general intellectual capacities are negligible so far as construction of norms are concerned.

- 1. Howard: The Mixed School, p. 109.
- 2. *Ibid.*, pp. 110, 160.
- 3. Peter Sandiford: Educational Psychology—An Objective Study, (1928).
 - 4. Dr. Daniel Starch: Educational Psychology, (1924).

In his Mental and Scholastic Tests Cyril Burt characterises the special qualities of the two sexes as in a large measure acquired rather than inborn; they are due not to inherent nature but to social differentiation. In his investigations he noted the following differences. In most sensory tests, especially in tests of touch, taste and colour, females were superior. visual disillumination of brightness and form as distinct from colour. males seem to have the advantage. In other forms of vision and hearing, he found it difficult to deal with certainty any sex-differences at all. Among the intellectual processes belonging to the higher mental levels, there was a difference in memory. In sheer retentiousness, girls seem to surpass boys and women to surpass men. In ingenuity, men seem to be as clearly superior as women were in tests of assimilative power. Burt noticed that constructive force and initiative came chiefly from the men, while the women students, almost without exception, worked conscientiously along lines laid down for them. He found girls superior to boys in literary compositions and inferior to them in arithmetic where rote memory was of no avail.

Burt ascribes the intellectual differences to social environment rather than to innate qualities. "Sheltered, supervised, detained at home, girls inclined to sedentary lives and engaged in literary pursuits They consequently excel in linguistic work and conversational activities." Boys on the other hand, he points out, have no more to do with the practical, preceptual, out-of-door work. They are sent to shops with money. They are allowed to play and wander in the streets. They are encouraged to handle tools, to construct toys for amusement and articles for use. "No wonder, therefore, that boys grow more ready with hand than with tongue and pen."

A scientific account of sex-differences is given by Geddes and Thompson in their book Sex. They argue that though certain differences between men and women are undoubtedly modificational and nurtural, that is to say, the individual results of disparities or peculiarities in their education, training and occupations, many of the differences are constitutional, that is to say, inborn and not acquired. "They are intrinsic, not tacked on; of ancient origin and, therefore, not liable to change quickly. They have a deep naturalness, and attempts

to minimise them are not likely to spell progress." And they add: "The differences are correlated, they hang together, they are the outcrops of deep fundamental distinction. We may say that the tenacity of life, the longer life, the characteristic endurance, the greater resistance to disease, the smaller percentage to genius, insanity, idiocy, suicide, and so on, are all correlated with the distinctively female constitution which may be theoretically regarded as relatively more constructive in its protoplasmic metabolism."

An interesting study of woman's nature is made by Dr. Taylor. It is not possible to go far into his discussion; but the main thesis of his work is to show that "sex is a biological, of mental and bodily significance." He points out psychological differences in higher birds and mammals who are not differently trained nor differently environed in early life. is the male and female reproductive glands that according to him exert great and unquestionable influence on the individual as a whole. Thus, emasculated animals develop feminine characteristics, and female birds whose plumage has been typical, when they cease to lay eggs, at times acquire the plumage of a cock. "Crowing birds that never lay, and women whose attributes change 'at the change of life' and who may at this period acquire masculine characters, and even thin beards are well-known phenomena, with the mental characteristics that accompany them." His whole argument can be summarised that woman is not a mere female man, but a woman possessed of womanliness; "and though there are manly women and womanly men, and men with female minds and women with male ones, vet womanliness is a broad characteristic of woman and manliness of man."

Stanley Hall,² one of the authorities on sex psychology, has stressed the psychological differences between man and woman, and has called attention to the deleterious effects that would follow the attempts to minimise them. Women, he points out, are more emotional, altruistic, intuitive, less judicial, and less able to make disinterested and impersonal judgment. Girls are more likely to know their environment, while the

2. Stanley Hall: Adolescence, Vol. II.

^{1.} Dr. Taylor: The Nature of Woman, pp. 13-14.

boys oftenest show surprising gaps in knowledge of what is right about them and unexpected knowledge of something unusual. He also agrees that woman thinks more in terms of the concrete, is slower in logical thought and has less patience involved in science and invention.¹

In Man and Woman,2 Havelock Ellis has considered impartially a great amount of available data as to the intellectual and other capacities of the sexes. He refutes the theory that larger brains in men mean a superior intellect. He admits that in Europe men possess absolutely larger brains than women. But the question to him is whether men have relatively larger brains. And here he finds that women possess no relative superiority of brain-mass. "The superiority in brainmass, so far as it exists, is on women's side." This, however, does not, in his view, imply any intellectual superiority. It is, he says, merely a characteristic of short people and children. Further he finds that there is no well-marked sexual arrangement of the nervous elements to show relative inferiority on one side or the other. He, therefore, concludes that "from the present stand-point of brain anatomy and brain physiology, there is no ground for attributing any superiority to one sex over the other." And further he warns that there is no recognisable scientific warrant for the introduction of these considerations (i. e. brain anatomy and brain physiology) as factors in the settlement of the questions of social and practical life.

If brain, according to Havelock Ellis, is at present "an unprofitable region for the study of sexual difference in intelligence," let us see what other, if any, intellectual differences he has discovered with reference to various tendencies to think and to act. Even here he emphasises the fact that "our knowledge of sexual differences in the manifestation of sexual impulse is fragmentary and incomplete." He, however, notes a few differences: Memory is decidedly superior, on the whole, in girls, although this superiority is not found in every kind of memory. Thus he draws attention to elaborate experiments made by Max Lobsien on over 450 children at Kiel. Here it was found that the total increase in memory-power during

1. Stanley Hall: Adolescence, Vol. II.

2. Havelock Ellis: Man and Woman, pp. 120-143.

school years was greater in girls than in boys; in girls there was a general development in all kinds of memory about the age of 12, but this uniformity was not marked in boys: the memory of girls for sound showed superior about the 13th year, and for visual representation about the 14th year. one were to compare the memory of boys and girls at different ages, Ellis gives results as follows: Between 10 and 11, there is, on the whole, a very slight superiority of girls; between 12 and 13, and here the precocity of girls comes into play, there is a decided superiority of girls; and at the final stage between the ages of thirteen and fourteen and a half, the superiority of girls is slightly fallen but is still there. As a whole, therefore, Ellis' findings may be summarised as follows: The memory for words and also for visual representations is decidedly better developed in girls. Boys are slightly superior in reproducing in exact succession figures and sounds, but in the sphere of real objects girls are decidedly superior.

It is when we come to abstract thought, that the discoveries of Ellis become interesting and instructive. The thought that we call abstract is, according to him, founded in the organic and emotional character of the individual. Abstract thought in women is, on the whole, marked by a certain docility and receptiveness. Even in trivial matters, he says, the average woman accepts statements and opinions more easily than a man; and in more serious matters, "she is prepared to die for a statement or an opinion, provided it is uttered with such authority and unction that her emotional nature is sufficiently thrilled." And here he accepts Burdach's statement that "women take truth as they find it, while men want to create truth;" and this, he asserts, has to some extent an organic basis.

Further, Ellis points out that woman craves more for sympathy than man and that she has not the same sturdy independence like him. In this connection he gives a list of famous women to illustrate that even women of genius, much more frequently than men of genius, have put forth their efforts when in sympathetic and intimate association with another person, usually a man, active in the same field. Thus Madame Curie, the most distinguished woman of science in modern times, was the wife of a distinguished scientific man who shared in her investigations. Mrs. Browning wrote her finest poems

after she knew Robert Browning. The whole of George Eliot's fiction and other imaginative work was written in the company with a man (J. H. Lewes) who shared alike her scientific and literary tastes.

Further, woman's disinclination to abstract thinking is brought up in the evidence of a well-known West End bookseller that even within the philosophical field women are more attracted to the most concrete of abstract thinkers, to the most poetic, to the most intimately personal, and above all, to the most religious, like Schopenhauer, Plato, Marcus Aurelius, Epictetus and Renan.

Taken as a whole, Ellis considers that the qualities of intelligence in men and women are not of identical character or value; but there is no question of superiority or inferiority. Their respective intellectual qualities fairly balance each other. Thus men, he says, are better able to apply what they have learnt; they are much more inclined to support what they have learnt by reflection or further investigation. They have a precise knowledge in their own department, are without doubt more apt to supplement the prescribed course of reading by independent scientific research, take more interest in scientific pursuits and have greater power of observation. Women, on the other hand, dislike the essentially intellectual process of analysis; because, says Ellis, they instinctively feel that "analysis may possibly destroy the emotional complexes by which they are largely moved and which appeal to them." why women do not favour rigid rules, principles and abstract propositions. They are more impulsive and believe in its rightness. These are all not defects of the feminine mind, says Ellis; they are innate sexual differences pointing to the inaptitude of women for science, however numerous and brilliant the exceptions. Even as students, he says, women are intellectually less curious and less skilful in solving, and feel a relative lack of interest in scientific problems.

These characteristics, in his opinion, mark the average woman in relation to man and are "probably correlated with instinctive and emotional qualities which may fairly be regarded as organic." What are these emotional qualities of woman which, Ellis says, are organic?

First of all, Ellis proves that emotion is not, as popularly supposed, a purely mental phenomenon. It has its reactions upon man's vascular and muscular system, however self-controlled a man may be. "No amount of self-control over the coarser expressions of emotion alters the case, for even to unscientific inspection the passion of the self-controlled man reveals itself by some quiver of muscle, some quickening of heart-beat." Here he lays down an important truth that emotion depends on physical organisation. And this, we shall see later, is entirely ignored by the advocates of higher education for females on lines of males, in the relation of its effect on their emotional temperament and the consequent warping of their physical organisation.

Woman's heart is easily excited under the influence of stimuli by which man's heart in a state of health is unaffected. And he gives a proof of the greater excitability of woman's heart by pointing that there is a distinctly greater increase in the number of pulsations on awakening from sleep in women. Even the complex phenomenon of Hysteria is due to weakness of resistance of the vaso-motor system. And the special tendency of women to be affected by the disease of the eyes called glaucoma is, he says, accepted by all authorities to be due to the disturbances which emanate from the generative organs.

He next points out that woman is more liable than man to convulsive manifestations. It is based on an abnormal readiness for action or, in other words, an undue affectability. Frequent appearance of blushing in women is due to the greater affectability of their vaso-motor system. Convulsive tendency of women is furnished by the facility with which they yield to tears and laughters. Tears are not produced by pain even when amounting to agony, but occur when "sympathetic nervous system is most developed and most impressionable" and the great emotions of fear, grief and joy are most active; and hence it is that women are more given to tears than men.

This greater neuro-muscular affectability of women makes their faces more expressive than men. A woman instinctively responds more than a man to influences from without in spite of herself. The affectability of involuntary muscular system in women, according to him, can be shown in various ways that are not easily obvious. Thus the pupil of a woman's eye dilates involuntarily to all sorts of slight stimuli. So also with the bladder, although its affectability to faint stimuli is not easily demonstrated. Experiments upon several young women by many investigators, he says, have shown that, when a plethysmograph was brought into contact with the bladder, even a slight touch with the finger on the back of the subject's hand produced a notable contraction of the bladder, and whenever the subject spoke, was spoken to, or made the slightest mental exertion, there was a mental contraction. Here again we shall note the close relation between physical organism and emotions. For, as Ellis points out, contraction of the bladder plays a part in the constitution of various emotional states of fear, anxiety and suspense. Not only heart, iris and bladder furnish evidence of woman's affectability, the comparatively larger size of the abdominal and some other organs in women and the comparatively greater range of their physiological action also furnish a visceral basis for the greater affectability of woman.

Another emotion more conspicuous in women than in men is fright. Women are, therefore, more held with fear than men. Some Prussian statistics, according to him, show that while 19% of boys committed suicide through 'punishment of fear,' the percentage of girls was 49%. Next he gives an important fact that fright is a frequent origin of nervous disease in women but rarely in men.

Obsessions are much more frequent in women and are caused by strong moral emotions, religious or sexual pre-occupations, terror, or even horrible dreams. These obsessions he attributes to the greater suggestibility of women. Thus 60% of girls and only 40 per cent. of boys were deceived by the pretence of throwing a ball into the air. Hysterical manifestations are due in most cases to the greater suggestibility of women.

Irritability, which Ellis calls 'irascibility', is another form of affectability which "has been quite legitimately attributed to women." This often expresses itself in reckless and uncontrollable outbursts of purposeless destruction. He here calls attention to the spasmodic 'breaking out' of women prisoners in England and to Dr. Clouston's remark that "there

is ten times as much noise in the female wards as there is in the male wards." One reason, according to him, why women love dancing is because it enables them to soften the violent expression of this neuro-muscular irritability. Music also serves the same purpose for women.

How far is this affectability in women, their greater emotionality, organic and therefore ineradicable, and how far is it the product of external circumstances and therefore capable of modification? Ellis answers the question this way—that affectability in women may to some extent be decreased, but that "there is, however, a limit to this sexual equalisation of affectability, remains extremely probable." And further he is emphatic when he says: "The comparatively larger extent of the sexual sphere in women and of the visceral regions generally, the physiological tendency to anæmia, the existence of inevitable periodicity of function in women, conspire to furnish a broader basis for the play of emotion which no change in environment or habit could remove." And he quotes Hymen that "all most characteristic features of woman's nature are correlated with emotionality, and half of woman's psychic nature would remain unexplained if we struck out this factor." Affectability in women, therefore, is an innate quality which, according to him, may be reduced to finer and delicate shades but can scarcely be brought to the male standard.

The evidence we have brought in is sufficient for our purpose to make it evident that there is general agreement among the authorities that there are certain psychological differences between the sexes, which are innate. Thus Welton is emphatic on it. Cecil Grant,¹ though he sees but little intellectual differences, admits that there are temperamental differences and that the interest that each sex takes in the same subject widely differs. To Howard also some psychological differences are clear—he recognises the power of intuition highly developed in women, which makes her 'jump to conclusions' and then to reason back from them to test their accuracy. Sandiford, Starch and Freeman see no intellectual differences; but they produce no grounds for their belief, nor do they say anything about the respective emotional qualities of the sexes. Burt

ascribes intellectual differences to social conditions and training, but he has not investigated into emotional attributes of the sexes. Helen Thompson alike fails to see intellectual differences, and whatever there appear in the investigations recorded by her she explains in terms of social conditions. Still, the researches do not contain much investigation as to the emotional qualities of the sexes. However, her finding that women seem to take more interest in the study of literature and that they are more religious and superstitious indicates emotional divergences of no mean significance. As already pointed out, Havelock Ellis alone has made an extensive study of the psychology of the sexes. He makes it clear how greatly woman differs from man in the sphere of emotion; how abstract thought is repugnant to her: how she is intuitional and feels that analysis may destroy her emotional equilibrium. More than any one else and more scientifically and authoritatively he exposes the inherent emotional tendency of woman, her great affectability.

It is not only Havelock Ellis who at great length discusses the relative psychological differences between the sexes. There are other psychologists and medical authorities who think almost in the same terms. Thus Bloch1 says that "psychically also man and woman are completely different beings;" and Forel² opines equally. Kisch³ who has made an elaborate and deep study of woman's sexual life remarks: "The intellectual changes undergone by the girl at puberty are no less extensive and characteristic than the physical. In brief, the girl is transformed into a young woman, endowed with all the attributes, mental and bodily, characteristic of feminity." Dr. Winge, a Norwegian physician quoted by Weith-Knudsen, says: "The difference of sex is fundamental. Both bodily and mentally the difference between the typical man and the typical woman is all-pervading—the difference is by no means confined to the sexual organs."4 And Weith-Knudsen himself remarks: "... man and woman are not equal; they never have been, and they never will be. On the contrary, the difference of sex

^{1.} Iwan Bloch: The Sexual Life of Our Time, pp. 59-86.

^{2.} August Forel: The Sexual Question, pp. 504-505.

^{3.} Kisch: The Sexual Life of Woman, p. 37.

^{4.} Dr. Winge, quoted by Weith-Knudsen: Feminism, p. 86.

is so deep-going, that two men of different civilised races are much more nearly similar in their nature than are man and woman belonging to the same race." And writes Dr. Lombroso that not only are man and woman different in height, in structure of the bones, and in the muscular system, but they are also different in the quality and quantity of air and food that they absorb, that they are subject to different sicknesses, their desires are different, and finally they differ in their mental and moral tendencies. She further remarks: "Progress, evolution and life are possible only through this differentiation."1 Dr. Otto Lipman, who carried researches in various schools in Germany, England, Sweden and America and examined more than 8,000 children of both sexes, concluded that the mental tendencies of the two sexes greatly differ. Thus, girls showed great quickness of apprehension, keenness, patience and docility; they showed more interest in religious studies and in literature and displayed a remarkable power of intuition and imagination. Boys, on the other hand, showed inclination to scientific pursuits like mathematics, technical sciences, etc.2 Another medical authority writes that women possess more emotion and are more emotional than men. The Dutch psychologist, G. Heymans, as a result of his extensive experiments in Holland, England, France and other countries, admits great prevalence of intuition and a sense for the concrete in girls.

There is, therefore, no escaping of the fact that there are certain inherent psychological differences which sharply distinguish man and woman. Here, there is no question of their relative superiority or inferiority. They only point out to the fundamental differences of the sexes in their function and mission; and as such, woman ought to receive such education as would be compatible with her mental and temperamental qualities. In their zeal to show equal educable capacity and intelligence, the English and American women are utterly misguided in demanding the same equal education for girls as for boys. It is now proved beyond doubt that woman has as

^{1.} Dr. Lombroso Gina: The Soul of Woman, (1924), see pp. 262, 263 and 264.

^{2.} Quoted from an article The Present Day Education of Girls, by Dr. Meyrick Booth, in Nineteenth Century and After, August 1927.

much intelligence as man in pursuing the highest possible education. And this is exactly what has misguided the modern woman. She has misunderstood her own nature, needs and She has allowed herself to be exploited by malelike ideals. She has come to conceive in womanliness something inferior and lacking, so that she has held before her as model all that the male world is doing. She has become ashamed of her womanliness and wishes it better if she had been born a male.1 These false ideas have created a false standard before her, and consequently she has identified her personality with that of man. She has ignored that she has an independent personality, quite different and entirely equal in quality to man, and which, if she developed, would develop into perfect womanliness. "The girl of to-day," writes Dr. Booth, "has fallen almost completely under the spell of masculine ideals. She follows where men have gone before. In her ideals, in her language, her education, her occupation, her outward appearance—nay, in her very thoughts, she has become If what woman has achieved during her struggle of more than fifty years has its value, it is because it has opened before her splendid equal opportunities for the enrichment of her personality and fulfilment of her mission. The English feminists are. however, sadly mistaken in taking the equal opportunities as a means for the equalisation of ideals. This is what is wrong with the male-like educational system of modern girls. Mrs. Dora Russell, one of the most sensible of feminists, re-"Is there something wrong with this education of marks: women, and, if so, what? I think we must judge that there is. The reason lies in the sense of inferiority bred in women by so much operation, and the natural result that their chief aim, as they struggled upwards, was to prove that they could iolly well do without them. This effort is mistaken. Each sex has that to give to the common stock of achievement, knowledge, thought, which it alone can give, and robs itself and com-

^{1.} Havelock Ellis writes that in America most of the school girls cherish male-like ideals. See Havelock Ellis: Studies in the Psychology of Sex, Vol. VI, p. 5.

^{2.} Dr. Meyrick Booth: Woman and Society, (1928), p. 26,

munity by inferior imitation Feminist ideals of education, then, had the defect that they did in a certain measure deny sex or ignore it."

The educational system of women today is, therefore, marked by the lack of feminine ideals. The girls are stuffing their minds with things for which they are neither equipped nor inclined. The result is a state of mental repression and perversion. Describing in an article in a London daily the educational pursuits of women at Oxford, a writer wrote: "Women in Oxford are merely poor imitations of the men. Their colleges, clubs, games, recreations, even their dress, are modelled on those of the men. Glorious young womanhood is content merely to ape in a feeble fashion the sex it should inspire." This inconsiderate imitation of men means the suppressing of their own individuality; it is a denial that womanliness exists at all except in a physical form.

That there is such a thing as 'female mind' is proved beyond doubt by psychologists. And this female mind requires a suitable education for its own culture and development, irrespective of what the corresponding standard is for men. deny the existence of 'female mind' is a gross and fatal misunderstanding. In this connection Rabindranath Tagore pertinently remarks: "If woman's nature were really the same as that of man, it would be a superfluity, a mere tautology...... If women acquire the view that sex-difference is only physical, and that mentally and spiritually they are of the same nature as men, and if they act on this assumption (thus giving life a one-sidedly masculine form), then our civilisation will sooner or later sink into utter confusion and chaos." And this remark bears out itself in the present condition of women who have masculinised themselves in their thought and life. This is nothing but the triumph of masculinism by which women are allowing themselves to be exploited under false and misguided ideals. As writes Mrs. Florence Low: "To-day the curriculum

- 1. Mrs. Dora Russell: Hypatia, p. 21.
- 2. As quoted in Meyrick Booth: Woman and Society, p. 29.
- 3. Rabindranath Tagore quoted by Meyrick Booth in Nineteenth Century and After, August, 1927.

and the examinations in the girls' schools are practically the same as boys It has helped to change the girl's outlook and attitude towards life and to give her the boy's ideals and aims . . . Our modern education of girls is, I think, the greatest compliment ever paid to men by our sex." And writes Dr. Schmalhousen: "Women, adjusting themselves crudely and swiftly to the world dominated by males and machines, seeking competitive equalisation and the prizes appropriate to impersonal efficiency, have become she-males "2—a good achievement of a long struggle. What a perverted and distorted conception of emancipation! This marvellous desire of modern woman to identify herself completely in the realm of personal fulfilment is a great fact that has transformed the habits and values which we know as feminism. What these women have obliviated and ignored is that their emancipation, to quote a famous sexologist, "is not intended to transform them into men, but simply to give them their human rights."8

But the above is not the only ground why women should have education different from that of men. The effect of the present male-like education is not only to warp the female mind; its worst result is upon her physique itself, which is of the gravest possible character.

During the years of adolescence great care and rest is necessary for the girl. Menstruation is by no means an ordinary phenomenon of local manifestation. It is but the most obvious symptom of the general 'monthly wave' which periodically flows throughout woman's body, affecting, to a greater or lesser extent, all her organs.⁴ Thus the observations of a great many medical authorities, according to Nemilow, have shown that during the process of menstruation most significant physical and mental changes are observed in woman.⁵ The whole nervous system of woman is during this period affected. It is the ner-

- 1. See Meyrick Booth: Youth and Sex. (1932), p. 161.
- 2. Calverton and Schmalhousen: Sex in Civilisation, (See Schmalhousen's article, The Sexual Revolution), p. 339.
 - 3. August Forel: The Sexual Question, p. 504.
 - 4. Nemilow: The Biological Tragedy of Woman, (1932), p. 118.
- 5. Ibid., pp. 119-120. Also see Havelock Ellis: Man and Woman, pp. 342-344.

vous system upon the normal functioning of which depends the general physiological well-being of woman. "But daily observation shows that woman's mental equilibrium is lost." Thus Nemilow records his observations that a woman street-car conductor pulls out the wrong ticket and is muddled in counting the change. A menstruating motor woman drives the street-car slowly and with hesitancy, becoming confused at crossings. The lady typist's fingers strike the wrong key. The woman dentist cannot find the proper instrument. An actress is not in the 'right mood' and makes wrong gestures.1 The psychic reactions of the menstruating phenomenon are recorded by Ellis also. There is thus, he says, at this period greater impressionability, greater suggestibility and more or less a diminished self-control. It is at this time that sudden caprices, fits of ill temper, moods of depression, impulses or jealousy, outbursts of self-confession are chiefly liable to occur. At times menstruation produces abnormal and diseased conditions. There may be so high a degree of physical pain and disability that the woman is really an invalid for several days every month. All sorts of slight visceral affections of a congestive character may be directly due to menstruation, and recur periodically. On the mental side, this abnormality might manifest itself into extreme irritability or depression almost amounting to insanity. Migraine is a disorder common at this period; hysterical and epileptic fits often occur. Erotomania, dipsomania and kleptomania are also liable to develop at this time; and of all forms of insanity, melancholia is the most liable to occur. In England, Wyan Westcott has stated that in his experience as a coroner of two hundred women who committed suicide the majority were either at the change of life or menstruating.2

It is now obvious that menstruation is not a phenomenon of mean importance. It is a continuous process, and one which permeates the whole of a woman's physical and psychical organism. Havelock Ellis has, therefore, uttered a note of warning that "it is no longer possible to regard physiological periodicity of women and the recurring menstrual function as the

1. Nemilow: The Biological Tragedy of Woman, p. 124.

2. Havelock Ellis: Man and Woman, p. 346.

purely private concern of the woman whom it affects."

The educational ideal of modern woman has absolutely ignored this most significant phenomenon in woman's life with all its physiological and psychical reactions. Enormous nervous strain exerted by modern education has upset the physical constitution of girls. Their menstruation has become irregular, painful and disorderly.

They have to study such subjects like mathematics, physics, etc., which have no appeal to their emotional nature with the result that they have to be hard at these studies and ignore their monthly periodicity and the rest which it requires. The worst result of this is that "great and sometimes permanent evils are inflicted upon even healthy girls when, at the beginning of their sexual life, they are subjected to a severe strain of any kind."

In an article Education and Training of Girls at Puberty wrote a distinguished gynæcologist that he did not find a single school in which the absolute distinction which exists between boys and girls as regards the dominant menstrual function is systematically cared for and attended to. He found all the school mistresses antagonistic to such an admission. They contended that there was no distinction between an adolescent male and an adolescent female and acted on the assumption that what was good for one was also good for the other. "If this was so," questions the writer, "how is it that while every practical physician of experience has seen many cases of anæmia and chlorosis in girls, accompanied by amenorrhœa or menorrhagia, headaches, palpitations, emaciations, and all familiar accompaniments of break-down, an analogous condition in a school-boy is so rare that it may well be doubted if it is ever seen at all."

Dr. Engelman⁴ has made an interesting study of this question in America. He found too long a proportion—as much as from 40 to 70% of sufferers from menstruation in schools and colleges. The percentage of suffering was greater in the

^{1.} See Havelock Ellis: Studies in the Psychology of Sex, Vol. VI, p. 64.

^{2. *}Ibid., p. 66.

^{3.} See Havelock Ellis: Studies in Psychology of Sex, Vol. VI, p. 69.

^{4.} See Havelock Ellis: Man and Woman, p. 352-353.

more exacting work of the study of more advanced classes than it was before in the years of greater freedom.

Dr. Storer deprecates the conditions of education under which he found delicate girls frequently ruined in both body and mind by school. Dr. Taylor, whom we have already had an occasion to refer and will do so more later on, stresses the pubescence period in a girl as a most important period when she changes into womanhood and is less inclined for severe mental work, and from this time forward throughout her life tends to wish to take, unless encouraged to the contrary, less violent physical exercise. It is probable rather than improbable, he says, that much physical and mental exercise at this period would retard womanly development, "making it less perfect, drawing off to other quarters nourishment which is needed for womanly changes coming into the young girl's life."

The Committee that was appointed to report on the Differentiation of the Curricula between the Sexes in the Secondary Schools has considered the effect of the over-straining education on girls after adolescence. "We are inclined to think," they say, "that the predisposition of girls to nervous over-strain, especially at the period of adolescence, is one of the most important factors in the problem of female education."3 Olive Wheeler, professor of education at University College, Cardiff, admits candidly in her work Youth that the present higher education system is highly injurious to the health of girls. She gives her own experience that in London secondary schools for girls, anæmia, spinal curvature and flat feet shared a tendency to rise during adolescence.4 In Germany, Tobler⁵ has investigated the menstrual condition of over 1000 women. He found that menstrual trouble was in the great majority of women the main cause of deterioration in health and diminu-

- 1. See Stanley Hall: Adolescence, Vol. II, pp. 5, 6, 9.
- 2. Dr. Taylor: The Nature of Woman, pp. 129-131.
- 3. Differentiation in Curricula between the Sexes in Secondary Schools, p. 120.
 - 4. See Meyrick Booth: Youth and Sex, p. 169.
- 5. See Havelock Ellis: Studies in Psychology of Sex, Vol. VI, pp. 68-69.

tion of functional energy. In England, Miss Bentham¹ stated before the British Association of Registered Medical Women that 50% of girls in good position suffered from painful menstruation. Mrs. Grainger Evans related her finding that this condition was very common among elementary school teachers who had worked hard for examinations during early girlhood. In America various investigations have been carried out showing the prevalence of disturbance in the sexual health of school girls and young women. Thus Dr. Helen P. Kennedy obtained elaborate data concerning the menstrual life of one hundred and twenty-five high school girls of the average age of 18. Out of the one hundred and twenty-five he found that only twentyeight were free from the trouble; half the total number experienced disagreeable symptoms before the period (such as headache, malaise, irritability of temper), while forty-four complained of other symptoms besides pain during the period (especially head-ache and great weakness). So also Jane Kelley Sabine found in New England schools among two thousand girls that seventy-five per cent. had menstrual troubles, ninety per cent. had leucorrhœa and ovarian neuralgia, and sixty per cent had to give up work for two days during each month.

All this shows how tragically modern woman is playing with herself under false pursuits and ideals which are in no way suited to her physical and mental constitution. In this connection Dr. Caroline Hedger of Chicago calls attention to the "wide-spread and absolute indifference as to the effect of education on the reproductive life of the girl, even in relation to the establishment of a reasonably normal menstruation." His personal experience as a physician led him to suspect that the girl, as she comes from school, "presents a vast amount of inefficiency due to menstrual disturbance."²

It has now become clear that authoritative opinion declaims the higher education as it is imparted today to woman as being utterly destructive of her womanhood. In her zeal

^{1.} See Havelock Ellis: Studies in Psycholagy of Sex, Vol. IV, pp. 68-69.

^{2.} Report of the Proceedings of English Speaking Conference on Infant Mortality, (1913), p. 288.

to show her equal educable capacity, modern woman has misjudged the fundamental values. She has misunderstood her own needs and ideals. "The great boys' schools, in spite of all their defects, are depositories of long tradition and immense experience of boyish ways and needs. The modern girls' school, on the other hand, is a new-fangled creation evolved for the most part under the influence of an unpsychological masculinism."

Higher education, therefore, as it is given, is unsuited to girls, regard being had to their nature and needs. If it impairs their health, disturbs menstruation and brings about nervous breakdown—not to speak of its discordance with their psychology, it is in their own as well as the social interest that they should give up this type of education. Women ought to realise that their nature and needs are not identical with those of men; and therefore, to accept the laws and limitations of men would be as bad as would be for men to accept the laws and limitations of women.

The great fact to be remembered is "that not only women, in physical size and physical texture, are slighter and finer than men, but to an extent altogether unknown among men, their centre of gravity is apt to be deflected by the series of rhythmic sexual curves on which they are always living. They are thus more delicately poised and any kind of stress or strain--cerebral, nervous or muscular—is more likely to produce serious disturbance and requires an accurate adjustment to their special needs." Educational course for women, therefore, requires an adjustment with her special nature and peculiar needs.

Not only is present female education incompatible with the nature and needs of woman, it has also entirely ignored her function and mission in life, namely motherhood. Her curriculum is a complete imitation of that of the boys, as if like them she is, in future, going to be an office-bearer. Exceptions there will be; but the generality of women are going to marry and become mothers is an undoubted fact. How far then does modern education prepare them for their great duties and responsibilities of motherhood? This is a most vital question

^{1.} Meyrick Booth: Woman and Society, pp. 39-40.

^{2.} Havelock Ellis: Studies in the Psychology of Sex, Vol. VI, p. 75.

which modern feminists have criminally ignored in their zest of following the standards of male pursuits. If education means education for the preparation for life, it is to be sadly admitted that modern education of women does not fulfil this purpose. Girls are not given instructions in domestic economy, they are not taught the nursing of children, hygiene of pregnancy, general household management, and such other subjects which are intimately personal to them. It is instructive to note that some witnesses before the Consultative Committee emphasised the importance of these instructions in the curriculum of every girls' school.¹

Education for motherhood is the crying need of the world today. Because the vast majority of girls become mothers in after-life, every girl should be required to specialise for a definite time in these subjects, which will make her a good mother. When the whole curriculum of girls is hopelessly congested with subjects on the lines of boys which cost them their mental equilibrium and physical health, their essential function in life is allowed to pass off in ignorance. Girls are expected to manage somehow, without one year's or even one month's real training. her function of motherhood on which in a great degree depends racial good or otherwise. As a woman herself writes: "The human mother gives poisonous mixtures to her infant in place of Nature's food. She feeds its lungs with poisoned air in over-heated, stuffy rooms, whilst its nervous and physical vitality is undermined by the noises and distractions of over-civilised life. Teach, train, and direct instinct in women if you will, but supplement it with knowledge that is essential for childbearing in our social organisation."2

Not only is there a thorough lack of training in maternity, but on the contrary, the female education to-day is such as to incapacitate women for motherhood and marriage. It is because the strain of higher education is so very enervating and exhausting that they cannot bear the strain of child-birth. As Dr. Cyrns Edson has remarked: "Many educated women

^{1.} Differentiation in Curricula between the Sexes in Secondary Schools, p. 71.

^{2.} Elizabeth Chesser: Woman, Marriage and Motherhood, pp. 233-234.

are so exhausted before marriage that after bearing one or two children they become wrecks."

In this connection marriage rate and fecundity of educated women is greatly enlightening. It must be particularly borne in mind that the low rate of marriage among educated women is in our opinion due to their physical incapacity rather than to mental aversion. It must be remembered that physical charm and grace are, among others, essential womanly qualifications. They are the crux of a woman's sexual attraction. While up to the middle of the last century, this was carried to ridiculousness, today it is treated with indifference under the false idea that it is undignified. The result is that modern education with its enervating strain is dissipating one of the vital things in woman, namely sex-attraction, and thus withdrawing from her a good deal of chances of marriage. As Havelock Ellis has pointed out, personal charm and grace is of great value to a woman in making her marriage relationship happy. "So many of our educated women are physically and socially unattractive," writes Willis Ballinger under the caption Spinster Factories,1 and adds: "This is to be laid directly at the door of their education." So the low figures of marriage among educated women that we are going to quote should not be interpreted as being due to their disinclination; it is a positive proof of their physical incapacity to marry.

Mrs. Howes² found about one-fourth of the graduates of America marry. The editor of the *Overland Monthly* found from the register of the year 1890, including 1078 names of the New England co-education colleges, that 24·7% were married as against 14·8% of the graduates of the women's colleges. In New York, of the graduates of the preceding 12 years, these percentages were 25·7 and 20·6 respectively, and of all co-education colleges 34·8% were married as against 22·9 per cent. of the women's colleges. In 1889, the New England female colleges showed 11% married, co-educational colleges 26%, the New York female colleges 15·1 per cent. and the western co-educational colleges 36%.

^{1.} Willis Ballinger: Spinster Factories. See Forum, May 1932, p. 302.

^{2.} Stanley Hall: Adolescence, Vol. II, p. 590.

Miss Shinn,¹ who has studied the marriage rate of the Association of Collegiate Alumni comprising fifteen leading colleges, found that out of 1905 enrolled in 1895, only 28% were married, the rate for the country at large for women over twenty being nearly 80%: she concluded that "under 25, college women rarely marry," and "that but a small proportion of them have married." Of 277 of the latest three classes, but 10% were married; taking only those graduates past the age of 25 only 32.7% were married; after 30, the percentage was 43.7, after 35, 49.7; after 40, 54% were married. "The ultimate probability of a college woman's marriage, therefore, seems to be below 55% as against 90% for the other women. Dr. Miss Abbot² who has also made a similar study found that college women marry late and in a far less ratio than others.

By corresponding with class secretaries and correlating their data with those kept at the college offices, Stanley Hall has himself gathered instructive data on the marriage of female graduates of three leading colleges—from Vassar there were 323 graduates in the first ten classes, 1867-1876, of whom, in the spring of 1903, 179 or $55\cdot4\%$ had married. In the next ten classes there were 378 graduates, of whom 192 were married, $50\cdot7\%$. In the third ten classes, 1887-1896, were 603 graduates of whom 169, or 28%, were married.

In the register published in 1913 of Wellesley, one of the largest women's colleges in the United States, were published the records, so far as could be ascertained, of 8,000 women who had been in attendance. The first class graduated in 1879 and from that time until 1900, 4,448 women were in the college. "Of these 2,096 have never married; 1,001 have married but have no surviving children; 1,351 have married and are having children numbering 3,138 or 2.3 children in the families who have surviving children, 1.3 child per family of all married in the group, or 0.7 child per woman for the group of 4,448." Commenting on these figures, Dr. Caroline poignantly remarks: "Compulsory education would certainly put Malthus'

^{1.} See Stanley Hall: Adolescence, Vol. II, p. 591.

^{2.} Ibid.

ghost at rest for several centuries." 1

From the reports issued by two of the women's colleges at Oxford and Cambridge, Whetham obtained lists of all the students who had been in residence for one year and upwards, the degrees they had taken, and the names of those who afterwards married. Excluding those who had left college within three years or less, he found that "of some three thousand women who took advantage of a university education only about 22 per cent. have subsequently married."²

The figures of fecundity of educated women, as collected by Stanley Hall from various sources, are equally startling. They prove but one fact that the more scholastic the education of women, the fewer children, and the harder, more dangerous and more dreaded parturition and the less the ability to nurse children. Their whole physique becomes so very wrecked by the time they complete their higher education that it has not in it left sufficient vitality to produce healthy and a moderate number of children. As Dr. Taylor³ remarks: "This much we do know that probably at no other time in history has child-birth been so difficult, so unhealthily difficult, as now, and that this has manifested itself chiefly in the last 50 years, a period of increasing educational strain for girls."

Herbert Spencer has said: "Absolute or relative infertility is generally produced in women by mental labour carried to excess." This statement is entirely supported by the fecundity of college graduates. Miss Howes found that of 705 graduates, 196 were married, but of these 66 were childless, while the remaining 133 had 232 living children, or 1.7 per woman. Mrs. Sidgwick who carried a similar investigation found only 10.25% of the English graduates were married and of these 72.4% had children and of these 9 per cent. were dead. Dewey who also made a study of the married life of women graduates found that 37% had no children, although the average number of years of married life was 6.2.

^{1.} See Report of the Proceedings of the English-speaking Conference on Infant Mortality, (1913), p. 292.

^{2.} Whetham: The Family and the Nation, p. 143.

^{3.} Dr. Taylor: The Nature of Woman.

Dr. Caroline Hedger also gives some instructive figures. Thus she points out that in the twenty years from 1880-1900-two hundred women graduated from the University of Illinois. But of these "seventyfour never married, and the remaining 126 had 235 surviving children or 1.91 child per marriage or 1.1 child per woman; in the whole group of the married, 29 had no children."

All this is a very disappointing feature of the modern educational system for women. No feminist-of however extreme views—can deny motherhood to be the flower of all woman's individuality, physical and psychical. If higher education on male lines has done anything wrong to woman, it is this-it has by arresting the full development of her physique, by enervating her nerves, made her incapable of attaining the full growth of womanhood of which motherhood is the final symbol. It has reduced motherhood to a form of caricature. What other evidence is necessary to show that feminists in their fanatic frenzy of attaining standards of men have allowed to wither away from themselves their own individuality? There is no surprise, that the graduates of English and American universities, with their physical energies sapped for any healthy reproduction, should come out in the world with amaternal feelings and should try to cover this up with false pretentions that their unmarried state is due to their desire to devote their lives to some social service. It is really a pity that many a fine girlhood which, if spared of this overstraining education, would blossom into fine womanhood and would give real service to society by giving it healthy and vigorous children is victimised under entirely false and misguided idealism. Dr. Kenealy in Feminism and Sex Extinction: "When adolescent girls are strained by athletics, by over-culture or industrial exhaustion, the vital resources are so diverted from the evolution of function as to cause incapacitation in them. partial or complete, for wifehood and for the bearing of fine offspring." She quotes a well-known American gynæcologist, Dr. Gallard Thomas, who estimated some years ago that only

^{1.} See Report of the Proceedings of the English-speaking Conference on Infant Mortality, (1913), p. 292.

4% of American women proper were physiologically fitted to become wives and mothers.¹

In our opinion, therefore, modern education as it exists is entirely antagonistic to the nature, need and function of woman. It is a denial of her womanhood. As Dr. Saleeby has remarked, "education of a girl must be to prepare her for womanhood and not to show that at a pinch she could be a boy."2 And remarks another doctor, Truby King: "Proper education should be given but above all there must be a development of a love of human life, and interest in children. and a development of proper womanly qualities." Education for women, we say therefore, there must be-as liberal and deep as men are availing themselves of. A woman must know the course of history, the rise and fall of different polities, the co-ordination and contact of different cultures, the fundamental issues that this evolution in history involves. She must also know where she stands, how she is related to society, how she can promote solidarity in social life without injuring the growth of the individual. She must also know how life began and to this end she must have knowledge in botany and zoology; she may also learn geographical conditions of this globe. Literature she must study, for it is the fount of culture and civilisation. All this and other liberal education she must have, so that she knows her relation to society and may thus prepare for real citizenship. But she must have training in domestic hygiene and economy; she must know the nursing of children, and decoration of the home; she must know different arts, which evoke a favourable psychological response from her. She must, thus, learn dancing and music and other fine arts. Woman's education, in short, must be so formulated as to permit the creation and contribution of distinct culture to society. If it is complained (and often ironically) that woman has done very little in history towards contribution of culture, let woman now with all opportunities at her service come forward and show that she has a distinct contribution to make

^{1.} Dr. Arabella Kenealy: Feminism and Sex Extinction, p. 135.

^{2.} See Report of the Proceedings of the English-speaking Conference on Infant Mortality, p. 295.

^{3.} See Ibid., p. 297.

to the fund of human culture. It is time now that motherhood should appear glorious and enlightened as it had never been before. And this is for the modern womanhood to show by exploiting all possible avenues of opportunities now available for it. If they are only going to fritter away their opportunities by misguided pursuits and thus undo the very cause for which they fought—emancipation from all unequal barriers that hindered the development of womanhood—they will still be worsening their cause by degrading their womanhood.

The ideal system of education is one which aims at making of each individual a versatile artisan—versatile for changing conditions, a good citizen consciously playing a part in a general scheme, and a well-disposed, considerate, amiable person in full possession of all his or her powers. All girls' education must be directed in accordance with this principle. At the end of our first part we have seen how the ideals of Scandinavian feminism are different from those of English feminism. The former, as we know, aims at securing conditions favourable for the true functioning of motherhood. That this has greatly influenced the social thought is evident from the system of female education in Denmark, Sweden, Czechoslovakia and Germany. A small glimpse into the female educational systems of each of these will serve our purpose.

In Denmark² there are special schools for girls in which domestic economy ranks high in the curriculum. At present there are eighteen such schools supported by government. These schools provide for at least 36 lessons a week, 12 in cooking, 12 cleaning, washing and ironing, and 12 for theoretical instructions in the value of food stuffs, household accounts, hygiene, and cooking demonstration. This shows how Denmark is realising the worth and value of giving proper education to its fair sex.

^{1.} See H. G. Wells: The Science of Life, (1931), pp. 99-100. Also see Dr. Joseph A. Leighton: Individuality and Education, (1928) Preface, p. vii. Also see, in this connection, Dr. James Ward: Psychology for the Students of Education, (1928), pp. 6-12. (A fine discussion as to what education should really mean).

^{2.} See Boje Andreas (Edited by): Education in Denmark, (1932). p. 91.

One of the school characteristics of the Swedish¹ educational system is the private secondary school for girls. Co-education is not regarded favourably in Sweden. In certain of the large towns higher State schools have been started. But the higher private girls' school called the Kommunal Flickskola giving an education especially centred round women's needs enjoys a settled reputation in Sweden; and steps are being taken to ensure its continuance.

In Czechoslovakia² a new type of vocational institution which has recently been developed and is greatly favoured by parents, is the domestic school for girls, Rodinne skoly (family schools). There were, in 1928-1929, 137 of these schools attended by 24,937 girls and women. They provide general part-time courses of (1) one year and (2) two years, in household management, cookery, care of children, hygiene, etc. Entrants must have attended a higher primary school or have passed the first four classes of secondary school. Many of these schools which are mostly in towns and large villages offer a special third year course of a definitely vocational character of dress-making, millinery, embroidery etc.

In Germany³ there is a special type of institution called the Frauen-schule, which gives practical training to girls after they have attended a Lyzehm or a middle school for six years. This school offers theoretical instruction as well as practical training for two or three years in domestic work, hygiene, care of infants, social work and kindergarten work, its aim being to educate future wives, mothers and welfare workers. There are two classes in this Frauen-schule. The girls in the first year class study German, domestic science, hygiene, history, religion, civics and elementary economics. The optional subjects are history of art, French, English, music, drawing and shorthand. The girls are also taught the care of infants and, later on, kindergarten methods in a practical way. The course of practical training includes cookery, gardening, and needle-work.

^{1.} See Dr. William Boyd: Toward A New Education, (1930), p. 52; and also, Dr. J. C. Hearnshaw: Educational Advancement Abroad, (1925), pp. 106-107.

^{2.} See the Year Book of Education, (1932), p. 928.

^{3.} See Syed Ali Akbar: The German School System, (1932), pp. 91-93.

The weekly hours devoted to theoretical and practical work are equally divided. The second year class gives training in child welfare work and kindergartens, psychology, pedagogics, religion, drawing, hand-work, needle-work, and music. Nine hours are allotted every week for practice in the kindergarten attached to the school and two hours for garden-work. Opportunity is also offered to the girls to visit Foundation Schools, schools for the feeble-minded children, hospitals and factories. Physical education is compulsory.

We see, therefore, that educational system in the above countries goes some way in preparing every girl to fulfil her most important function, that of home-maker, and without detracting opportunities for a liberal education.

CHAPTER X

PARASITISM FALLACY AND THE CALL OF MOTHERHOOD

"Motherhood and the home are the two things for which there are no substitutes."

-Helen Blagg.1

GREAT thinkers are wondering whether 'civilisation,' as it is understood, is not really a disease. The steam-engine, electricity and radio symbolised the gigantic achievement of man—his conquest of time and space. And the world expected, and quite naturally, that with simplification of many of its labours and duties, a new era of happiness would set in. The great expectation, however, has not been fulfilled. The world is today in the midst of the greatest of chaos it has ever seen. There is complete anarchy in the sphere of social relationship. There is mutual distrust, lack of sympathy and of feeling. And this is due to the one most inimical tendency—the desire for acquisition with its baneful results of aggrandisement and exploitation.

If anarchy is the disease, culture is the cure. So said one of the prophets of the nineteenth century—Matthew Arnold. And it was hoped that woman with her great opportunities and liberties would, true to her great and unparalleled instinct, motherliness, lead the world out of this great chaos to culture. But woman mistook her role, and only complicated the terrific chaos of modern world. Modern industry has come to mean only capitalism and exploitation, it has been the bane of true culture, and woman's entry into it has sealed the hopes for its revival for a long time to come.

^{1.} Helen Blagg, quoted by Dr. Hugh T. Ashley: Infant Mortality, (1915), p. 59.

"We claim today all labour for our province," woman has made a forceful and emphatic demand. Her case for this great demand is equally forceful.

Since the dim dawn of humanity, she says,2 she has worked side by side with man. In the hunting stage, she wandered with him, bore him the race and dressed and cooked for him the animal that he hunted. When the wandering ceased, and when man went out for fighting or hunting, she did the whole household work. She laboured on the land, shaped the dwellings, wove the clothing and made earthen pots. Thus it was she who gave to the race, out of the sweat of her labour, its food, clothing and shelter. At a later stage when fighting became unnecessary and man remained at home, he slowly took share in woman's work. He worked on the field, built houses and ground corn. But woman had still her labour. by the side of the spinning wheel and gave clothing to her family. She brewed the ale and "the simples which are used as medicines were distilled and prescribed." But after this came a great change. The storm of scientific inventions that swept across Europe during the last century robbed woman of all her labour. "Our spinning-wheels are all broken; in a thousand huge buildings steam-driven looms, guided by a few hundred thousands of hands (often those of men), produce the clothings of half the world; and we dare no longer say proudly, as of old, that we and we alone clothe our peoples." Woman, thus, complains that the world of her labour has been deprived from her. The ploughman and the miller long ago took away from her her hoe and grind-stone, and today most of the daily necessities—bread and loaf and drinks—that she prepared are now poured down at the door by steam and machinery. "Day by day machine-prepared and factory-produced viands take a larger place in the dietary of rich and poor, till the workingman's wife places before her household little that is of her own preparation." In modern cities, she points out that the carpets are beaten, windows are cleansed, floors polished, by machinery or male labour. "Year by year, day by day, there is a silently

^{1.} Olive Schreiner: Woman and Labour, p. 203.

^{2.} See *Ibid.*, pp. 27-65.

working but determined tendency for the sphere of woman's domestic labour to contract itself."

Thus, complains woman, she became a parasite; she had no work to do; all the avenues of her labour were permanently closed. But then, she looked at man. She thought to herself, if the scientific inventions had affected her labour, it had affected man's also. But lo! she saw here a different state of affairs. Factory had opened its gates to man; every morning she heard the factory whistle beckoning man to do his work at the machine. She felt revived. Great liberties that the advance of time was pouring upon her, she thought to utilise in productive works. And here she saw man labouring by the side of machine all day long. Here, she thought, was a great opportunity for her also. On her forehead was stamped the ideal of equality. If factory work was good for man, it must also be so with woman. Here was a splendid field of labour, a great compensation for her lost domestic labours. She said: "slowly but determinedly, as the old fields of labour close up and are submerged behind us, we demand entrance into the new;" 1 and "presently she arose, and followed her lost wheel and loom to their new place, the mill." 2

This entry of women into industry was given out as an endeavour on the part of women to save themselves from inactivity and degeneration.³ It was taken as a great step towards emancipation. And it must be remembered, it was only a question of capacity.⁴ If women could do the same work as men, if they could exhibit the same skill, there was no ground on earth why they should not enter industrial field with men.

Thus the English feminists argued their case for economic independence. In this way, they thought woman's personality would be developed and enriched. And today hardly any industry exists which has not in it a host of women toiling for their economic independence.

- 1. Olive Schreiner: Woman and Labour, pp. 70-71.
- 2. Charlotte Perkins Gilman: Woman and Economics, p. 152.
- 3. Olive Schreiner: Woman and Labour. See particularly pp. 172, 189, 196, 202-203.
- 4. Charlotte Perkins Gilman: Woman and Economics. See particularly pp. 38-39, 52, 83-84, 182, 190-191.

Employment of women in factories is entirely derogatory to the personality of women. We deprecate this tendency of entering factories in which conditions of work do not in the least approximate to those obtainable in the home. are entirely misguided in the belief that outside work of any type will give them a channel for self-expression and self-development, only because men are so employed. What is most striking and deplorable is that an increasing number of women are found to continue to go to factories after marriage only because of the desire for an independent income.1 More inconsiderate degradation of personality is difficult to meet. To free themselves from 'paternal' dependence women fled to the capitalist to secure economic 'independence.' He was too glad to receive them. He saw in women a form of cheap labour. He found an opportunity for splendid exploitation. The women could not complain of low wages; otherwise here was the retort: "If you want equal wages with men, why not employ men? We get more work from them." And were they to compete with men in equal production, it bears upon their health, it becomes overstraining and the result is physical and mental enervation and deterioration. We have already shown what result overstraining mental and physical work has upon the health of women. And when we remember that women have to work in the atmosphere of factory slum, one wonders what sort of personal enrichment it is. The economic independence that woman has come to achieve is at the cost of her 'individuality.' To the modern woman house-work appears stultifying, dull, monotonous. So she goes outside at the punctual hour in quest of glorifying work. One fails to understand what sort of glorifying work she does when she types like a machine a fifty sheets per day for her boss who has not the least sympathy with her and to whom she has to be suppliant every few minutes. And how infinitely more dull and monotonous is the dreary work generally performed by women employed in industries. They have to work at some infinitesimal process, necessitated by the division of labour and specialisation, which performed year after vear only stunts her intellect and kills her very soul.

^{1.} See Report of the War Cabinet Committee on Women in Industry, (1919), p. 236.

What an infinite drudgery at merely making pins' heads, or bottling, or flattening something, or winding something! How lifeless it is in comparison with the service of a child! How ugly it is in comparison with housekeeping! How soulless it is in comparison with the warmth of the hearth! And besides this degrading work, women have to bear, not infrequently, the evil glances and at times approaches of their vicious employers. It is at the cost of their personality, that under false ideals of equality women are inconsiderately throwing themselves into the degrading moloch of industries. Does working in the factory ennoble a woman's personality? Is working after a machine a nobler or better task than looking after growing human beings, and watching the ever fresh process of their mental unfoldment? Is turning a small wheel all-round the day more refining than feeding and dressing and training her own baby whose liveliness. sportiveness and innocence she can watch, guide and mould? Does it strike her more ennobling to come home, after a tiring labour of eight hours, only to find a reign of disorderliness in the whole house, her children uncared for the whole day, eager to fall in the arms of their mother but whom her tired energies cannot receive with the fulness of motherly feelings? Is not her industrial life reducing her personality to a form of caricature? A gradual degradation of personality is the sad result of this type of misconceived emancipation of woman in the present century.

And what are the implications of this 'economic' independence? Over-straining labour and deterioration of physique and mind; negligence of the home and children; and the worst of all, dehumanisation of motherhood.

The factory work not only degrades the personality and freedom of woman, it saps her vitality and turns her a physical wreck. One who has even an elementary knowledge of

1. Ella Mary Wiggins, singer of the strike 'ballets' that encouraged the workers in the great Gastonia strike expressed in a song what every working mother feels:

We leave our home in the morning, We kiss our children good-bye, While we slave for the bosses, Our children scream and cry.

a woman's physiology might best imagine the horrible effects of factory labour upon woman's physique. We have already pointed out why great care of health is extremely necessary during the days of adolescence, why rest is indispensable for a girl during this greatly changing period in life. Over-strain, whether physical or mental, at this age means loss of all that is womanly in her. Conditions of factory life, as Geddes and Thompson¹ say, " are too hard for them, where strain is too great, especially in adolescence, and where regularity of attendance is so stringently enforced that health suffers." And further they remark: ".....but what has to be steadily faced is the fact that misadjustment leads to biological inefficiency, and biological inefficiency is the silver at least of our national wealth, while money is but its bronze or metal."2 A stirring picture of how tender girls are being sacrificed under erroneous and misguided ideals is presented by Anna Garlin Spencer: "Read again what we do to our young girls between the ages of fourteen and twenty, when of all the periods of life for women there is most danger of premature death and of wasting and disabling disease In the confectionery business three thousand chocolates dipped every day at fever heat of energy. In the crack-making trade, the girls standing or walking not six feet from the ovens show a white faintness from heat and hurry and they handle a hundred dozen a day; and can't stand the work long as the strongest can confess. In the cigar-making industry, fourteen hundred stogies a day, worked over by girls seventeen to twenty years of age, and the whole work is so exhausting that even the older girls say that they "can't keep the space more than six years." In the garment trades, the sewing machines speeded to almost incredible limits, the unshaded electric bulbs and the swift motion of the needle giving early 'eye blur' and a nerve strain that enables the strongest to earn only five to six dollars a week..... In the laundries, women are operating machines so heavy that their whole bodies tremble with the strain of their use; and the muscular system, drawn upon for this spasmodic effort for an isolated feat repeated as rapidly as the body can be forced to act, under the

^{1.} Geddes and Thompson: Sex, p. 227.

spur of a never-ceasing pressure, is often that of young girls, many of them under sixteen years of age. In the manufacture of caskets and other articles where strong lacquer is used, the manufacturer often says he can't stand it more than two or three minutes in the room where the fumes are worst, but this girls work in ten hours a day for the pitiful wage of nine dollars a week, called good pay for women."1 We shall be excused for citing this long quotation at the cost of much space. It gives us an adequate idea of the victimising effects of factory labour upon young women. "Loss of beauty, loss of health, loss of chastity, involuntary motherhood, these are the items that overweight all the pompous theorising of feminists."2 Dr. Taylor cites his own experience as a medical practitioner that the industrial work completely disorganises "woman's individuality and strength" repeatedly and that the state "of unmarried girl clerks, as most medical men can testify to, is often pitiable in the extreme." The returns of the Post-Office, he points out, where men and women do in some industries identical work, women tend to be invalid many years earlier than the men.3 And writes Stanley Hall: "In most factories speed, strain, and nervous tension increases; and this, taken in connection with the instability of woman's nervous system, is a very grievous evil." Thus he gives one instance of telephone girls on duty for five hours suffering from nervous debility. And he cites a medical authority who says: "after four or five years many of these girls leave the service and marry, but they often break down and have nervous children."4 Westermarck's researches into the condition of savage lifehave already shown how savage women are made to labour hard and become prematurely old, lose their beauty, and become ugly and sterile. "I am disposed to think," he remarks, "that physical exertion has a much greater influence. Even from a physiological point of view, hard labour seems to shorten

^{1.} See Wolfe: Readings in Social Problems, (1916), pp. 541-543.

^{2.} Prof. Wadia: Ethics of Feminism, (1923), p. 76. Also read inthis connection the level-headed criticism of Dr. Edward Devine: The Family and Social Work, pp. 42-43.

^{3.} Dr. Taylor: The Nature of Women, p. 37.

^{4.} Stanley Hall: Educational Problems, Vol. I, p. 684.

^{5.} Vide Part I. Chapter I.

female youth. Statistics show that among the poorer women of Berlin menstruation ceases at a rather earlier age than among the well-off classes." In the face of all this testimony it is very amusing to note that the fatigue and exhaustion which a day's hard labour brings to women should be characterised by Loire Brophy¹ as an illusion. To say that the fatigue consequent upon a day's hard labour makes the woman sleepless, causes her to twitch all over, depresses her with vague fears, makes her think of every disagreeable and unhappy thing that happened to her, and yet to hold that all this is no fatigue at all but only the illusion of fatigue is only logical perversion. What should be borne in mind is the fact that the work and atmosphere in the factory is too much for the nerves of a woman to bear, who is a greater sufferer from nerves than man. And as remarked by Sir William Lane,2 it is essential to understand "that all these symptoms of 'nerves' are not 'just imaginary.' They are intensely real to the suffering woman who is fundamentally unhappy."

Hard labour has such a devitalising effect upon woman's health, that it incapacitates her for the full function of maternity. Child-birth becomes torturing to her and the condition of children is far from satisfactory. As Ellen Key writes: "When women in England worked in white lead factories, seventy-seven women were examined in one factory. It appeared in the time covered by the investigation that there were among this number ninety miscarriages, twenty-seven cases of stillborn children; besides, forty young children died of convulsions produced by the poisoning of their mothers. The effects of this occupation were most harmful in the case of women from eighteen to twenty-three years of age; lameness, blindness, and other infirmities resulted from this kind of work."3 And further she states that in Silesia, where children and quite young girls are employed in glass industry, the work has so distorted their bodily structure that when they bear children their sufferings are intense. "Such unique material do they offer for the study

^{1.} Loire Brophy: If Women Must Work, (1936), pp. 87-88.

^{2.} Sir William Lane: Every Woman's Book of Health and Beauty, (1936), see pp. 18-24.

^{3.} Ellen Key: The Century of the Child, p. 73.

of obstetrics, that doctors make pilgrimages to Silesia to learn from their cases." Robert Woodbury's report on maternal and infant mortality in eight American cities showed that premature births and maternal and infant deaths are most frequent amongst mothers employed away from home; least frequent amongst mothers gainfully employed in the home. The rate of mortality and premature delivery amongst mothers employed only in their own domestic work was lower than amongst those working outside the home.

The War Cabinet Committee found³ that most employed women are young; and though the conditions of their work have not been such as to cause actual disabling diseases, still it is such as to "favour general constitutional ill health and a lowered power of resistance, the ultimate effects of which may reveal themselves remotely and not immediately." The Committee found anæmia to be present in greater or less degree in a very large number of working girls. The Committee also supports the findings of an earlier Committee⁴ that sickness incidence is greater among women than among men. Some further indication of the injury to health consequential upon increased industrialisation among women is suggested in the tuberculosis death-rate during War.⁵

At another page, the Committee makes a trenchant remark that industrial employment of woman is "at the expense of her own youth and physical vigour" and strongly deprecate this industrial employment under which mothers wear themselves out in a "life of colourless drudgery and a continual struggle with difficulties which frequently prove too great to be overcome and of the results of which there is ample evidence in the sickness returns under the National Health Insurance Act."6

- 1. Ellen Key: The Century of the Child, p. 73.
- 2. E. Sylvia Pankhurst: Save the Mothers, (1930), p. 111.
- 3. War Cabinet Committee's Report on Women in Industry, pp. 224-225.
- 4. Departmental Committee on Sickness Benefit Claims under the National Insurance Act, 1919.
 - 5. War Cabinet Committee's Report on Women in Industry, p. 226.
 - 6. Ibid., p. 236.

Deterioration of physique and incapacity to bear and rear children are the two splendid achievements that woman has made by following the footsteps of man to industry. And this has come to be recognised as 'emancipation.' The race must degenerate if woman during the child-bearing years goes into active and unlimited competition with man. As Prof. Karl Pearson makes a scathing remark, "either a direct premium is placed upon childlessness, upon a crushing-out of the maternal instincts on which the stability of the society essentially depends, or woman has a double work to do, and she can do it at the cost of the future generation." What sort of mothers would these women whom Ludovici 2 calls "sexless beings going to and fro in tube and bus like shuttles in a machine to dull work robbed of all joy, earning their livelihood and turning their backs on men in response to feminist propaganda" make?

Only the fanatic feminists cannot be reconciled to the view that a woman who is unfit for motherhood or who brings into the world children who are unable to survive even their infancy is unworthy of the name of woman. One has only to travel through the figures of infant mortality to find how under the big name of 'economic independence' young souls, ill-nourished and unattended, are forced to close up their life-history within the first year of their life. Mr. Newman in his Infant Mortality has made an extensive study of infant mortality in England and established a strong correlation between the employment of married women and infant mortality in industrial towns. He found that in towns which were centres of textile industries and in which women were mostly employed, high infant mortality went hand in hand with the employment of women at the period of child-bearing, or rather reproductive potentiality. He found on the other hand that infant mortality was very low in non-textile towns in which the percentage of occupied women at child-bearing period was low.3

Doctor Reid, the Medical Officer of Health for the county of Stafford has repeatedly called attention to the high rate of

^{1.} Karl Pearson quoted by Geddes and Thompson: Sex.

^{2.} Ludovici: Lysistrata.

^{3.} See Newman: Infant Mortality, pp. 103-110.

infant mortality year after year in the Staffordshire towns. In this report he gives the following figures of infant mortality:

Five-year Period.	Burslem	Fenton.	Longton.	New Castle	Quarry Back.	Tunstall.	Wednes- field.
1889-93	193	186	225	168	164	213	175
1894-98	204	220	247	188	152	224	134
1899-1903	199	185	227	181	142	200	152

And this high rate of infant mortality is attributed by the County Medical Officer "to the nature of the trades carried on as affecting the facilities for the employment of women away from home, and as a consequence of the proportion of wholly artificially fed to entirely or partially breast-fed infants." The said medical officer furnishes the following interesting table which leads to the same conclusion as above:

Class according to percentage of Married and Widowed workers	No. of	Deaths of infants under 1 year per 1,000 registered births.			
to Female Population between 18 & 50 years.	Towns. 1881-90		1891–1900	1901-1904	
I 12 % and over	5	195	212	193	
II Under 12 % and over 6 %	13	165	175	156	
III Under 6 %	8	156	1 6 8	149	

These figures emphatically establish relation between infantile mortality and employment of women during child-bearing period.

The following table, derived from the same authority², of some select districts and towns having a high percentage of

^{1.} See Newman: Infant Mortality, p. 109.

^{2.} Ibid., p. 110.

employed women,	yields	broadly	the	same	result,	namely,	a
high infant mortal	ity rate	e:					

Town or District.	Percentage of Women occupied.	Infant Mortality.	Decennial Period.
Lancashire	62-2	179	1891-1900
Leicestershire	56⋅5	164	1891-1900
Manchester	63.3	187	1895-1904
Stockport	68-1	204	1894-1903
Norwich	60.1	176	1894-1903
Birmingham	63-6	184	1894-1903

Newman's findings thus lead to the positive conclusion that employment of women in factories is closely related to high infant mortality. And the factors that explain this relationship are, according to him: first, the ordinary injuries and diseases to which women and girls in factories are liable; secondly, the strain and stress of long hours and hard work to the pregnant woman; and thirdly, the absence from home of the mother of the infant.

In a report dealing with Infant Mortality in Lancashire, Sir Arthur Newsholme attributes it to the industrial employment of women. He remarks: "It is reasonable to believe that the industrial occupation of women, in so far as it exposes the pregnant mother in laborious work and strain and so far as it separates the infant from its mother thus not only preventing suckling but also diminishing the individual care which the mother can devote to her infant, must tend to increase infantile sickness and mortality." Adelaide Anderson, the principal lady inspector in England, also found a high rate of infant mortality in districts where women were largely employed in heavy labouring work. And Dr. Ashley also remarks: "It

^{1.} See War Cabinet Committee's Report on Women in Industry, pp. 234-235.

^{2.} Adelaide Anderson: Women in the Factory, (1922), p. 154.

is only in Lancashire and other parts of the country where women go out to work that we find a high infant mortality, and that in those places where the women stay at home and devote themselves to children there is a low death-rate."

From U. S. A. comes the same sad story. Studies of industrial employees in selected cities made by the Women's Bureau of the United States Department of Labour revealed that 61% of the married women employed were living with their husbands at the time of their employment. Furthermore "it was not chiefly from the childless women that the married breadwinners were recruited, for nearly 53% of all gainfully employed mothers had children and 40% of these mothers had babies under 5 years of age." The Bureau found that the effect of their absence upon their children was seen in a greatly increased infant mortality rate and a high delinquency rate among the older children. They found the cause of the high mortality in artificial feeding necessitated by the absence of the mother from the home.²

In their Family and the Nation Mr. and Mrs. Whetham's strongly animadvert the tendency of modern women to take up industrial pursuits of men and belittle home duties "for which women by their essential nature are specially responsible." They point out that in the first place this tendency sets false ideals before the rising generation—ideals which are antagonistic to woman's development as a personality; and in the second place, the worst results of this tendency are manifest in diminishing birth-rate in towns where women are in large majorities employed. Thus in towns like Northampton, Halifax. Burnley, Blackburn, Derby, Leicester, Bradford, Oldham, Huddersfield, and Bolton--all places in which an exceptionally large proportion of married women are engaged in factory work -" are the ten towns in all England in which the relative fall in birth-rate between 1881 and 1901 is most startling." On the other hand, in mining districts where the employment of women is rare, the Whethams point out, the birth-rate remains high.

^{1.} Dr. Hugh T. Ashley: Infant Mortality, p. 59.

^{2.} See Ruth Reed: Modern Family, (1929), pp. 81-82.

^{3.} Mr. and Mrs. Whetham: The Family and the Nation, see pp. 197. 200.

And this correlation between low birth-rate and employment of women, they explain, is due to the bad effects of factory work on health of women and their absence from the home.

Another interesting study of the relation between the health of mothers and infant mortality is made by Prof. Karl Pearson in *Eugenics and Public Health*. His studies bring out clearly one potent fact how factory work deteriorates the health of women and makes them incapable of breast-feeding their children. This reacts upon the health of children, leading to a high rate of infant mortality and invalidity. The studies are with reference to two important industrial centres, Preston and Blackburn, in which married women are employed in large numbers.

First, he takes breast-feeding. The data is provided by Dr. Partington, Medical Officer of Health for Preston.¹

PRESTON

Mortality Rate, 1st year of life	
Entirely breast-fed	13.2%
Partly or entirely artificially fed	15.7%
Babies in bad health in 1st year	
Entirely breast-fed	18.7%
Partly or entirely artificially fed	11.7%
Dead and delicate babies	
Entirely breast-fed	18.7%
	27.4%

Could anything be more conclusive? "We see that nearly 50% or more babies die or are delicate when the mother does not entirely breast-feed." Dr. Partington, however, takes us further; he investigated into the reasons for entirely or partially artificial feeding. The reasons may be classed into two big groups, those cases for which it was needful either because the mother could not provide the milk or because the infant could not take it, and those cases where the mothers gave up

^{1.} For these and other succeeding figures see Prof. Karl Pearson, Eugenics and Public Health, (1912), pp. 24-26.

nursing optionally because they wished to return to the factory or because they disliked nursing. Prof. Pearson has examined the like rates by distinguishing these two classes.

PRESTON

f life	
	 13.2%
	 7.3%
	 20.5%
	 5.5%
	 7.3%
	 14.2%
	 18.5%
	 14.6%
	 34.7%

It would appear from these figures that in Preston it is not the artificial feeding *per se* which accounts for the high death-rate and delicacy rates. The high rates arise only in the case of those women who necessarily adopt artificial feeding. This important point Pearson makes clear by giving some control series obtained through the courtesy of Dr. Greenwood of Blackburn. Thus he has the following data:

BLACKBURN

Mortality Rate, 1st year of life	
Entirely breast-fed	 6.3%
Partially or entirely artificially fed	 15.8%
Babies in bad health	
Entirely breast-fed	 24.0%
Partially or entirely artificially fed	 19.0%
Dead and delicate babies	
Entirely breast-fed	 30.3%
Partially or entirely artificially fed	 34.8%

Analysing these returns in the previous manner:-

BLACKBURN

Mortality Rate, 1st year of	f life	
Entirely breast-fed		 6.3%
Optional artificial feeders		 6.9%
Necessary artificial feeders		 22.0%
Babies in bad health		
Entirely breast-fed		 24.0%
Optional artificial feeders		 17.2%
Necessary artificial feeders		 20.0%

These results absolutely confirm those from Preston, the death-rate of artificially fed babies is swollen because "they include mothers unable to feed their children." But more than artificial feeding it is the health of the mother that is the prime cause of the mortality of the infant. How much more the health of the mother means than the nature of the feeding can be brought home by comparing the percentages of dead and unhealthy children in relation to nature of feeding and health of the mother in Preston and Blackburn. Thus:

Percentage of Dead and Delicate Babies at the end of 1st year.

PRESTON

Partially breast-fed	
Difference of percentage	8.7%
Mother's health good	23.2%
Mother's health bad	38.6%
Difference of percentage	
	•
Dr. commun.	
Blackburn	
Entirely breast-fed	30.3%
Partially breast-fed	34.8%
Difference of percentage	4.5%

Mother's health good 28·4%

Mother's health bad 45·3%

Difference of percentage 16·9%

It will be seen that the difference of the rates in these two cases is of a wholly different order.

We thus see that industrial employment of woman, in the first place, deteriorates her health by overstraining work which is antagonistic to her delicate health, and secondly, prevents her from breast-feeding her children both on account of her bad health and absence from the home; and the reaction of these two upon the racial life is a high infant mortality. The splendid manly ideals that demand all labour to become woman's province have to pay this high toll of infant mortality.

It might be most pertinently argued that the high infant mortality in these towns in which women are largely employed is due not so much to absence of the women from the home and artificial feeding as to poverty, low wages and insanitary conditions. On its appearance this argument seems to be substantial and appealing. But when it is put to the test of facts and opinions, its very bottom is knocked down. It must be remembered that during infancy mother's care, nurture and breast-feeding are indispensable, if the child is to grow healthy. "Regular breast-feeding," says the Report of the War Cabinet Committee,1 "by a healthy mother for the first eight or nine months of life is one of the best means of ensuring healthy infancy and is the greatest natural protection to the baby." Besides, during pregnancy, the mother must keep good health in order to ensure good health to her child. But the overstraining work of factory is such as to leave very little of health As the War Cabinet Committee remark: among women. "The great physical strain placed upon the woman who is industrially employed and also has a home and family to manage is often unrealised," etc. And at a further stage they say: "The average woman is physically weaker than the average man. She cannot compete with him satisfactorily in operations requiring

^{1.} War Cabinet Committee's Report on Women in Industry, p. 235.

considerable physical strength, while competitions in operations requiring considerable physical strength and competitions in operations of a less arduous but still exacting character may be detrimental to her health in that her power of endurance and her reserve energy are usually less than the man's, while she is often obliged to spend time and strength on domestic tasks which do not fall to his lot." It should be emphasised, therefore, that factory work in itself is so very exacting that it is detrimental to the health of average woman and especially so during the days of her pregnancy. "The structure of her body is framed with a view to pregnancy and child-birth and is less well adapted to muscular exertion than that of the man."2 And if she is subjected to muscular exertion, the effect cannot but be detrimental both to herself and to her children. All other precautions and improvements by way of high wages and provisions of sanitary conditions etc. will go very little in meeting the problem of high infant mortality. When the mother herself is overworked and is absent from the home, and thus when the child is deprived of the best kind of nurture. nutrition and care that it could avail, all other precautions would make no amends. For example, in Burnley the infant mortality rate rose in 1904 to 223: in order to bring about a decrease in this high death-rate the corporation engaged three sanitary inspectors and opened a sterilised milk depot; but the Medical Officer opined that the principal cause was the factory occupation of women and that nothing could minimise this great evil. In his report he made the following observations: "Burnley is the largest textile manufacturing town in Europe. that is, it contains more looms for the weaving of cloth than any other town or city; and as a larger number of women than men are employed in weaving, it follows that many infants are put out to nurse whilst the mothers are engaged in the weaving shed; when infants a few weeks old are thus put into the hands of unskilled nurses, it becomes certain that food will be at times unsuitable and the natural requirements of the infants are not attended to. A sensible mother's care is necessary for the upbringing of a healthy child, and this motherly care cannot be

^{1.} War Cabinet Committee's Report on Women in Industry, p. 250.

^{2.} Ibid., p. 220.

obtained where mothers are intensely employed in factories." And in the opinion of Dr. Hugh Ashley, though much might be done in some places to improve the conditions of labour among women regarding ventilation etc., it is the absence of the mother from her baby and her home that is more injurious.²

More convincing testimony of how factory employment itself has a disastrous effect upon the health of children comes from the city of Bradford, which, as Dr. Bradford points out,3 is a very prosperous city "and has never been so prosperous as it is to-day owing to the importance of wool." The city, he says, has availed itself of the services of remarkable and admirable men like E. J. Smith, the chairman of the Public Health Committee, and Dr. Buchan. The city has moreover taken the best possible precautions for infant welfare. With a population of 300,000, it spends £40,000 a year on infant welfare work under "the direction of these devoted and masterly students of the problem." "No other place," the doctor writes, "in these islands can compare with Bradford for the magnitude, monetary expenditure per head, thoroughness and science of its effort. The infant welfare department is a very model of its kind." And yet with these equipments and precautions the infant mortality rate of this city in 1917 was 132. "There are few babies born, the babies die fast, and all this in spite of wonderful effort, perfectly co-ordinated, well devised and splendidly executed."

Now let us turn to Ireland, to Connaught where, the same doctor says, there is "poverty and not mere ignorance—medical resources, nursing and ante-natal resources, standard of obstetrics, of housing, of public effort, all best left undescribed." But in Connaught under these deplorable conditions what are the figures of infant mortality? Everything, as the medical authority points out, "is against the infant"; and yet the infant mortality rate for Connaught is hardly 50 as compared with 132 in Bradford with all its municipal devotion and resources.

- 1. As quoted in Newman's Infant Mortality, p. 105.
- 2. See Dr. Hugh T. Ashley: Infant Mortality, p. 59.
- 3. See Lady Emile Lutyens: The Call of the Mother, pp. 62-65.

^{4.} Ibid., pp. 65-66.

In another county, Roscommon, where is to be found "poverty, ignorance and a plentiful lack of everything that knowledge and civilisation can provide", the infant mortality rate in 1916 was 35, that is one-fourth of the wealthy, scientific and generous Bradford. And the cause is not far to be fetched. Connaught babies, says the doctor, "have healthy mothers who stay at home and feed them as no science can feed them, and the babies live although the maternal environment is as wrong as it can be." But unlike in Bradford where 90% mothers practically go out to work, in Connaught the maternal environment is right; and what tremendous difference it makes!

These facts conclusively prove that factory employment of women is by itself a great evil regarding the health of both women and children. And for us anything that arrests healthy motherhood denies the best expression of personality to woman. Every woman is a potential mother and all her activities in life must go to make this most ennobling function glorious. There may be exceptions in society who are neither inclined nor fitted for motherhood. And such women may take up professions and work suited to their inclinations and ideals. But society is not made up of such rare exceptions. A great majority of women are going to be mothers. And it is in the best interests of themselves and society that they make motherhood into a glorious function by giving to society a healthy and refined race.

It is here, that the ideals of the Scandinavian group vary. To us the greatest blunder that English feminists did was to view the situation as man did. When they saw all their domestic industries being fast destroyed by mechanical productions in factory, they thought the best way to restore their position was to follow man and his work in factories. As a matter of fact, if one calmly and seriously thinks about it, here had machinery taken away from woman the drudgery of her domestic labour. It had simplified and lessened her work, so that she could devote herself to the duties and function of motherhood in the most cultured way possible. Here was an opportunity for women to demand from society such work suited to women as would not conflict with the duties and function of motherhood: nay, here was a great opportunity to claim from society re-

cognition of motherhood in itself as a vocation of no less value than any other honourable profession. Instead of making these demands, they preferred the drudgeries of factory life which deteriorated their health, degraded their personality and reduced motherhood to a form of caricature.

Scandinavian feminists demand from society equal respect to motherhood as to any other profession useful to society. Motherhood, they repeatedly stress, is a function which is of immense importance by itself. Every woman has the right to healthy motherhood; it is the consummation of her personality. Woman can raise motherhood into an artistic and noble func-And these feminists want women to achieve this ideal. Throughout the centuries gone by, motherhood was but a physiological phenomenon, it was a nature's burden. But now that woman can avail herself of liberal education, now that she can share the cultural life of the world, now that her equal position with man is recognised both by social and legal conceptions, should she not be a better mother and her children better citizens? Should she try to disparage her personality and motherhood in the slum of factory life? Ellen Key, therefore, beckons the whole womanhood to this great and so far neglected field of their constructive life. The development of mother-instinct into motherliness, she points out, is one of the greatest achievements in the progress of culture, a "development by which the maternal functions have emotionally become more complex and differentiated." And this great instinct of motherliness finds its full expression not merely in the physiological act of giving birth, it involves an imparting of culture and spiritual life to the child by means of her tenderness, observation, discrimination, judgment and self-control. A woman's character, as Ellen Key remarks, "often develops more in a month during which she is occupied with the care of children, than in years of professional work." Mother-love and the reciprocal love that it awakens in the child are of infinite significance and value than is generally believed; it exercises the first deep influence upon the child's life of feeling, and this love is "the first form of the law of mutual help, it is the root

^{1.} Ellen Key: The Woman Movement, p. 185.

of altruism, the cotyledon of a new widely ramified tree of social instincts."

Modern woman has not realised the importance of the role of mother in society. The intimate relation between mother and child is of immense significance from the racial point of view. In our opinion a child in its early years, say upto the age of five, must receive careful and continuous care and training of its mother. Nothing else can direct the potentialities of a child in healthy channels as motherly affection and training would do. Even in the ancient days the philosopher Plutarch¹ emphasised the importance of mother in the growth and development of a child's body and mind. The natural and close bond that exists between mother and child can be exploited in the best interest of the child, "How many of us have conscientiously attempted", asks a rational feminist,2 "to analyse the problems which will force our children in this chaotic world, and to create an environment calculated to prepare them for it?" It is for the mother to maintain an atmosphere of poise, generosity and hilarity in the home. It is she who has to create an atmosphere of goodwill and emotional repose without which superficial techniques are a joke. When it is remembered that many habits and attitudes essential to later success and happiness, are formed during the first years of life and the success of this early training depends upon a favourable home situation, when we remember that the young child is extremely sensitive to the different elements of his environment both physical and psychological, we realise the great responsibility of the mother in laying foundations for later good health and culture by proper feeding and training. And now that woman is getting more and more into close touch with social and political life, now that she can avail herself of liberal education, now that she can magnify her personality by sharing with man his rights and privileges, it behoves her that she directs all these in building a home in which her child will find a university of true culture. Instead of frittering away

^{1.} Plutarch: Moralia, (English Translation by Frank Cole Babbit, 1922), see pp. 46-47.

^{2.} Elizabeth Murray: This Fuss about Women, see Forum, August 1932, p. 152.

her energies and capacities in the abject surroundings of factory life, she should utilise them in making her home a temple of honour and a seat of culture. Her motherly feeling alone could create an atmosphere of love, sympathy and altruism. It must be remembered that woman is the link between the civilisation of the past and the progress of the future. And what enlightened motherhood could achieve in this respect is a matter which passes our comprehension.

The greatest service, therefore, in our opinion that Scandinavian feminists rendered to womanhood and society is this idea of ennobling motherhood. To raise motherhood to its true dignity and culture and to win from society the recognition of its immense value, these feminists formed themselves into a 'Bund für Mutterschutz,' the main object of which was to restore motherhood to its proper significance in society. This organisation included members of great personality and thought like Ellen Key, Ruth Bre, Dr. Helen Stocker, Marie Lischenewska, Lily Braun, Dr. Bloch, Prof. Bruno Meyer, etc. In England and America, it has received warm sympathisers like Havelock Ellis, Katherine Anthony, Lady Emile Lutyens, etc.

These feminists deeply deplore the amaternal tendencies of a certain section of modern women. In Charlotte Perkins Gilman's Woman and Economics, and Rosa Mayreder's A Short Survey of Woman Problem, these amaternal ideas have found full and free vein. They have repeatedly hammered the idea that motherhood which is to be found common with beasts and other animals cannot be a higher instinct and function. A more fanatic perversion is difficult to discern. And so here we find Ellen Key, with sobriety of thinking and with a true perspective of historical evolution, defending motherhood as the greatest and noblest task of a woman. "No social or individual activity of women," she asserts, "could compensate for the extinction of this 'instinct,' which only recently in Messina drove hundreds of mothers to shield their children with their own bodies; this 'instinct,' which recently impelled a mother, who learned before she gave birth to her child that her own life must be the price for the saving of that of the child: 'I have lived, but the life of my child belongs now to mankind-

save the child." In her Renaissance of Motherhood she has developed this very idea and shown that with woman's freedom is dawned a new era of renaissance of motherhood, which alone could impart to the world true culture. In spite of all her subjection, she points out that throughout history powerful torrents of life-force, of soul, tenderness and goodness have flowed through humanity from the motherliness of the true mothers, and even through the motherliness of those women who have not borne children. She makes a strong and feeling appeal to make motherhood into a cultured craft, so that it may become a channel through which true civilisation and culture may flow. "The truly free woman of the future," she says, will be she "who will have attained so fully developed a humanity that she cannot even dream of a desire to be 'liberated' from the foremost essential qualities of her womanhood-motherliness."2

Modern woman will be, therefore, making the gravest mistake if she takes motherhood to be no more than a physiological event of importance and value both to herself and society. As Lady Emile Lutyens puts it, "the mistake that is being made by women at present is in regarding motherhood as merely adjunct to other professions and occupations. Motherhood is a vocation by itself, and one of the highest in the world."3 It is a vocation which requires most careful and specialised training, and it is the one which, as Lady Lutyens says, at present receives the least. Here we emphasise the point that home-making and motherhood are not simple functions to be performed easily without any training. Homemaking is an art by itself which requires expert education. So is with the proper functioning of motherhood. It is only when a woman has training in child psychology that she can get an insight into the potentialities of her child and can thus properly direct his or her energies for the realisation of these potentialities. Popenoe's words are of deep significance when he writes: "An education of young women which prepared them better for motherhood, which inculcated a more scientific

^{1.} See Ellen Key: The Woman Movement, p. 188.

^{2.} Ellen Key: Renaissance of Motherhood, p. 121.

^{3.} Lady Emile Lutvens: The Call of the Mother, p. 71.

attitude toward the home, and which made them more efficient in the discharge of their domestic duties and better able to see the fallacies in the propaganda of home-breakers, and which showed them how to take a large part in the cultural and expressive opportunities of life, would do more than anything else to remove the sources of irritation."¹

It is quite assuring to read in this connection the views of some sensible feminists. Ida Tarbell in her *Business of Being a Woman* upholds the home as a great field for constructive work for women and deprecates the tendency of modern women to belittle it. "I doubt," she writes, "if there is to-day a more disintegrating influence at work—one more fatal to sound social development—than that which belittles the home and the position of the woman in it. As a social institution nothing so far devised by man approaches the home in its opportunity, nor equals in its success." She warns modern women that their own as well as the humanity's fall or rise depends upon as that centre is strong or weak. For "it is the human core."

Another feminist, Elizabeth Murray, speaks almost in the same strain.³ She advocates that instead of wasting away their intellectual and other achievement in muddling along with dehumanising jobs "beneath our cultural level, they should sense that here is great, here-to-fore neglected field for constructive thinking. A woman who has put her house in order, has coped with her marital problems intelligently and has provided for her children's needs has no reason to bemoan having spent a decade or more of her life in one of the most profound of human experience: mating and rearing of the young."

Dr. Mary Scharlieb⁴ in her *The Expectant Mother* criticises the industrial employment of married women as being open to grave objections. The woman who has a house, husband

- 1. Popenoe quoted by Ruth Reed: Modern Family.
- 2. Ida Tarbell: The Business of Being a Woman. See especially the last chapter "Ennobling the Woman's Business," pp. 218-242.
- 3. See Elizabeth Murray's article This Fuss about Woman in Forum, August 1932, pp. 102-5.
- 4. Dr. Mary Scharlieb: The Welfare of the Expectant Mother, (1919), p. 111.

and children, she says, has sufficient work and responsibility, and although the wages of the pregnant woman may ease the family finances, this money is earned, she observes, "at the expense of the real welfare both of her household and of the State." And Helen Bosanquet¹ emphasises that motherly duties cannot be delegated and characterises the industrial employment of woman as leading to "the miserable condition of home and children."

Back to motherhood should, therefore, be the ideal of modern woman. This is not returning to old times when mother's position in society was abject and her illiteracy and ignorance made her only indulge her children. Modern woman is a cultured woman; she is on equal basis with man in all social and legal fields. She must now equip herself with the most liberal education that she can avail herself of; she must take training in the art of home-making and decorating; she must possess deep insight into child psychology. "The time has now passed," says Munsterburg, "when it seemed unnecessary to give serious attention to the preparation of women for domestic work and when the little knowledge of household economy was simply transmitted from mothers to the daughters." He strongly forces home the point that the highly cultivated mistress of the house fulfils her work better than one who simply follows her own instinct, just as the farmer who works with the modern machines is getting better results than he who does the work as it was done a century ago. In this connection we may mention what a woman of culture could do in the field of domestic life. With her knowledge of laws and principles that regulate food-stuffs and nutrition and of the nature and composition of the various food-stuffs, the changes effected by temperature of fermentation, the principles of diet, the relation of food to health, the economic side of the food question—with all this knowledge she can manage her household in the most economic and hygienic way. Her knowledge with reference to the home and the household, the construction and the surrounding of the home, the hygiene of the home, ventilation, heating, lighting, and water supply and also of the home decoration and furnish-

^{1.} See Helen Bosanquet: The Family, (1915), pp. 281-294.

ing from the artistic and from the sanitary point of view (really of very inestimable value), the care of the house including cleansing, the supervision of a well-ordered house etc., offers her a distinct group of important problems which she alone can tackle successfully. Then as already emphasised, her study of the child, the knowledge of the child's mental and bodily development and the study of the principles of sound education and instruction will be of immense value to her in training her child according as his inclinations and potentialities require. Then all her technical and untechnical knowledge in domestic science, viz. cooking, sewing, house-keeping and marketing, will make her the central figure in her domestic world. Consider for a moment the importance of a mistress in the household who knows the tasteful furnishing of the house, selection of the colours, designs in costumes, the care and organisation of the household; who plays with children and takes care of their physical and mental development; who nurses the members of the family and manages the economic expenditure of the household!

Thus we find that there is an immense field for constructive work for modern woman. To say, therefore, that women have been rendered parasites is clear ignorance and misunderstanding. Scientific inventions have taken away all the drudgery of domestic life and opened great opportunities and possibilities of making home a happier place for human habitation both from æsthetic and economic points of view. "The domestic life," says Munsterburg,¹ "controlled by love for the family, by joy in the home, by wholesome pride and a moral attitude for life, is an inspiration inferior to none. It is the ideal demand of humanity which ought to appeal to every woman's heart, demanding that she give her best energies to the unselfish fulfilment of the family needs." To us home is the temple of all honour and culture, it is the unit of social life; and the devotion of a patient and intelligent woman alone gives meaning to it.

For the full expression of womanly qualities in the home and society, a woman must no doubt be economically independent. What is more important to us is not her economic 'in-

^{1.} Munsterburg: Vocation and Learning, p. 224.

dependence' but her economic 'freedom.' And for this she should not be forced by society to leave the home in search for out-door exacting work. Every woman must, therefore, get a legal share in the income of the family. And every mother must get endowment from society. Some enlightened women¹ have placed this demand before society, and great thinkers like Havelock Ellis,² H. G. Wells³ and Bernard Shaw⁴ have fully supported it. If society wants rehabilitation of culture which modern civilisation of capitalism and exploitation has annihilated, it must give woman her proper position by recognising her greatest services as mother. Motherhood must be recognised as a function and vocation of no less importance than any other useful and honourable function in society. A society that finds huge finance to maintain its military and other forces, the avowed object of which is human destruction, can easily find financial resources to save the best of its human souls and to give them a fairer chance to live and grow under the training of their mothers. No woman who has a child to care for and look after should be forced to work outside the home. She must receive the best help and sympathy from society so that her contribution to society will be a living culture in the form of her best-trained children. Women, therefore, with their political and legal rights must now, more than at any other time, push forth this idea in the legislatures and bring home to them the tremendous importance of their rôle in the home and thus demand a fitting endowment for motherhood. They must also demand a legal share for every woman in the family income. In England, as already pointed out in the first part, the wife's full ownership of her property is recognised by the Married Women's Property Act. But she has no claim over her husband's income. In France such claim is taken to be a violation of his rights. In Sweden alone a wife's right to share her husband's income is recognised. This legal recognition of a

^{1.} See Ellen Key: Love and Marriage. Mrs. Dora Russell: Hypatia, p. 67. Katherine Anthony: Feminism in Germany and Scandinavia.

^{2.} Havelock Ellis: The Task of Social Hygiene, pp. 63-64.

^{3.} H. G. Wells: Modern Utopia, (1907), p. 303.

^{4.} Bernard Shaw: Intellectual Woman's Guide to Socialism and Capitalism, p. 196.

woman's share in the income of her husband must find a place in the statute-book of every nation. It is only then that the real economic emancipation of woman can come about. It is only then that her work as housewife and mother will be fully compensated. It is only then that she can put her heart and soul into her work, and her creative impulses will find noble and constructive expression. The home will then become a true unit of society. And the refinement of culture that she will bring to her home-life out of her education and training and economic freedom will make it a centre of a powerful force—a centre through which will radiate an illumination on the path of social progress. Thus only will the individual and society be linked in gold. This is not a wanton dream of an idealist, but a true picture of a new social life to emerge.

CHAPTER XI

IN THE WAKE OF EMANCIPATION

CONCLUSION

"Woman is not undeveloped man but diverse."

-Lord TENNYSON in The Princess.

REEDOM and equality are the basis of human development. Women fought for them. And their great struggle has remained a landmark in human history. Their demands may be summarised to be the following:

In the field of education and instruction: to enjoy the same educational opportunities as those of men.

In the field of labour: freedom to choose any occupation. In the field of civil law: the wife should be given the full status of a legal person, and full civil liability. In criminal law: the repeal of all regulations discriminating against women.

In public law: woman's suffrage.

In social field: recognition of the high value of woman's domestic and social work.

The movement was founded on the most rational basis; its demands were perfectly legitimate. Woman wanted her emancipation both as a sex-being and as a human being. Woman recognised that for the development of her own personality and for fulfilling her true role in society, she should be a free personality possessed of equal opportunities, rights and privileges like man. And society had to square with her demands.

But we have seen that the progress of the Movement was extremely chequered. There was opposition, in the first place from the society and the government, and secondly from an influential section of women themselves. In the teeth of this

1. Also see Dr. Kaethe Schirmacher: The Modern Woman's Rights Movement, pp. 13-14 Also see Part I, Chapter III.

opposition they had to make out their way. One can, therefore, imagine the result of such things. There was the reaction. And woman went wide of the mark and went in hot pursuit in the foot-steps of man, just to show that woman could do everything as well as man. This was the genesis of the militant phase. This accounts for woman's fanatic entrance into all fields of man's activity.

But though one can see that this was obvious, one fails to admit that it was the best. The reaction was natural; but carried to excess its results have been anything but constructive. And some women of insight and foresight did realise the evil that lay in the fanatic attitude which the later feminists adopted. Marie Corelli, for instance, uttered a note of warning when she wrote: "In claiming and securing intellectual equality with man, she should ever bear in mind that such position is only to be held by always maintaining and preserving as great unlikeness to him as possible in life and surrounding. Let her imitate him in nothing." And further she reminded women that the "feminine individuality is as plain and potent as masculine individuality. We have only to insist upon it and assert it."

And this is why we have criticised the attitude of modern feminists in the field of educational and economic ideals as being not only in the nature of imitation of men but also as being positively antagonistic to the interests of women and society.

Researches in the psychology of sex tell us that woman is unlike man in the essentials of human personality. Havelock Ellis,³ Forel,⁴ Bloch,⁵ Van de Velde⁶—all distinguished sex-psychologists, and also psycho-analysts like Jung⁷ and Adler⁸ tell

- 1. Marie Corelli: Free Opinions Freely Expressed, (1905), p. 182.
- 2. Ibid., p. 184.
- 3. Havelock Ellis: Man and Woman,
- 4. August Forel: The Sexual Question, pp. 504-505.
- 5. Iwan Bloch: The Sexual Life of Our Time, pp. 59-86.
- 6. Van de Velde: Sex Hostility in Marriage, pp. 41-67.
- 7. See C. J. Jung: Contributions to Analytical Psychology, (1928), p. 170.
- 8. Alfred Adler: Problems of Neurosis—A Book of Case Histories, (1929), pp. 42-68.

us that woman is different from man in fundamental psychological qualities. Emotion, intuition and suggestibility are the supreme qualities in woman, which should not be underrated nor allowed to be dissipated. In highest psychic processes woman is different from man, because she has to fulfil a different rôle from him. "So long as women are unlike men in the primary sexual characters and in reproductive function," writes Havelock Ellis, "they can never be absolutely alike even in the highest psychic processes." "We cannot expel from the world," writes Bloch, "the fact that man and woman are eminently different alike physically and mentally."

But then there is no question of woman's inferiority to man, because she possesses different psychological qualities. Her personality is as great, supreme and important as man's. It must be recalled that along with the process of reaction there was also this 'inferiority complex' that drove woman to assume manly ideals. This inferiority complex ought to go. Woman must put away man as her standard. She must realise that she has an independent personality as great as that of man and that its growth and development is her real ideal.

It is not only woman's personality that differs from that of man; her role also is different. Woman must realise that man has utterly failed in the long process of civilisation to produce true culture. Anarchy, chaos and discontent are the achievements of man, because he has not understood the true importance and value of human living. Because, as Freud's says, "man measures by false standards....while underrating the truly precious things in life," that civilisation has become a disease. Man has failed to solve the problems of human suffering, because he sees in work not a means for constructive creation, but as an instrument of gain, of personal pleasure, power and aggrandisement.

This destructive philosophy of life, woman adopted and then tried to test her capacity in the spheres of manly works and activities. She only complicated the problem. The result 2

^{1.} Prof. Sigmund Freud: Civilisation and Its Discontent, (1930), p. 7.

^{2.} Vide Part III, Chapters IX and X.

of this attitude upon her personality, health and function of motherhood has been disastrous. She underrated her own personality and began to cherish manly ideals. Womanliness became to her a low thing, an inferior quality. She dressed like man, cropped her hair like him, adopted his habits of smoking and other vices. Even in the matters of talking and walking she completely imitated man. One should like to ask whether this is emancipation. One who has studied Havelock Ellis' Studies in the Psychology of Sex would realise of what significance and value are woman's charm and grace of personality; what part true 'modesty' plays in woman's life.2 It is only a beautiful woman possessed of rich womanly qualities of grace and charm of personality that gives a beautiful race to humanity. If sex attraction is the most important element that maintains the sexual bond between a man and a woman, that sex attraction on the side of woman lies in the charm and grace of her personality. One should in this connection carefully read Alfred Adler's Problems of Neurosis. In that he deals with the case³ of a neurotic woman of twenty-six who came to consult him and who "showed definite signs of masculine development." The result of this masculine development was the tragedy of her sexual life. this connection Adler comments: "I am fully convinced that much trouble would be saved in the later life of children if they were brought up from the first in knowledge and preparation for their right sexual role." He warns that if a girl were stimulated to imitate boys by her environment or education it would increase her difficulties later when she has to face her problem as a human being. "Girls should be educated. not as if for a lower function, but with a view and sense of their social responsibilities and possibilities." This reputed psycho-analyst finds that at present 'the masculine protest' is rampant and widely displayed by "women of all ages who smoke, wear short skirts and short hair and do every-

^{1.} Havelock Ellis: Studies in the Psychology of Sex, Vol. VI, pp. 507-575.

^{2.} Havelock Ellis: Studies in the Psychology of Sex, Vol. I, pp. 1-84.

^{3.} Alfred Adler: Problems of Neurosis. See pp. 42-43.

^{4.} Ibid., p. 68.

thing possible to approximate to masculine manners." The result is that in her effort to become as much like man as possible the modern woman becomes, as pointed by Dr. Beran Wolfe, a curious human caricature whom he describes as "a psychological hermaphrodite which is something between a sexless woman and a parody of man." This learned physician laments that many a modern woman in her desire to prove her equal capacity with man has forgotten to be a woman, a sweetheart, a wife, a mother, to her own damage and regret.1 In this connection history provides two glaring examples. One is Goethe's sister Cornelia and the other is the famous French author, Aurore Dupin, known to the world as George Sand. Both completely rejected woman's role. Cornelia Goethe rejected everything that lends dignity and beauty to feminine life as such and despised all that is characterised as womanliness. She went to the length of turning over her child to the strangers for upbringing with a view to avoid the responsibility. The result was that she became cold and frigid, and finally became unable to do the slightest amount of work, and spent most of her time in bed. She, who had no leaning towards a woman's life, in the end turned away from life altogether, stayed in bed and sank into melancholia. She, thus, renounced the role of woman but paid it with a renunciation of life itself. Negation of woman's role led her finally to a negation of life itself. Aurore Dupin discarded her name in favour of a masculine name, George Sand, and assumed all manly styles and manners. She wore men's clothes and indulged in the same unrestrained sex-life that she was accustomed to observing among men. But finally all these efforts failed for the one reason that Aurore destroyed in herself the best that she had to give: her womanhood. Realising the ravageous effects of this masculine protest, in her work Rhythm of Life, Sofie Lazarsfeld makes a fervent appeal to avoid everything that might lead to a rejection of the female sex role.2

To modern woman, this thought of being a woman is iden-

^{1.} W. Beran Wolfe, M.D.: A Woman's Best Years, (1935), see

^{2.} Sofie Lazarsfeld: Rhythm of Life: A Guide to Sexual Harmony of Women, (1934), pp. 278-81.

tified with defeat. This complex ought to go. Woman must value and ennoble her own personality, furnished as it is with rich qualities. Personal charm and grace, emotion and intuition, sweetness of expression, and melody of voice—these she should develop taking them as ends in themselves. The Middle Ages, when they ushered in the chivalric era, worshipped and derived inspiration from women who were richly endowed with such qualities.¹

Now, the development of this personality requires suitable surroundings, especially of education and work. Woman's education and work must be so formulated as to favour the development of her own personality. At any rate, her educational system must be built on this basis that her personality, needs and function are different from those of man.2 Popenoe and Johnson write: ".....it seems wise to modify their educational system in general in such a way as to prepare women for the kinds of work best adapted to their capacities and needs."3 These learned authors suggest more and more differentiated courses for women so as to prepare them for distinct occupations including marriage and motherhood. They make a poignant remark that "the unrest of intelligent women is not to be lessened or removed by educating them in the belief that they are not different from men and setting them to work as men in the work of the world.4

So also should be with regard to her work. It is not possible nor essential to give a list of professions in which women might work without any harm to their personality, and through which they might contribute true culture to humanity. We may only say here that work which is carried on under surroundings that approximate to the conditions of home-life, which allow sufficient rest and which do not come in the way

- 1. Vide Part I, Chapter III.
- 2. "Our present tendency to drive woman through our curricula in schools and colleges and to force her to adopt our mode of intellectual activity," writes Anthony M. Ludovicy, "amounts to a policy of violence against her specific modes of mental activity." Anthony M. Ludovicy: The Future of Women. (1936), p. 135.
 - 3. Popenoe and Johnson: Applied Eugenics, (1920), p. 382.
 - 4. Ibid., p. 383.

of her function of motherhood, provides the most suitable vocations for women. In this respect women, now enlightened as they are, must attempt to change the whole perspective of society with regard to work. No work is worth its name if it fails to be a channel for self-expression and self-development. Factory work in this sense is quite unsuited to women. debases her personality, ruins her health, and what is most important, it prevents her from properly applying her care and nurture to her children.1 The loss to society in the form of infant mortality and delicate children² is of vital significance. We have already drawn attention to the importance of breastfeeding and personal care of mother as a formative influence on the physical and mental growth of a child,3 And for an enlightened mother of modern days there are vast opportunities in this field. Havelock Ellis in his More Essays of Love and Virtue⁴ has drawn a glowing picture of a mother who knows the art of bringing up children so as to make them good citizens. It is now high time that in order to bring about a re-orientation of ideas about true civilisation, the attempt must begin with enlightened mothers. They must impress upon the mind of their children the spirit of courage, confidence and altruism; they must impress them with the idea that work exists for man and not man for work, and the work which fails to promote human happiness and culture by giving the workers sufficient rest, proper maintenance and by allowing him opportunities for self-expression and self-development is not true work. When Goethe's Faust discovered that human salvation lies only through 'work', it was work in this sense. And if in the future, conflicts of various sorts between races and races, nationalities and nationalities, and between man and man, are to cease, the future race ought to be brought up by their mothers in an atmosphere of ideas like the above. Bernard Shaw's Candida who at the close of the drama Candida narrates how throughout the life of her husband she has been his true mother who looked after him in every of his difficul-

^{1.} Vide Part III, Chapter X.

^{2.} Ibid.

^{3.} Ibid.

^{4.} Havelock Ellis: More Essays of Love and Virtue, (1931), pp. 11-20.

ties, counselled him in moments of despair, taught him the real principles of life and thus made him a 'wise boy' presents the true mother of the future. Continued and careful attention of a mother is absolutely essential in the early years of childhood. This duty can be delegated only with serious consequences. Dr. Edward Glover utters a grave warning against the sadistic among other influences that are brought to bear upon the child owing to the absence of the mother from the home during the major part of the day. He makes an appeal to make child-bearing what it ought to be—the oldest, most honoured and most skilled of human professions.

But then if enlightened mothers are to renovate the whole social organisation so as to make this century really a 'century of the child,' it is the most sacred duty of society to see that the economic problem of these mothers is properly solved. This can be done only by giving pensions to mothers who cannot bring up their children without recourse to any outside work. We may refer here to a more or less satisfactory system of mothers' pensions in some States in the United States.2 Some such scheme ought to be adopted by every government so as to secure its mothers to look after their own children. The principle of these pensions in these States is to ensure that the children shall be cared for by their own mothers. In a few States the aid may be granted to either or both parents, to grandmothers, or to other relations. In a few other States the benefits are expressly limited to widows. In the great majority of States, the laws apply only to mothers. In twenty-seven States and the District of Columbia aid may be given to any mother with dependent children or to a mother whose husband is dead. deserting, divorced, totally incapacitated (physically or men-

^{1.} See Dr. Edward Glover: The Dangers of Being Human, (1936), p. 158.

^{2.} See B. Seebohm Rowntree and Frank D. Stuart: The Responsibility of Women Workers for Dependents, (1921), pp. 57-60. Also see Social Work Year Book (1929), (published by Russell Sage Foundation, New York), pp. 273-279. Here we have described the systems of mothers' pensions as they are to be found only in some States in the U. S. A. Similar systems of mothers' pensions are to be found in Denmark and Canada also; but in our opinion they are not based on a satisfactory basis.

tally), in prison, or in an institution for the insane, feeble-minded or epileptic. In three cases Hawaii, Michigan, and Nebraska, unmarried mothers are specially included in the law. In our opinion no distinction should be made between married and unmarried mothers in giving such pensions.

The lowest age of the child at which the pension ceases is 13 years; the highest at which it is allowed is 17 years. The average number of children for which these pensions are given varies between 3 and 4. The maximum amount of pension paid in different States varies considerably. For the first child the amount varies from 8 dollars per month to 25 dollars, and for additional children 5 dollars to 15 dollars per month. In some States the maximum allowance which can be paid to any family is fixed. In the respective States this ranges from 40 dollars to 60 dollars per month. The amount of pension is, however, found to be inadequate in view of the fact that the object of the mothers' pensions is to enable the mother to remain at home for most of her time to look after children and also that the Maximum Wages Commission appointed in ten States during the years 1910-15 agreed that the minimum amount on which a woman over 18 could be expected to exist was 32 to 40 dollars a month.

The main principle to be observed in such mothers' pensions is that they should enable the mother to bring up her children both physically and mentally according to the standard of a particular nation. If the mother is the most precious possession of the nation, so precious that society advances its own highest well-being when it protects the functions of the mother,¹ then it must be realised that these functions are not limited to birth nor to the nourishment of the child; but they go on during the whole of its training. And, therefore, society ought to regard the maternal function as so important for the whole social order, that every needful mother under fixed conditions, subject to certain control, during a certain period, and for a certain number of children, will obtain from

^{1. &}quot;We cannot yield in our belief that woman's greatest function is motherhood, but recognition of this should increase, not diminish, the strength of her position in the State." Popenoe and Johnson: Applied Eugenics, p. 365.

society an allowance for maintaining and educating her children.

Another important reform called for is the legal recognition of the wife's share in the income of the family. Women among the well-to-do families have no necessity to work outside the home. But out of necessity for economic independence, they work outside the home. They cannot tolerate the fact that they have to look to their husbands and other relatives for their private expenses. Their services, therefore, in the household ought to be recognised as useful services to society itself. Norway and Sweden have done justice to women in this respect. The law of 1920 in Sweden lays down that "if wife works at home, her work there shall be recognised as composing her share in the support of the family." But in England, though the Married Women's Property Act gives a wife the right to keep her property and earnings free from the control of her husband, she can make contracts only to the extent of her separate property. She has no claim over the income of her husband. In other countries the story is simi-In France, for instance, the law of 1907 gave a wife sole control over her earnings, but the housewife will not get any remuneration for her services as housekeeper or homemaker.

Our main thesis, therefore, with regard to the educational and economic ideals of modern women is to prove that emancipation in these fields should proceed through channels different from those hitherto followed. Anything that identifies woman with man is not her emancipation. "The feminist movement," as Lady Emile Lutyens puts it, "has made one great mistake. It has attempted to force a unity which does not and cannot exist, and has tried to lose sight of differences of physique, of mentality, of emotional and spiritual outlook between the two sexes, which differences constitute the woman's greatest claim to take share with man in public life." If women are the same as men, then they can be adequately represented by men. But their right to share in the government of the nation is their most sacred right, because they are different from men, because they represent another aspect from men in the great life of God,

^{1.} Lady Emile Lutyens: The Call of the Mother, p. 75.

because their opinion and point of view are so vitally necessarv to the welfare of the nation and the world. If women cannot bring a different point of view to bear upon the world's problems from that of men, they had better remain silent. When women seek to resemble men in their appearance, in their dress, their habits and occupation, they are losing sight of their greatest purpose and function in the human world. Lily Braun nicely puts this point of view when she says: "Only the recognition that the entire nature of woman is different from that of man, that it signifies a new vivifying principle in human life, makes the women's movement, in spite of the misconception of its enemies and its friends, a social revolution." The whole struggle of women was aimed at personal freedom. And now that they have secured personal freedom, they must utilise it "to work out and establish their diversity." 2 Freedom is only good, as the great psychologist Havelock Ellis remarks, when it is a freedom to follow the laws of one's own nature: "it ceases to be freedom when it becomes a slavish attempt to imitate others, and would be disastrous if it could be successful."3 The solution, therefore, as suggested by Popenoe and Johnson lies in "recognising the natural differentiation of the two sexes and in emphasising this differentiation through education." 4 "We have talked enough of woman's emancipation;" says Anna Von Nathasius, "let us begin to live it. No philosophy carries such conviction as the personal life."5

In the domain of sex, there ought to be radical reforms, if the personal life of women is to be fulfilled. Each girl from earliest childhood should, on every question asked about this subject, receive honest answers, suitable for especial stage of her development. She should be in this way completely

^{1.} Lily Braun, quoted by Havelock Ellis: Studies in the Psychology of Sex, Vol. VI, p. 4.

^{2.} L. T. Hobhouse: Morals in Evolution, p. 355.

^{3.} Havelock Ellis: Studies in the Psychology of Sex, Vol. VI, p. 4.

^{4.} Popenoe and Johnson: Applied Eugenics, p. 383.

^{5.} Quoted by Katherine Anthony: Feminism in Germany and Scandinavia, p. 252.

enlightened about her own nature as woman and so acquire a deep feeling of responsibility in relation to her future duty as woman. She should be trained in the habits of earnest thought and earnest speaking on this subject. In this way alone can there come into existence a higher type of sex with a higher type of morality.

Researches in psycho-analysis have now revealed to the world of what deep significance is sex in the whole life of man. Most of our useful life activities depend upon the curve our erotic life takes. If, therefore, the future race is to be healthy and noble, erotic life of women ought to be free from legal and social restrictions that prevent its enrichment. It is only the interests of the race that can intervene in her erotic life. To this end, the science of eugenics may be utilised to lay down rules for prohibiting sex-intercourse between persons of certain relationships, as well as between persons of certain physical and mental qualities. But besides this the erotic life of woman must be free. Society must not interfere with her sexual life if it does not contravene the eugenical rules that it lays down. "Since in post-war times, there is such a notable excess of women," writes C. G. Jung, that "..... our legal code and our social morality offer no answer to this question Should we build gigantic nunneries in order to provide suitable accommodation for these women; or should police-controlled prostitution be increased When it comes to the question of love, ideas, institutions and laws mean far less to women than ever before." These words of a great psychologist are worth noting. It is high time now that the erotic life of woman is left to herself. How the responsible element in society is increasingly appreciating the new outlook of woman toward sex can be clearly felt from what Viscount Dawson of Penn, a great medical authority, said in the House of Lords during the debate on Marriage Bill recently passed. "In the years preceding the War," said he, "freedom and equality were coming to women, and with this an increase in sex-consciousness." And this sex-consciousness, he asserted, proceeded from and strengthened the belief that woman has

^{1.} C. G. Jung: Contributions to Analytical Psychology, pp. 172-173.

as much right to be sexually happy as man, and to deny this right would only be a social tyranny.

If the personal life of women is to be fulfilled, it also demands that the old ideas about marriage ought to change. If society recognises that sexual satisfaction is an end in itself for the enrichment of erotic life, marriage will come to mean only an institution for the procreation of children. A girl who is brought up in an atmosphere of freedom and knowledge about sexual matters, who is impressed with her role and responsibility in life, will not abuse her opportunities if she is allowed to contract marriage on the basis of freedom. The traditional marriage has fostered on the side of man the idea of 'exclusiveness.' Woman, under present conditions, naturally resents this. Days of coercion are gone. If marriage is to be a lifelong union, both the man and the woman in it must possess supreme excellence as man and woman so as to make each permanently attached to the other. And such a union though perfectly free will be perfectly faithful. It will be found that freedom will not be a danger to fidelity. There will, then, bewhat Ellen Key2 calls 'voluntary fidelity.' And this voluntary fidelity will be a sign of true nobility. To this end, society should allow free divorce, so that if a woman thinks that hermarriage is not happy she should without violating the urges of her personal life honourably put an end to the contract. And if it is found that by allowing this freedom society has committed an error, it will also be discovered that the error is committed on the right side.

In the wake of woman's emancipation lie some of the sober and sordid effects of the glamour and the gloom through which the Woman Movement passed. These we have ana-

^{1. &}quot;Children are the main purpose of marriage and no one should be tied down to a union which fails in this respect."—Bertrand Russell in his article *Divorce by Mutual Consent*. See Noel Douglas: *Divorce As I See It*, (A symposium), (1930), p. 13. "We may call the older idea of marriage jealousy marriage, and the newer idea parent-marriage."—H. G. Wells in his article *Divorce is Inhuman*. See the above symposium edited by Noel Douglas, p. 33.

^{2.} Ellen Key: The Century of the Child, p. 36.

lysed and criticised. The promise of a new world as a true and lasting abode of peace, goodwill and happiness will be nearer its fulfilment if the modern woman properly appreciating her rôle conjures up a vision wherein she as a healthy, happy and enlightened mother has become the fountain-head of a new race richly imbued in the qualities of body and spirit.

THE END.

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